Ukraine War, 10 January 2023
Good morning everybody!
Some are asking me not to report ‘everything’, because there are yet more bad news from the Soledar-Bakhmut area — and, it seems, at least 1 Ukrainian soldier there in Bakhmut is reading my reports and thus my reporting might lower his/her morale…
…while I was about to add a title ‘Soledar Crisis’ after ‘…10 January 2023’ in the title today…
Sorry guys: I’ve got my own ‘policy’, which is to report everything I know about any conflict. Good news and bad news. Sole exception is information that is too sensitive (and don’t worry: after 35 years in this ‘business’, I’m well-qualified to decide what is sensitive, and what not).
Moreover: I could understand if Russians might follow my reports, but if anybody there on the Ukrainian side in Bakhmut needs my reporting to know what’s going on, then… sigh…. the situation is actually sad.
Before I go on, reminder №1: nothing of the following is official, 1000% confirmed and/or cross-checked…
Reminder №2: wars are no fun, and certainly no football matches. Wars are not won by listing equipment NATO is going to deliver to Ukraine (nor by complaining about that, in the case of the Russians); or by NOT reporting about critical situations and defeats. Even if wars would be football matches: not every football match ends the way one would like it to end. Far from that. Equipment that’s going to be delivered….yeah, nice — but, a matter of future. And, not reporting about critical situations or about defeats, or downplaying crises — is lying to oneself: when one starts lying to oneself, then it’s pointless to continue:. That’s where no patriotism, no bravado, and no best intentions are going to help.
***
Right now, the situation in Soledar is very, very critical. That’s dead serious.
As written already once or twice, the last few days, the ZSU positions in the town are surrounded from three sides. The counterattack south of the salt mine has failed. Yesterday in the morning, there were rumours about recovery of the village of Yakovlivka. Would have been great news but: by now, there’s no confirmation, and thus one has to conclude that either no such counterattack was launched, or that it ended unsuccessfully.
If that’s not enough, as of yesterday in the morning, the Russians have assaulted and taken most of Krasna Hora — a village in between of Soledar and Bakhmut. By the afternoon, they were claiming that the entire Ukrainian frontline in this area collapsed.
Now, sure: almost a day later, it appears Ukrainians have ‘stabilised’ the situation. To have stopped the Russians shortly before these have reached the road T0513. That the Russians do not control all of Krasna Hora, nor all of Pidhorodne. At least Ukrainian troops from multiple units are still there are doing their utmost to stop them.
BUT, the net result is that the Russians now have the fire control over that fateful T0513 road (connecting Bakhmut with Siversk), and they do have the fire control over the M03 highway (connecting Bakhmut with Slovyansk). Means: they can shot at anything travelling up ot down either of the two.
With this, the main supply line of the ZSU for its garrison of Bakhmut is cut off.
Before anybody starts panicking: this shouldn’t mean that all of Bakhmut is cut off. Because their units in Klishchiivka have held out, Ukrainians are safely holding the T0504, connecting Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka.
Thus, the supplies are still very much coming to Bakhmut. They ‘just’ take longer to reach the garrison (because the route from Slovyansk via Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka is longer than the direct one from Slovyansk to Bakhmut). It’s more serious in regards of evacuating casualties: they now take longer to be taken out of the Bakhmut area…
Hand on heart, that’s not what appears that problematic to me. What’s really troublesome for me are several other points.
- 93rd Mech held the same positions in Soledar, almost alone (reinforced by 2–3 battalions of Territorial Defence) for three months. And it held out.
- The ‘proud paratroopers’ of the 46th Airborne failed to do so after just some 2–3 weeks in the line — although re-trained in the UK and elsewhere, supported by elements of the 4th and 17th Tank, plus 10th and 128th Mountain, plus (now) 3rd Assault, plus two UAV-battalions, much better and much more artillery support than the 93rd could call upon, plus, plus…
- …and although it was crystal clear that, after failing to take Bakhmut through frontal attacks, the Russians are going to assault north and south of it, with the aim of doing exactly what they’re doing now: cutting off supply links, no matter the cost.
What’s at least as worrisome is the impression that currently responsible Ukrainian commanders seem to have brought themselves into the same situation in which their Russian opponents are already since October: they have no solutions on hand. I’ve got no clear idea who exactly is it: brigade- or battalion commanders, or somebody higher up — but, they all seem to have no other ideas but: ‘send more troops’.
Less worrisome, but sad, is that nowadays even people renowned for ‘sincere reporting’ are rather busy with smearing marmalade into the eyes and ears of the public, and stressing the excellence of this or that unit, rather than reporting about how serious the situation is.
OK, if people are asking me not to report about how bad the situation is, they’re asking me for my opinion, too. Sure, it’s easy babbling from over 1000km away, but…
…patriotism and determination are all nice and fine. However, this crisis needs an experienced and proven commander with ideas. One commander, not 25+ of them. It needs military thinking: military is no democracy but a discipline that takes cool heads, criticial reviews, brainstorming, ideas, and solutions — no cover-ups, no lies, no bravado, and no deployment of elements from 25 different brigades… (hand on heart: alone the latter is mindless, and no surprise the Russian social media is ridiculing the result… see attachment below and mind: the mass of Russians is seriously convinced every single ‘quadrat’ means ‘one Ukrainian brigade’….).
‘We’ all went a long way from those days I’ve had to report the Russian breakthroughs at Izyum, and then — the worst of all — the one at Popasna, back in April and May last year. The condition of the ZSU is far better than it was back then, and the condition of the de-facto militias nowadays making the VSRF, the VDV, and that Wagner PMC, is dramatically different, too. Still, nobody is expecting the ZSU to ‘run from victory to victory, leaving a flame-trail in its wake’. Just to remain cool and do its job.
Temps might help remaining cool: they’re down to around -10°C, -18°C (or lower) by night. Yes, that’s hampering operations, making almost every move a human tries to make a major trouble. Even breathing is hard at such temperatures. But, the same is valid for the masses of Russian mobiks, the last few days sent into this battle without armour plates, often even without helmets — and that while few of Wagner-mercs are bragging around with their night-vision sights…
Please mind: considering the frozen soil, low temps are an opportunity, too…
