Ukraine War, 1 September 2022, Q&A Session, Part 2
The next ‘group of questions I’ve frequently received in the last few days and weeks was related to combat operations at operational level.
The questions were including such issues like ‘general obsolescence’ of the Ukrainian ‘fleet’ of T-64, T-72, and T-80 MBTs; then why aren’t these deployed to run big-style operations; indeed, why Ukrainian mechanised and airborne assault units appear to be far more effective than Ukrainian tank formations; and vice-versa: why aren’t Russians running big-style mechanised operations? Indeed, can we expect this much-lauded ‘III Army Corps’ VSRF, deployed into Ukraine of the last few days, to run such an operation, punch the Ukrainian frontline, and effect a victory….?
Up front, there are more ‘active/regular’ tank brigades of the ZSU than usually reported by standard sources of reference (whether online or printed). Most of sources have listed only three ‘active’ armoured Brigades (1st, 14th and 17th). Actually, it seems that already in 2019–2021 period, several of ‘reserve’ units — foremost the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 14th — have been mobilised and expanded above their ‘reserve’ status.
From what I’ve got to hear, Ukrainian tank formations are either bigger or smaller than usually reported. With other words: reports about their tank battalions consisting of either 30 or 50 MBTs each, should be wrong: nominally, an Ukrainian tank company is supposed to have 13 tanks; each tank battalion 41 tanks (3x13 + two command tanks); and a tank brigade should have three tank- and one mechanised battalions (plus an artillery group of four ‘divisions’, an anti-tank ‘division’, an air defence ‘division’, etc.).
One should keep in mind that every Ukrainian mechanised brigade is including one tank battalion, too.
Point is: Ukrainians are operating a much bigger number of main battle tanks than usually assumed.
(Of course, with this war being in its 7th month, meanwhile, plenty of things have changed, and there are certainly lots of companies with more or less than 13 tanks; battalions with four or more companies, perhaps even brigades with four tank battalions.)
Now, why are they less effective than mechanised and/or airborne assault formations?
Usual explanation is that VSRF is custom-tailored for mechanised- and manoeuvre warfare: so much so, even the VDV is fully mechanised. In turn, this would mean that it is also custom-tailored to counter enemy mechanised warfare; i.e. that the ‘superiority’ of Russian tank formations neutralised Ukrainian tank formations.
However, by now it should be crystal clear that after the first two weeks the Russians have abandoned all attempts at fighting mechanised- and manoeuvre warfare. Instead, they switched to massive artillery barrages opening way for infantry attacks. Due to resulting losses in infantry, nowadays it’s their artillery that’s keeping the Russian frontlines together, and Ukrainians in check (which in turn means that many sectors of Russian frontlines are thinly occupied and depending on fortified strongholds supported by artillery).
This is also the actual answer to all the related questions: yes, ZSU’s tank formations — especially the 17th Tank — have suffered quite some losses, early during the war. However, these have been replaced alone by all the stuff they’ve captured intact ever since, not to talk about extra vehicles supplied by NATO.
Foremost, the actual problem of Ukrainian tank units is the dominance of the Russian artillery: there’s so much of this that whenever Ukrainians try to concentrate more than a platoon of their tanks in one spot, the Russians are regularly detecting- and heavily shelling them by their artillery. Whenever Ukrainians try to advance without extensive artillery support (and, especially: counter-battery effort by own artillery) they are cut to pieces.
This is why Ukrainians are nowadays usually holding their tank brigades behind the frontline, as an intervention reserve. As a result, tank brigades see (relatively) less action than mechanised- and airborne assault formations.
This works the other way around, too: already early during the war, Ukrainian artillery has obliterated numerous Russian mechanised BTGs. Other VSRF units have suffered extensive losses to mechanical breakdowns, usually caused by lack of maintenance and spares (best examples were 1st Guards Tank Army and the 41st Combined Arms Army, both of which fell apart while advancing into north-eastern Ukraine — thanks to their corrupt- and incompetent officers). Such experiences, the omni-presence of Ukrainian UAVs, and the fact that the Ukrainians are repeating the exercise whenever they find just a platoon of enemy tanks at one spot, forced the Russians into abandoning attempts at operating their tanks in ‘big style’ (the last they tried this was when the rebuilt 1st Guards Tanks Army attempted to ‘exploit’ the penetration of Ukrainian frontlines in the Popasna area, back in June… sufficient to say that the 1st GTA hasn’t been very active ever since). This is what resulted in the current ‘gridlock’.
Evidence for the level to which Ukrainian artillery is effective in countering Russian tanks can be found all over the Russian social media — especially in posts by VSRF’s (and Separatist-) tankers complaining about lack of tank-vs-tank action; about the mass of engagements taking place at ranges of 2000–4000 metres (i.e. outside the range of their guns); about their tank formations suffering extensive losses (up to 90%) already before reaching the battlefield, and similar.
For comparison, forces of the Ukrainian Airborne Assault Command consist of ‘crack’ infantry: regular troops, with lots of highly-experienced professionals between them. Regular Ukrainian mechanised formations, too: units like 80th and 81st Airborne, 92nd and 93rd Mech have survived countless crises back in February and March. They’ve been repeatedly cut off by deep Russian advances around their flanks in the first days of the war; had to find the ways to reach own lines, to extricate themselves from most problematic situations. Quite often it was the fact that their vehicles were ‘lighter’ than tanks — and thus faster and in need of less fuel — that helped them survive. Others, like 24th Mech, are holding their portion of the frontline without losing a single metre of terrain since 24 February; the 56th was as effective in similar fashion until the Russians concentrated so much of their artillery on a sector of less than one square kilometre, that they’ve pulverised its entire battalion.
Contrary to most of Ukrainian tank units, these brigades have accumulated a wealth of positive combat experience. Unsurprisingly, nowadays, they’re highly skilled in roaming Russian positions: operating in squads heavily armed with anti-tank weaponry, material- and sniper rifles, calling for artillery strikes on selected targets, and thus ‘needling’ the Russians all the time. No doubt, even their primary problem remains the Russian artillery: most of ZSU units are meanwhile well-supported by UAVs, but these are spending up to 50% of their time just with checking own positions — to make sure these are well-concealed from the Russians.
Finally, humans are smaller than tanks and thus infantry is easier to hide than big, loud, dust- and smoke-creating armoured vehicles. Ukrainian infantry also has it easier to run counterattacks where these are the least-expected by the Russians: say, broken terrain and forests, urban areas, and by night — than their colleagues from tank formations.
This is why nowadays both sides are keeping their tank units well to the rear, as ‘operational reserve’, or ‘rapid intervention force’ in the case of crisis along the frontline.
Finding a solution for this problem is not a question of introducing one or another improvement on tanks, or this or that ammunition, or anything else that would be ‘singular’ or ‘simple’: it’s an issue of finding an entire system of solutions — from means of countering enemy UAVs, via means of countering enemy electronic warfare capabilities, means of countering enemy artillery, and then the air power….and all of this, ‘big style’, not just on a segment of frontline 500 metres wide. This is why, for example, all the possible Western supplies of armament to Ukraine were ‘helpful’, no doubt but, also ‘trivial’ in comparison to the extension of the problem.
Finally, there was a question — and a lots of claims, too — if the ‘tank is dead’?
IMHO, nope: the tank is not dead. What should be dead in the 21st Century would be extremism and resulting prejudice; at least the predilection of so many people to jump to conclusions. What should also be dead, but is never going to die away, is the widespread impression that tank is some sort of solution for everything. It is not. Tank works just as good as any other piece of equipment: well when deployed properly, well-supported and as a part of an inter-arms combat system, and not at all whenever left entirely on its own.
If at all, then I find it’s the Russian concept of tank as a ‘lightweight, throwaway tool of all trades, master of none’ — that is dead. There is no way to patch up all the T-62s, T-64s, T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s by additional armour plates, ERA, cages and whatever else, if their basic armour is simply too thin. And low silhouette etc. is no defence when the tank is actually hit: this is so because the supporting artillery didn’t knock out enemy artillery, and anti-tank teams, and enemy tanks, before — for example — own tanks were sent to attack. Should there be any doubt, ask the Israelis: they’re constantly adding ever more armour to their tanks — that are already much better protected than any of (actually) ‘Soviet’ designs from back in the 1970s and 1980s.
