Ukraine War, 14–15 April, 2022

Tom Cooper
9 min readApr 16, 2022

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Good morning everybody!

Here’s my review for the last two days of the Ukraine War, 14 (50th day of this war) and 15 April 2022.

CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)

BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)

CBU — cluster bomb units

GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)

GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)

GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)

GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)

Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)

KIA — killed in action

LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)

MBT — main battle tank

Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)

MIA — missing in action

MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)

MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)

PMC — private military company/contractor

RFA — Russian Federation Army

South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)

Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)

TR — Tank Regiment (Russia)

VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)

STRATEGIC

In general, when reading the Russian media and social media these days, one cannot avoid the impression that it’s nothing less than NATO aggression if a 43-years-old missile cruiser of the Russian Navy gets blown up in the Black Sea (by sheer accident, of course); then the ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ shot down another Ka-52 (by the 93rd Mech in the Sumy area); Ukrainian special forces are widening their sabotage operations in the Brjansk, Orjol, Smolensk and Kursk areas in south-west Russia; and it’s the NATO and only NATO to blame for Finland and Sweden being on the best way to join the NATO, and that very quickly. Free along the plan of genius strategist and the best commander of all the times, Vladimir, it’s about the time to start deploying tactical nuclear weapons. That’s going to ‘teach them the lesson’ — and force the NATO into negotiations. And, of course, everybody else is to blame, just not the Russians…

Whatever… Kyiv and the People in Need of Fresh Air (the Pentagon), report that, hard on the heels of the 1st GTA and the 41st CAA, the Russian Federation Army should have re-deployed its 36th CAA to the Izium area. Furthermore, the RFA should have reinforced its 8th CAA (responsible for Donbas and Mariupol) with units from the Northern Fleet and the Baltic Fleet (the latter should include a BTG each of the 126th Coastal Defence Brigade and 127th Reconnaissance Brigade)….

Point is: the RFA should have a strength of about 65 BTGs in Ukraine, or about 65,000 troops (just quoting official Kyiv and Washington). Considering the Pentagon report from few days ago, according to which there are at least 30 Separatist and Russian BTGs in Donbas and Luhansk, this would mean,

a) The People in Need of Fresh Air are now assessing the strength of every of RFA’s BTGs at 1,000 troops (instead of 600–800 as until now), and

b) Dvornikov might have about 95,000 troops under his command — with a reserve of about 20 depleted BTGs inside Russia close to the border with Ukraine (but not in condition to run offensive operations).

For comparison, in an interview with the BBC, President Zelensky numbered the strength of the Ukrainian Army along the LOC with 44,000 troops (i.e. no 70,000–100,000, as assessed by various Western experts). Considering the Ukrainian Army is known to have eight regular- and three brigades of the Territorial Defence deployed along the LOC, plus another five regular- and three brigades of the Territorial Defence arrayed between Kharkiv and Sloviansk, if correct, this all would mean that there are about 95,000 Russian (and Separatist) troops against about 57,000 Ukrainian troops deployed in eastern Ukraine.

(That is: without the 3rd and 4th Tank Brigades of the strategic reserve, which — after nearly two months of work-ups — seem to have, finally, been deployed to eastern Ukraine.)

By side that this is leaving me wondering where are all the troops of the Ukrainian National Guard, or the remaining 96,000 troops of the Territorial Defence (because, yes, there’s no doubt the Ukraine meanwhile has well over 300,000 troops under arms)…but, pay attention: the media here in the West is reporting something like ‘there is no trace of the much-announced big Russian offensive’. Some are already guessing that the reason would be the Rasputitsa, i.e. the thaw weather, made worse by continuous rain — both of which are making any off-road movement for wheeled vehicles particularly problematic. Well, let’s see….

AIR

As usually, aerial warfare — or at least official reporting about it — remains the funniest, most ironic, and often the most absurd discipline of every war, and this one remains a perfect confirmation for this conclusion.

The Keystone Cops in Moscow claim that on 14 April, their S-400 SAMs have shot down one Ukrainian Mi-8 near Gorodnya, in Chernihiv region (and this after, supposedly, this flew another air strike on some target inside Russia), and a Su-27 over Lozovaya, in the Kharkiv region. A little bit estranging, such statements, considering the same Keystone Cops have declared the entire Ukrainian Air Force for ‘destroyed’ at least a month ago…. But, no problem: it’s obvious that the Ukrainian farmers are now growing not only corn, cucumbers, and tomatoes on their farms, but Su-27s, too.

Furthermore, so Moscow, the glorious VKS has bombed 13 military targets (all of them by night), including two ammunition depots and 10 ‘areas of concentration of Ukrainian weapons and military equipment’. Makes me wonder, how many of command posts, strongpoints, and enemy manpower concentrations are there in Ukraine? Gauging by reports from Moscow, it must be few dozens of thousands…

Launch of multiple Kalibr cruise missiles from a warship of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea, late on 15 April 2022.

But wait. It’s getting better. The Keystone Cops say, their ‘high-precision, long-range sea-based’ missiles — see: Kalibr cruise missiles, fired from ships in the Black Sea — have hit a ‘military facility in the outskirts of Kyiv, during the night from 14 to 15 April. Correspondingly, they should have hit the ‘machine-building Vizar plant’, in Zhulyanks, ‘destroying the production and repair workshops for long- and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ship missiles’.

Hear, hear! So, if the missile cruiser Moskva went down ‘due to an accident’, as insisted by official Moscow for two days now, then why strike a factory for anti-ship missiles….?

Ah, me and my unpleasant questions….

BTW, RUMINT has it: Moskva’s skipper, Captain 1st Class Anton Kuprin (photo above) was KIA in the first explosion and only between 17 and 58 (reports differ) out of 510 crewmembers were saved. Provided this is truth, it would mean the ship was blown up straight to Mars, few crewmen from the rear of the ship have survived, leaving only Moskva’s bottom to sink…

But, I digress…. Atop of cruise-missile strikes, the Keystone Cops have also used ‘high-precision air-based missiles’ (ah, they’re now basing them in the air, too?) to strike one Ukrainian launcher for Tockha-U ballistic missiles, missile and artillery, and fuel depots in Mikolaiv, Parutino, Dergachi, Novoelizavetovka, and Povstanskoe. Finally, Russians deployed their ballistic missiles to hit a ‘concentration point of Ukrainian nationalists’ in Yasenovoe, where 20 armoured vehicles and 50 nationalists should have been killed. By a single missile….Yes, sure… Atop of that, the Russian missile troops have ‘eliminated’ an ‘entire private Polish mercenary unit’ in Izyumskoe, in the Kharkiv region, killing about 30.

This ‘missile offensive’ was continued through the night from 14 to 15 April, too. Between others the Russians claimed striking 12 targets, including ammunition depots in Velyka Mikhailovka and Bogatyr, and the Dnepr AB, where they claim to have destroyed a MiG-29, a Bayraktar, and a Mi-8 on the ground.

But, seriously now: there is no doubt that the Russians are white-mad and have significantly reinforced their aerial offensive. Their social media is full of demands for deployment of nuclear weapons, ‘or at least’ to ‘move from the fighting more humanely and more accurately than everyone else in the world, to the destruction of military targets’ (quote from here: what’s better than having such humane journalists around). Well, sure: using military means against military targets, instead of terrorising population and destroying ‘dual use’ facilities, is certainly a good idea. Quite estranging then, that it takes ‘journalists’ to come to the idea, instead of the Russia’s political- and military leadership…

NORTH-EAST and EAST

I’m putting these two into the same section of this report for the following reason. For most of the last 48 hours (‘or so’), the GenStab in Kyiv was zip-lip about developments in the Izium area and along the LOC. This is so at least since rumours appeared that the Russians have re-launched their advance on Barvinkove and Sloviansk, from the north, and also to have attacked and taken Gorlovka, from the LOC, i.e. the East.

Could it be the reason is that the Russian offensive already began and the position of the Ukrainian forces drastically worsened over this period of time?

As usually, we’ve got to wait and see.

For the time being, all that’s available is RUMINT, and this says that after securing Topolske, 3–4 days ago, the RFA pushed south and took Mala Komyshuvakha and Sulyhivka, both in between of Izium and Barvinkove. Furthermore, the Russians should have entered Dovhenke, and the Ukrainian Army should have evacuated Borova (this was then taken by one of four BTGs the 201st Military Base has inside Ukraine, meanwhile). Finally, the Russians seem to have re-deployed at least two BTGs of the 4th Guards Tank Army to the Rubizhne area, and are now assaulting the same from the north. While their assaults in Lysichansk, Popasna and Panteleimonivka on the northern section of the LOC have been repelled, the Russians and Separatists should have taken Marinka, west of Donetsk. All of this on 14 April alone: as of yesterday, elements of the 1st Corps (primarily Separatists of the Sparta and Khan Battalions) have taken Krasnohorivka, and were pushing further west along the N15 road.

I.e. the Russians are already attacking, perhaps at a smaller scale than expected, but they’re already attacking. What’s slowing them down, definitely hampering them, are two factors: rain and resulting soft ground, and the fact that thanks to their UAVs, the Ukrainians seem to have hit several of Russian columns moving towards the frontline by their artillery, causing significant losses. I.e. some of RFA units are suffering attrition even before reaching the frontline in the Izium area.

MARIUPOL
Kyiv has officially acknowledged that ‘few dozens’ of Marines from the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade have surrendered to the Russians in the Azovmash area (the Keystone Cops claim over 1,120), while the Keystone Cops in Moscow claim the RFA and ‘units of the Donetsk People’s Militia’ have ‘completely liberated Illich Steelworks from Ukrainian nationalists’. With other words: fighting remains bitter, and the area still under Ukrainian control continues to shrink, especially in the east, where the 102nd Motor Rifle Battalion (68th TR/150th MRD), Separatists and Chechens are trying to cut off the Livoberezhnyi District from the rest of the pocket.

Obviously, the garrison is still holding out and tying down thousands of enemy troops: however, as we’re going to see next, the number of later is ever lower.

Damaged T-80BV of the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade, captured by the Russians in Mariupol.
Parts of the U500 Donbass (command ship) of the Ukrainian Navy, as seen inside the port of Mariupol. She was sunk back on 6 April 2022.

SOUTH

Officially at least, most of the southern frontline remained quiet the last two days…. However, there are solid — even if unofficial — reports that the Russians are on advance again. Correspondingly, the 58th CAA has breached the frontline of the 23rd Brigade National Guard and captured Staromlynivka — and that by elements of the 163rd Tank Battalion and the 70th Motor Rifle Battalion. This is interesting for two reasons:

a) The 163rd TR and the 70th MRR are both part of the 150th MRD: they were assigned to the 8th CAA and fighting in Mariupol until about two weeks ago (indeed, parts of that division are still fighting in Mariupol). But, the HQ 8th CAA obviously concluded the situation in the city is good enough to release two precious BTGs.

b) Staromlynivka might not ring any bells, but the place — which is about 40km west of Vuhledar — used to be a base and repair shop of the Ukrainian Army. Unsurprisingly, the Russians captured a number of armoured vehicles there, plus one launcher for the S-300PS SAMs and one for Buk M1. At the time Kyiv is trying hard to get heavy weapons from the West, this is certainly no ‘good news’…

Immediately after, the Russians advanced for about 10km and attacked Velyka Novosilka.

Further west, the Ukrainian 80th Air Assault brigade reported the liberation of ‘several villages’ in the Kherson area, on 14 April — without releasing any kind of details.

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Tom Cooper

From Austria; specialised in analysis of contemporary warfare; working as author, illustrator, and book-series-editor for Helion & Co.