Ukraine War, 18 February 2023
Good morning everybody!
Originally, planned a rather short update today, largely focusing on Bakmut….but well, eventually this one grew quite large.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Up front, amid RUMINT that Prigozhin’s conflict with the Keystone Cops in Moscow has reached a point where he was ordered to ‘shut up’ (i.e. stop his public appearances and blaming the MOD for incompetence etc.), and that the VSRF ceased delivering ammunition and supplies to the PMC, there are reports that — except on a narrow sector of the frontline — what’s left of that company has been withdrawn and replaced by VSRF’s ‘regulars’ (i.e. mobiks). As if to confirm this, several videos surfaced, prepared by the mercenaries, demanding Putin and the VSRF to re-start supplying them: one of them was taken in a morgue full of bodies…. Which at least indicates: somewhere behind the frontline.
Kupyansk-Svatove….the Russians claimed to have captured all of Hryanyvka: found no evidence for this.
Kremina…for whatever the VDV was attacking in this area, even managing to push Ukrainians back by 100–200m a day, all of this stopped, the last two-three days. Indeed, in the south, the 95th Airborne is already in counterattack: has managed to throw them back, reaching the outskirts of Dibrova and Kuzmyne. Numerous obituaries of VDV officers are meanwhile making circles in the social media, indicating heavy losses…
Siversk…the Russians spent the last six or seven days assaulting Bilohorivka from three directions (as reported earlier, they claimed it as taken, some 10 days ago). It can’t be said that a lot is left of that village, but: Ukrainains held out.
Soledar….the Russians continued pushing from Mykolaivka on Vasyukivka (west), Fedorivka (north) and Razdolivka (north-east) — though without much success, the last few days.
Bakhmut….North…about four or five days ago, Wagner did manage to enter the northern side of the village of Paraskoviivka (that’s the only sector where the PMC seems to be still on the frontline). Meanwhile, the mercenaries claim to have taken full control of this village, and it’s certain: they’ve taken its centre. New Ukrainian frontline is now in the hills directly east (and slightly above) the M03 highway, running from Zaliznyanske to south-western Parakoviivka, down to….apparently the northern entrance to Krasna Hora.
BTW, two nights ago, the ZSU hit a Wagner base in this area, reportedly killing 60–100.
Bakhmut….East…the ZSU seems to have left the Russians in, smashed them, and is said to be on advance here, clearing street by street east of the Bakhmutska River, the last two days.
Bakhmut….South….this was the most critical area of the last six or seven days, with plenty of reasons for most serious concerns. As Reported, the Russians brought in the 3rd Motor Rifle Brigade, DPR and then pushed with all force on Ivanivske. This unit was rebuilt for the fourth time over the last 12 months (i.e. it was decimated three times): apparently, lately it was at least partially re-staffed with Russian mobiks whose IDs were taken away and replaced by those of the DPR. Anyway, the 3rd MRB pushed over ‘that hill’ north of Klishchivka on Ivanivske, with Wagner (while still around) pushing in direction of Chasiv Yar, on the western flank of the 3rd. Aim of both assaults was the Road T0504 connecting Kurdyumivka with Bakhmut. The weather was bad, see foggy, and thus the UAVs of both sides have had major problems. Moreover, Ukrainian troops were exposed to such fierce and sustained assaults, that they began running out of everything: artillery shells, mortar shells, replacement barrels for machine guns (there was a day when the 40th Artillery Brigade was down to exactly 10 shells per every gun it had). The fight ended in a slugging match at shortest ranges, usually with assault rifles and rifle grenades, but sometimes with knives… AFAIK, the 3rd DPR assaulted at least two times, almost reaching the outskirts of Ivanivske…
Since two days, there are ever better news. First there was a report about the 40th Artillery blowing up a Russian ammo depot in Zeleonpillya, south of Bakhmut. Then, and what really surprised me: the 3rd Assault Brigade, ZSU, reported that it all the time held out at ‘that hill’ above Klishchivka. Got no details or evidence yet, but it seems a part of the unit was surrounded, almost overrun, for three or four days: gauging by a video released by the Azov SSO (a special forces outfit), it took a nocturnal attack by snipers, material rifles and mortars to punch through to them. One way or the other, first it was reported that the Wagner was forced to fall back about 1,000 metres away from the T0504, and since yesterday, word is
a) that the 3rd remains firmly in possession of that crucial hill, and ‘everything is fine’, and
b) the T0504 is ‘safe’ again.
Moreover, the ZSU should’ve constructed an additional road into Bakhmut, somewhere via the fields west of the town, and was busy collecting dozens of POWs.
Guess, the ZSU brought in reinforcements, around 14–15 February, and — though foremost — received the necessary re-supply in ammunition and spares. With this, the situation in southern Bakhmut should be back to what it was as of late January (if not earlier). To make sure: this is all still ‘raw info’; I’m waiting for cross-confirmation.
Vuhledar….the Russians released a video of their TOS-1-strikes on the southern dachas, about 2,000m south of Vuhledar. Outright silly was that they claimed this to be a confirmation for ‘street fighting in(side) Vuhledar’. No idea about the date of the same, but:
a) if this was taken early during this offensive, then it’s shown the original assault, from back on 24–25 January; and
b) if it was taken only recently, then it means that what’s left of the VSRF in this area, was meanwhile forced to withdraw to its starting positions of 24–25 January.
According to recently captured Russian ‘Marines’, the ‘elite’ 155th Naval Infantry Brigade was ‘re-built’, for the third time and then so that what’s left of it was combined with survivors of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade… That’s something like three destroyed brigades. For a while, there were reports about ‘massive Russian reinforcements blocking the roads from Mariupol up to the front’: it turned out this were big convoys of heavy trucks carrying away stolen Ukrainian wheat.
Guess what: the Russians continue bringing in new units, and continue attacking, every day, several times a day, regardless of appalling losses. Putin is very happy with how well are Russian ‘Marines’ fighting in Vuhledar, while there are ever additional reports about the Keystone Cops nowadays being the party that’s recruiting convicts (instead of Wagner doing that).
Bottom line: the ‘biiiiig’ Russian offensive appears to be petering out amid massive casualties and at least two big failures. Yes, this conclusion might be premature (and yes: even I’m surprised for coming to the idea to write this) — even more so considering reports from within the ZSU, along which they began facing well-motivated, reasonably well-trained, and definitely well-equipped Russian mobiks of the VDV. As reported already several times, the Russian Paratrooper Association is a big organisation, and former servicemen remain closely affiliated for years. Thus, at least the VDV should’ve had no serious problem with re-filling its ranks. And still, it seems this was not enough…
Unless much more details become available, I guess the reasons are what I’ve explained again and again:
a) the VSRF cannot support one ‘biiiiiiiiiig’ operation in a single sector, thus was forced to distribute less troops on three ‘primary’ sectors, and these proved insufficient to overcome the combination of Ukrainian fire-power and will;
b) because of incompatibility with the winter weather, it’s Orlan-10 UAVs are not working, and thus the Russian generals are ‘commanding blind’ (they do not know where are what of Ukrainian positions), while their artillery lacks the effectiveness necessary to breach Ukrainian frontlines and enable a serious advance;
c) the mass of mobiks is simply not trained well-enough to conduct offensive operations (especially no mechanised operations); and
d) the VSRF is lacking officers to organise, train, and lead 100,000, 150,000, 200,000 (or more) of mobiks into combat.
Atop of this, due to the lack of UAVs and other modern means of reconnaissance, and bad weather, even the GRU and FSB are experiencing growing problems with collecting intelligence. Between others, it turned out they’ve requested their moles in the German BND to obtain intel on activity of Ukrainian M142 and M270-units…
Finally, by now it’s obvious that even Gerasimov and his aides found no solution for the general degeneration of the VSRF — for which there is nobody else but Putin and the Keystone Cops in Moscow (foremost including Shoygu and Gerasimov) to blame.
