Ukraine War, 15 January 2023

Tom Cooper
20 min readJan 15, 2023

Hello everybody!

Let me start with some more thoughts and analysis of what’s going on in Moscow — and St. Petersburg — these days. It’s going to become obvious ‘why’, later on.

I am still finding commentary like ‘Putin is fighting a long war’, ‘Putin is fighting a war for the sake of…’ this and that, and similar for ‘amusing’, but pointless.

Putin is fighting this war to keep himself in power. Officially at least, his second-second term is lasting until elections in March 2024, and sure: he has meanwhile adapted the law so can remain a president after two terms. But, he’s still got to ‘win’ the next elections — no matter how forged these are going to be. Means, he’s got about one year left to find a way to distract enough, and gain enough popularity to overcome any related hurdles, create a legal way to ‘win’ once again, and to remain in power.

….and at the time all the corruption and incompetence of his regime are fully exposed, there’s just no better way to do so but to frenzy all of Russia into ‘destroying Ukro-Nazis’ (and, you know: the more Ukraine resists, the more are Ukrainians to blame for that, of course).

‘By accident’, the ‘speed’ at which the talking-heads like Biden, Scholz, Sunak, Macron etc. are ‘supporting Ukraine’, is thus playing straight into Putin’s hands. That’s so because the ‘system of rule’ in the West is simple: deliver a little bit of this and a little bit of that to Ukraine — anything, just not enough shells and artillery pieces, so not to upset Putin too much — and one can proudly claim at the next press conference, ‘we did so much’.

Meanwhile, Putin should have met Prigozhin (boss of the Wagner PMC) in St. Petersburg. Unsurprisingly (because he’s got neither as much power nor as much influence as he would like to have), and gauging by resulting ‘silence’ (all provided there was such a meeting, first and foremost): Prigozhin ‘lost’, while Gerasimov/Surovikin-axis ‘won’. Kind of: Prigozhin wanted to demonstrate he can win this war ‘his way alone’, but the GenStab, GRU, and FSB convinced Putin this is not the case… and thus, Gerasimov is going to have his own way…. Think, as so often, we have to wait and see.

Meanwhile, Ukrainians — but NATO, too — continue monitoring the continuous Russian military-build-up in Belarus with growing concern. Even more so because of visits by several of top officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) in Minsk, the last few days. The more time passes by, and the more related reports are published, the harder I find it to analyse and thus assess what might happen there. For example: after all the reports about wholesale transfer of Belarussian stocks of ammo, even heavy arms, to the VSRF in Ukraine…. I cannot but wonder: with what whould any kind of a new Russian offensive into northern Ukraine be supplied? In turn, one simply cannot ignore a deployment of Belarussian and Russian troops ever closer to the border with Ukraine, their joint exercises etc…


Yesterday, Surovikin…ho-hum… it was ‘Gerasimov, of course’… has re-launched the missile offensive on the Ukrainian power grid, delivering some particularly painful blows.

14 January began with some sort of detonation in or near the main railway station in Kyiv, reporting about which soon grew to ‘four detonations’. The ZSU denied this was related to any kind of military activity: they say it was an ancient locomotive that blew up… Only later on did the civilian authorities then announce that a ‘critical infrastructure facility caught fire’. Apparently, it was some sort of accident on the already badly damaged elements of the power grid. However, some three hours later, reports surfaced that this was a strike using 48N6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) of the S-300 air defence system fired in ballistic mode, and that it knocked out one of TPPs in the Kyiv area — and that the Ukrainian air defences completely failed to even register the incoming missiles. One way or the other, the turbine-section of the Burshtyn TPP (Ivano-Frankivsk) is now looking as can be seen on the photo below: the oblast is out of electricity.

Of particular interest is that,

a) the Russians now began targeting power plants (i.e. power-generating facilities, instead of transformators, as at earlier times), and

b) eventually, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU) denied that this strike was launched from within Belarus. Whether this was a politically-motivated statement, or it’s really so that the Russians modified their 48N6s so these can reach the Kyiv area when launched from within Russia — no idea.

Immediately after, the Russians then followed with another series of ballistic- and cruise-missile attacks. Around 09.30, air raid alert was sounded in northern-central and eastern Ukraine: over the next 4–5 minutes, this was ‘spread’ to almost all of the country, followed by announcement that ’17 Tus’ (Tupolev bombers) were airborne, and an air raid is pending starting around 12.00hrs. Eventually, the strike came around 13.00hrs local time and it transpired that it included a mix of additional ballistic- but also cruise missiles.

Ukrainians claimed that the Russians have released 23 Kh-101s, Kh-555s, and Kalibrs, 7 Kh-59s (released by Su-35s), and at least 5 Kh-22s (released by Tu-22M-3s), for a total of 38 guided missiles, and that 23 of these — including 18 of Kh-101/555s and Kalibrs, and 5 Kh-59s — were shot down. Before soon, though, it transpired that this strike included additional S-300 and S-400 SAMs fired in ballistic mode. One of Ukrainian SAMs fired in return crashed inside Moldova. Foremost: the damage caused by those missiles that did get through was massive. Attacks on elements of the Ukrainian power grid were registered in the Lviv-, Ternopil-, Ivano-Frankivsk-, Khmelnytskyi-, and Vinnitsya Oblasts, with confirmed hits in the Ivano-Frankivsk-, Vinnitsya and four other oblasts, but I’m not sure which of these were results of the ‘main strike’ and which of ‘tactical strikes’. For example: further south and east, heavily targeted — and hit were TPPs and the power grid in the Odesa-, and infrastructure facilities in Mykolaiv-, Kryviy Rih-, Dnipro- and Kharkiv Oblasts.

Ever since, energy-supply system of Kyiv is only partially operational, that of Kharkiv completely dysfunctional, and the water-supply system of Nikopol is out of service (with other words: if you have contacts in Ukraine, don’t be surprised if they’re not responding — whether today, or the next few days.)

That said, worst of all was the hit of a Kh-22 — released by a Tu-22M-3 from the direction of Kursk — on an apartment building in Dnipro, around 15.30hrs. A large part of the building was, literally, blown away, or caused to collapse. At least 21 civilians were killed, 73 wounded, and 26–35 are still missing there: rescuers — who have recovered at least 38 critically injured people — are still sorting through the resulting piles of rubble…

Except for an outburst of anger and promises of revenge (some Ukrainians are blaming the commander of the 526th Guards Heavy Bomber Regiment, Russian Air-Space Force (VKS), Oleg Timohin, for this massacre), to me it appears that this attack caused at least two controversies, too.

As first, Zelensky’s advisor Arestovych collected plenty of ‘public flak’ for claiming that, ‘actually’, Ukrainian air defences hit one of incoming Kh-22s, causing the missile to slam into that building. Plenty of people seem to misinterpret this into something like, ‘the building was actually hit by Ukrainian air defences’ — and thus there’s even discussion about whether a surface-to-air missile can cause so much damage or not… Others argue that the VKS released over 210 Kh-22s so far, and Ukrainian air defences failed to down even one. Thus, Arestovych ‘must be a stupid’ alone for claiming this was different this time…

Secondly, members of the glorious Romanian media then went to the record to announce that NATO is re-deploying three Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft to Otopeni Air Base, in Romania — quasi in reaction to the ‘poor performance of the Ukrainian defences during this attack’. Actually, this re-deployment was announced by NATO already days before. Reason: it’s saving lots of time — and strain on aircraft and crews — to deploy them that close to the battlefield. That way, they need not wasting three flight hours in transit from Geilenkirchen AB, in Germany, just to reach their patrol stations over Romania, and need no tanker support once they are there.

Finally, please mind: these were not the only Russian strikes on the Ukrainian power grid and civilians. Through all the time of the last five days, the Russians continued shelling and rocketing Sumy, Kharkiv, Nikopol, and Kherson, causing additional material damage and wounding dozens. That much about Russians ‘not intentionally targeting civilians’…

In turn, the ZSU continued HIMARS-ing Russian supply depots within its reach. For example, another one in the Melitopol area was blown up yesterday, and the Russians claimed the downing of an Ukrainian OTR-21 Tochka tactical ballistic missile over the Bryansk Oblast, in Russia. In this regards, let me end with observation that while the collective West remains insistent on not delivering anything of that kind to Ukraine, the ZSU is preparing an entire set of weaponry that should enable it to strike back, deep into Russia (more about this when the time comes.)

Activity of both the Russian and Ukrainian air forces remains focused on the Bakhmut area. The VKS should be back to flying up to 200 combat sorties a day, the Ukrainian Air Force is down to 16–17. Both sides claimed few jets and helicopters shot down, the last few days, but I haven’t seen any kind of confirmation for this.

Su-25 of the VKS (or Wagner PMC?) in the Bakhmut area, about a week ago, and…
...Ukrainian Su-24M over the Bakhmut area, around the same time.


While most of the media and even the mass of ‘war monitors’ in the social media is doing as if the fighting on the ground in the Soledar-Bakhmut area ‘ended’ with the Russian conquest of Soledar (which, AFAIK, remains ‘not officially confirmed’ by Kyiv), or is petty bickering over how much of the western fringe of Soledar is the ZSU still holding… the action just went on.

Kupyansk-Svatove area… On 12–13 January, the ZSU assaulted Novoselivske and secured at least half the village. The Russians are counterattacking ever since, though without much success. For example, the GenStab-U claimed that the 26th Tank Regiment VSRF deployed there, is down to 10 operational T-80BVs.

Kremina area….There’s little doubt that the ZSU is ‘in the outskirts’ of the town, and that — probably — both on its northern and southern side. However, three or four days ago the Russians have rushed the 76th VDV Division to the scene and ever since there are no news about any further Ukrainian advances.

Bakhmut-Soledar… already on 13 January, the VDV and Wagner continued with their onslaught from Soledar (which is: industrial zone and the Mine №7) in western and north-western direction. All the Ukrainian positions from Krasnopolivka in the north, via Sil, Blahodatne, and Krasna Hora to Paraskoviivka in the south are under immense pressure ever since. As far as can be said by now, all positions of the 46th and 77th Airborne Brigades are holding (at least the GenStab-U is reporting attacks and artillery barrages on them, which is usually something like ‘sign’ that they’re under Ukrainian control) — not the least because of abundant tank support by the 17th Tank, and artillery support provided by the 45th Artillery Brigade, ZSU: apparently, the latter — finally — received another load of urgently-necessary shells.

This is ‘Alex’, one of captured T-80BVMs of the VSRF, meanwhile deployed under new ownership (ZSU). Gauging by white rings on its gun, it’s crew destroyed (or at least is claiming the destruction of) 17 Russian vehicles (MBTs, IFVs, APCs, and other) ….and that at least with this gun tube…
For their part, the Russians re-captured this T-72B3, somewhere in the Soledar area.

Bakhmut is holding out, too — and that despite there still being too many different units in the town, to a degree where commanders of certain units are openly demanding the withdrawal of their (less competent?) ‘neighbours’ — so they can fight better. Seems, the re-organisation of the garrison remains incomplete.

That said, cannot but repeat that Ukrainians have definitely lost Opytne and the 106th VDV Division — ‘supported’ by some of Wagner — is pushing extremely hard into the southern outskirts of Bakhmut.

South of Bakhmut… the Wagner ‘drive’ south/south-west of Klishchivka remains a bloody mess, but is becoming unpleasant too — because the Russians continue attacking positions of the 57th Mech from the south. Ukrainians are meanwhile fighting back with their 3rd Assault and the 5th Tank, supported by the 40th Artillery, but Russians ‘just keep on coming’ — en masse…. is going to be discussed below, too…

Gauging by videos released by both sides and shown Russian artillery strikes on from eastern- and southern Bakhmut, but especially on occupied Soledar, the mass of ZSU’s fatalities of the last few days were caused by the deployment of Russian TOS-1 multiple rocket launchers, and air-dropped bombs filled with so-called ‘fuel air explosives’: at least there are multiple videos shown ‘scores’ of Ukrainian troops, all killed in the same place, at the same time, by the same blow. This is indicating not only the fact the troops in question were taken by surprise, or the necessity for much more NATO support in regards of provision of artillery pieces and related ammunition (to be discussed below), but also better tracking of the movement of VSRF’s units equipped with TOS-1s.

On the other hand, a ‘BTW’ in regards of this all: yesterday, reports surfaced in the social media along which the Russian TV reported that as of 1 January 2023, the Wagner PMC suffered the following losses:

  • Out of 38,244 convicts recruited by that date,
  • 29,543 were killed, captured, or went missing, while
  • 106 have completed contract, received an amnesty and were released.

AFAIK, no precise Russian source was ever mentioned, just ‘Russian TV’: therefore, this is anything else than ‘official’. Provided this would be truth, this would mean a loss rate of some 77%, and that ‘only’ about 8,700 convicts were left to Wagner by the time it became involved in onslaughts on the area between Pidhorodne and Soledar, on 4 January 2023. Not sure if this is really ‘good news’ - even if that number was certainly further depleted during the onslaughts on Soledar: but, I do consider these figures for at least ‘realistic’ — although much higher than all the possible Ukrainian and Western estimates known to me. This because ‘a well-connected-one’ can ‘hear’ similar reports from the circles of the Russian Association of VDV-Veterans: privately, some of these are bitterly complaining about heavy losses from Bakhmut and Soledar, sometimes going as far as to swear revenge — in Moscow…

Further south….the mass of ‘action’ on frontlines in the Donetsk area was ‘limited’ to exchanges of artillery barrages. Most heavily hit were the ‘usual suspects’ — which is Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske, north-west of Donetsk, and Marinka (repeatedly blasted by BM-21-rounds filled with incendiaries, in recent days) west of the city. On their side, the ‘Separatists’ in the DNR can’t stop complaining about ‘Ukrainian shelling of civilians’ — which is almst certainly related to additional HIMARS-strikes on their supply depots.


For this end of this report, let me add a few thoughts. Gauging by different reactions to my recent posts, I think I need to explain my insistence on ‘artillery’: on the — urgent — necessity for NATO to supply much more artillery pieces, and especially much more artillery ammunition to Ukraine. To explain why am I stressing, again and again, and already since early March of the last year that Ukraine needs lots of artillery, and yet more artillery shells….and that, once one has delivered enough of these to Ukraine, one must send yet more artillery pieces and shells…

In the West, we’re de-facto obsessed with ‘plinking’ single Jihadists running along some goatpads in Hindukush, southern Arabia or several places around Africa with guided ammunition. Especially with so-called ‘de-capitating strikes’: strikes that are targeting enemy political leaders and military commanders. Hand on heart, it’s ah-so-sexy to watch resulting videos in the social media. However, this way of fighting wars is not only extremely costly in monetary times, but in regards of time, too. So much so, it’s completely ineffective. Not working. Considering the fact that we’re fighting such wars for at least 20-, more often 30, 50, 70 years, without useful results, conclusion is on hand: fighting that way is the ultimate exercise in failure. For those having doubts about this: if ‘de-capitating strikes’ (no matter what kind: air strikes, commando attacks etc), are ah-so-highly-effective as politicians and strategists of multiple major Western powers and Israel can’t stop insisting they are, there would be no armed Palestinian armed resistance already since 1939, no threat of international terrorism at least since 1972, no Hezbollah since the late 1980s, no al-Qaeda, no Taliban, and no Daesh (a.k.a. IS/ISiS/ISIL/IGIL) since almost two decades, and no IRGC-QF at least since February 2020…

….and yet: not only are all these ‘armed opposition’ groups very much still around, but this is exactly how the West continues to fight until this very day. Indeed: this is meanwhile a sort of dogma prevalent between Western strategists, which is why we’re going to see endless repeats of this very same exercise for decades longer.

….even attempts to apply the same doctrine in Ukraine.

In Ukraine, things are fundamentally different. Ukrainian armed forces (ZSU) are facing quantitative — and, often enough: qualitative — superiority of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation already since 2014. The Russians are all the time attacking with far more artillery, far more tanks, and — along selected directions of their advance — far more troops than Ukrainians can put up against them.

Pay attention at NATO’s reaction: convinced by its ‘glorious and infallible’ intelligence that Ukrainians would fold and run, the collective West reacted to Putin’s re-invasion of February 2022 with the same or at least simila dogma: providing ‘high-precision’ anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and shorter-ranged anti-tank weapons like NLAWs, Javelins, Panzerfausts etc. — so to convert the ZSU into a guerrilla force capable of ‘needling’ the Russians — and then directed it into ‘de-capitating strikes’ on Russian generals.

No doubt, some of results were of great use for propaganda, back in February-March 2022, but, hand on heart: entirely ineffective. Putin has so many generals, he could establish several complete divisions staffed by generals only. As the chieftain of the System Putin, he knows the mass of them is of little use for anything else, too. Simply expendable.

We’ve seen what happened: yes, Ukrainians have ambushed and annihilated numerous VSRF units rushing in direction of Kyiv, or trying to outflank Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv, but, that was not enough even at the time the Russians were completely disorganised and thus the most vulnerable. Moreover, Ukrainians have suffered heavy casualties fighting this way, while — at most — stopping the Russians and thus achieving a draw. They didn’t manage to force the Russians to withdraw this way.

What did make the difference was the precise — yet massive — deployment of Ukrainian artillery brigades: within shortest periods of time (usually: a minute or two per fire-action in question), Ukrainian artillery has both mauled multiple VSRF units within the same sector of the frontline at once and disturbed their logistics system to the point where there were no troops left to continue the advance, and nobody to keep them resupplied. Nicest of all: all of this in exchange for no, or only minimal Ukrainian losses.

That is what ‘won’ — whether north-west of Kyiv, or in Chernihiv, or in Kharkiv. It ‘just’ wasn’t reported to the public because our glorious media was preoccupied distracting everybody with its usual rubbish-reporting. Thus, there are still far too few people ‘thinking this war’ in this way.

The reason for this success was the usual combination of three-four ‘war-winning factors’ in conflicts of this size and scope: a combination ‘firepower’, ‘manoeuvre’, and ‘precision’ — with ‘numbers’ and ‘time’. Knocking out enemy vehicles one by one with ATGMs and RPGs looks ‘sexy’ on videos, and is a handsome propaganda tool. However, that way of fighting is taking time, is extremely dangerous for the ‘user’ and results in, actually, minimal effects. A single ATGM-hit on the lead tank of some advancing column is going to stop and delay the column’s advance. Two-three such hits even more so, no doubt, but: they are going to achieve little else in grand total. The Russians are always going to have it easy to replace such losses.

On the contrary: blasting the entire column in question with 30, 60, 90 or more well-aimed artillery shells is going to annihilate that unit and break the will of its survivors to continue fighting. And doing that to two, three or more enemy combat units, plus their logistics system — all at the same time, the way artillery can do — is going to collapse an entire sector of the frontline. That’s something no tanks, no infantry fighting vehicles, and especially no ATGMs can do. Should there be any doubts, ask the two (in digits: 2) survivors of the VDV regiments destroyed by Ukrainian artillery at the Hostomel Airport, just for example.

This is what eventually forced the Russian withdrawal from northern and north-eastern Ukraine, and what the Russians then promptly demonstrated on their own. Mass application of their artillery ‘blasted the way open’ for their tanks and troops to advance south of Izyum, and then especially at Popasna, in April last year. The one time the VSRF artillery was not around (at least not in sufficient numbers) to support another advance — on Siversky Donets in May — Ukrainians promptly proved capable of concentrating enough of own artillery to blast not one, but at least two or three VSRF units crossing the river, plus their logistics, more or less simultaneously (in a matter of 2–3 days, at most). We’ve seen the results, and that Russian offensive was nothing else but smashed: stopped cold. They not only never attempted anything similar again, but the 1st Guards Tanks Army took almost half a year to recover from that blow.

It was artillery, and its capability to hurl ‘shiploads’ of high explosives (HEs) upon the enemy that won all these battles. This is something no other means of conventional warfare can do. For example: even if Ukrainian air force would have 300 combat aircraft, all of these couldn’t deliver even a comparable ‘tonnage’ of HE with similar precision like just one of its artillery brigades can do. Neither at once, nor in sustained fashion, ‘for days without an end’. And what four or five of Russian artillery brigades — especially if combined with two or three rocket artillery brigades — can do… Should there be any doubts: no need to ‘believe’ anything I’m writing. Just ask Ukrainian survivors of Popasna and you’re going to know.

Bottom line: in conventional warfare, there is no other means of ‘unloading’ conventional high explosives in amounts necessary to destroy the VSRF and thus disable Putin’s capability to continue attacking Ukrain — than artillery. No matter how big and powerful is some air force, what advanced aircraft it flies (and even if one would take such heavy/strategic bombers like Boeing B-52 or Tu-160 into account): artillery is always going to remain in possession of superior capability in regards of ‘tonnage’ of HE it can deliver upon the enemy. That’s, between others, one of principal reasons why the Russians — experts in ‘bringing the warfare to the point’ — are as reliant on artillery: no matter how equipped, artillery is the centrepiece of their doctrine and strategy. Nothing else matters as much as artillery to them: air power is ‘mere extension of artillery’, and ‘tanks advance where the artillery cleared the way’. Conclusion: in wars like this in Ukraine, it’s the ‘tonnage of HE’s that matters’, and the principal means of delivering that tonnage is the artillery.

BTW, artillery is also much cheaper in acquisition and simpler in maintenance and operations — than air power. This is translating into the ability to re-equip (and keep operational) a larger number of artillery-equipped-units than one could do with, for example, an air force. Even more so at the time there’s no time, no political will, and — hand on heart — no means to ‘re-equip’ and ‘expand’ the Ukrainian air force to 100, 200, 300, or more combat aircraft.

Sorry fly-boys (and mind: I am something like ‘proponent of air power’): artillery is clearly superior in regards of all of this.

Why am I explaining all of this?

For the simple reason that this is not only the ‘core essence’ of how was this war fought the last 10–11 months but, and even more so, this is going to become the core essence of how is this war going to be fought (at least) the next 10–11 months, too. Putin’s going to launch another mobilisation, rush anther 70,000 mobiks to the battlefield straight away, and without any- or just with minimal training, as necessary, then have them shot away by thousands. Meanwhile, he’s going to have another 70,000 undergo at least ‘reasonable amounts’ of training, and send them in as next. As soon as these 140,000 will be shot away, he’s going to mobilise again….

Face it: thanks to debilitating effects of 22-years of his propaganda barrages upon the mindset of the Russian public, thanks to the fact he’s both opportunistic and pragmatic enough, and cynical enough, Putin is in perfect position of repeating that exercise for as long as he wants. At least as long as — and now I’m getting back to the start of my report from today — he’s secured himself ‘at least another term, if no life-time presidency’ of Russia, as the ‘saviour of nation from NAZI-aggression’.

All of this means: such ‘human-wave onslaughts’ like on Soledar are going to become the norm of warfare in this year. Whether in regards of the Russian offensives, or in regards of their defensives.

They are going to remain the norm even if, say, NATO would now re-equip Ukraine with no 12 or 14, but 120 to 400 Challenger 2 MBTs and no 40 but 400 Marder IFVs.


Because even 400 Challengers or 400 Leopards would never have the same fire-power like 400 artillery pieces. They are no artillery and thus can’t hurl a comparable amount of HEs like artillery can. Result: they can’t cause the necessary — massive — amount of damage to the VSRF. At most, they can cause ‘lots of needling’; at worst, their formations are just going to offer plentiful of excellent targets to the Russian artillery — because Ukrainian artillery is going to remain unable to suppress that of the VSRF.

This is going to remain that way even if all these tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (and whatever else NATO-members are promising, the last few days) — would enable the ZSU to build-up something like ‘strike capability ‘— which, actually, is little more than daydreaming. Why? Because even 200 Challengers would not provide the ZSU with the capability to pulverise VSRF units meanwhile deployed along two-, some-places even three lines of defence — all heavily protected by kilometres-deep minefields — constructed all along the frontline, and that from the border in north-western Luhansk, all the way down to the Dnipro River. The only military branch capable of doing that is the artillery of the ZSU — all provided this would be supplied with enough pieces and shells.

US-supplied M777 howitzer knocked out by the Russian artillery, in the Soledar area.

2000 Metres Breaststroke for Non-Swimmers… (with Participants from 44 Nations)

This is why all the babbling about ‘Britain sending Challengers’, and ‘Poland sending Leopards’, and ‘Germany sending Leopards’, and/or ‘but Germany might not permit Poland send Leopards’ and whatever else — is the ultimate exercise in entirely pointless idiocy. Such a waste of time, its participants could all commit a suicide — and it wouldn’t matter. Not the least. Everybody involved would do better by going to watch one of Monthy Python’s episodes about competitions of biggest twits… or idiot Olympics…and discuss topics like, ‘why isn’t the International Olympic Committee accepting the discipline of 2000 Metres Breastroke for Non-Swimmers’ as an official olympic sports…’

What would matter would be if all the idiots in Washington, London, Berlin, Warsaw and few similar places (plus those hyperventilating while ‘reporting & discussing such highly-important affairs’) would fight each other — indeed: fall over each other — over the issue of who’s going to send more artillery pieces, and even more artillery shells to Ukraine, followed by all the (serious) air defence systems NATO could only scratch together.

…and then actually send all of that, not just babble about sending it.



Tom Cooper

From Austria; specialised in analysis of contemporary warfare; working as author, illustrator, and book-series-editor for Helion & Co.