Ukraine War, 11 May 2022

Good morning everybody!

Can’t help it: I’m still not happy with developments along the Siversky Donets. Therefore, here another ‘quick and dirty’ update, explaining the ‘why’.

The reason is…. well, a mix of ‘total silence at the top’ and ‘usual bragging at the bottom’ on the Ukrainian side.

To start with, nothing of the following is anything like ‘official’: at most, it’s a ‘collection of bits and pieces of information’, topped by plenty of deduction based on past experiences.

What I know about the situation by now is described on this map.

Here it’s worth paying attention at the following:

• Over a month ago, there was a similar situation south of Izium: the Russians attacked in a pincer movement around both flanks of the town. Breached through on the western side, threw two pontoon bridges over Siversky Donets, crossed the river and pushed forward.
• All the unofficial Ukrainian sources reacted with, ‘ah, no problem, we’ve destroyed them’, followed by photos/videos of ‘destroyed pontoon bridges & sunken tanks and other vehicles’.
• Now check the maps ever since: it’s obvious that was — at most — a temporary success. Actually, yes, they knocked out one bridge, but the Russians used the other to keep on crossing and then kept on steamrolling further south. By now we all know how the battle went on and where they are (i.e. the RFA is certainly not back to Izium).

In the case of this ‘Siversky-Bilohorivka situation’, me thinks the situation is much worse. Reasons are something like this:

• AFAIK, all the available official Ukrainian sources are zip-lip about this battle, exactly like in the case of the Russian break-through south of Izium;
• all the available unofficial sources are talking about the destruction of one or two bridges,
• sole official release I’ve found is mentioning the destruction of just one bridge near Bilohorivka, while
• (unofficial) Russian sources are clearly pointing out they’ve constructed (at least) four bridges, and
• something like destruction of two crucial bridges is not mentioned by any of Ukrainian sources known to me.

Instead, there is lots of celebration about the troops advancing north of Kharkiv and reaching the Russian border. This is a great achievement, and thus understandable, but sorry: ignoring problems is never a good idea. Even more so if it’s gradually becoming obvious that the Russians have ‘just’ weakened their positions north of Kharkiv in order to bolster their units that are crossing Siversky Donets….or that they couldn’t construct even one bridge — without securing a bridgehead on the southern side, first and foremost.

Another reason to worry are UAV-photos like the following two series. Arguably, they might indicate something like, ‘we have them in sight, everything is under control’. Sorry, having somebody/something in sight is one thing, actually destroying that somebody/something — an entirely different affair. On the contrary, gauging by the number of (perfectly intact) armoured combat vehicles that can be counted on these photos, it seems that the RFA is ‘coming down’ to just one bridge with an entire BTG (about 50–60 armoured vehicles). And that is just one of bridges, and then one I’m assessing as ‘decoy’: keep in mind, there are three other such bridges.

Gauging by the number of bridges reported by Russian sources, this means the RFA has engaged ‘at least’ four BTGs for this operation — along a frontline of about 10km.

Now add what I’ve said about the Russian Army, and its relations to ‘bridges’ and ‘bridgeheads’, yesterday, plus the — relative — proximity of this area to the central section of the LOC, especially to the Popasna area, where there is now another major RFA concentration (including a BTG of Wagner PMC and at least one of the 150th Motor Rifle Division).

Already a quick look at the map is likely to explain everything else: a rapid advance from Bilohorivka to Popasna — a distance of about 45km by the road T1302 — would bypass Ukrainian fortifications in the Lysychansk area, and close the encirclement of a major group of Ukrainian forces in the Severodonetsk area. Indeed, it would collapse the entire northern sector of the LOC — or at least encircle it. What’s more: contrary to day-dreaming about ‘strategic-level’ of advances from, for example, Izium on Barvinkove and then Zaporizhzhia, the RFA has the troops and suplies necessary to run this kind of , ‘operational-level’ enterprise.

Indeed, this morning there are reports about shelling of Hirske — which to me means: ‘something’s going on along that route’.

That’s why my assessment is that this — I’m calling it the ‘Russian Plan G’, meanwhile — is the Russian ‘Schwerpunkt’, i.e. a major operation: one that should not be underestimated.

Conclusion is on hand: somebody there (in Kyiv) should be kind enough to clarify what’s going on in between Bilohorivka and Popasna. No, I’m not expecting ‘quick and easy’ victories, but simple acknowledgment of understanding that ‘something is going on’ and the situation is serious — would be of lots of help.

EDIT: ah yes, and, I do hope I’m completely wrong with all of this.