Ukraine War, 19–20 April 2022
Good morning everybody!
Here’s my review of most important developments in Ukraine War for 19 and 20 April 2022.
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
CBU — cluster bomb units
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
KIA — killed in action
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MIA — missing in action
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
PMC — private military company/contractor
POL — petrol, oil, lubricants
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)
TR — Tank Regiment (Russia)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
STRATEGIC
The NATO is rushing lots of heavy armament of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, these days. The amount of weapons about to be sent to the country, or already underway there might appear ‘small’: for example, the USA is sending 18 M777 howitzers, and as of this morning it’s certain that the US Army is in the process of transferring much heftier stuff, like M142 HIMARS. Canada, France, and Great Britain are to follow in fashion and deliver heavy artillery, armoured personnel carriers and mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, additional MANPADs and even anti-ship missiles. Norway has already delivered 100 French-made Mistral light SAMs (this would be only the second war for this system, after the II Congo War of 1998–2003). This might prompt one into thinking that this is not going to be enough. However, one should keep in mind a) the total amount, and b) the fact that alone the combination of firepower and precision they are going to offer, not to talk about their mobility, are going to effect a change in the balance of forces on the battlefield — and this regardless should Putin eventually announce at least a partial mobilisation in Russia, not to talk about a general one.
Why that?
I’m monitoring — often with some awe — commentary by different Western observers of this war, usually illustrated with maps including long arrows from, for example, Izium to Dnipro and Slovyansk; from Horlivka to Kramatorsk, from Vasylivka to (and around) Zaporozhye…. i.e. with the RFA running operations deep into Ukraine. Problem: the GenStab of the RFA and Dvornikov’s conduct of the battle over the last week are so orthodox, they are so predictable, and they so obviously lack not only the necessary command infrastructure, but especially troops and equipment, that I do not see them being able of running at least an operational-level offensive. So much so, any discussions about whether Dvornikov might introduce a new command layer — atop of that of the South OSK, and with the specific purpose of running this ‘big offensive’ — is entirely pointless: the RFA neither has the experience, nor capability of running the kind of operations many in the West still expect it to run (arguably: exactly the same is valid for the Ukrainian GenStab). Finally, despite all the reinforcements the 1st GTA, 20th and 35th CAA have received in the Izium area alone (see my last report), they still had to withdraw several units to Russia in order to ‘restore combat capability’. But, let’s discuss that on case-to-case basis.
AIR
According to the People in Need of Fresh Air, the USA have supplied Ukraine with ‘additional aircraft’. This promptly fired the fantasy of many of foreign observers, some of whom began discussing deliveries of Romanian MiG-21s, and Polish/Slovak/Bulgarian MiG-29s. However, yesterday in the afternoon the command of the Ukrainian Air Force has denied such reports: it only confirmed the reception of spare parts. From that point of view, it seems that only the part of Kirby’s (Pentagon’s spokesman) statement related to the spares enabling Ukrainians to increase the number of their operational aircraft — was correct.
What else can be said about the VKS in this period of war? By now it’s clear it has withdrawn the mass of its combat aircraft from Belarus to bases in south-western Russia and is flying about 200 combat sorties a day. Why that few? Because it is facing improved Ukrainian air defences: these are forcing it to plan its operations much more carefully; to group its fighter-bombers into ‘strike packages’ including electronic warfare aircraft, for better mutual protection. The mass of such formations are active by night. Merely urgent air strikes and close air support operations (the latter flown by Su-25s and combat helicopters) are undertaken by day. Strikes deep into Ukraine are run exclusively by cruise missiles released from Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers or warships of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea, or by ballistic missiles like Iskanders and Tochkas, fired by the RFA. From time to time, the Russians are using their tactical aviation (see: Su-35s, sometimes Su-34s) to launch Kh-59 (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘AS-13 Kingbolt’) and Kh-59M (‘AS-18 Kazoo’) cruise missiles. However, and despite ferocity of some of such strikes, their total number is in constant decline — because the VKS had only minimal stocks of such weapons, the Russian industry has only a limited capability to replace them, too many have been spent by now, and the war is going on much longer than ever planned (so much so, Russians are forced to deploy their Bal anti-ship missiles as PGMs….).
The improved efficiency of Ukrainian air defences was nicely demonstrated on 19 April. Not only that the activity of VKS strategic bombers was detected although these were as far away as over the Caspian Sea, but, and for example, around 2200hrs they shot down both cruise missiles approaching the area of Ivano Frankivsk. Early on 20 April, Ukrainians claimed another cruise missile and one VKS fighter-bomber — though did not report the exact area.
Unsurprisingly, by now it is clear that — despite quite a few of panicky reports from the West in this regards — the Russians have failed to hit even one of shipments of Western arms entering Ukraine. This is unsurprising: they do not have the means to find and track these, and even less so to attack them. This is why they are trying to interdict possible storage sites and major railway connections in western Ukraine: so far, with such minimal effect, that the Ukrainian Armed Forces appear not to suffer at least from shortages of fuel, although all of this must be hauled by train all the way from Poland and Romania.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Despite reported ‘success’ in ‘stopping’ the much-announced RFA offensive all over the 480-kilometres-long frontline in eastern Ukraine, there are actually not that many ‘good news’ to mention.
For the start, the Ukrainian counter-offensive east of Kharkiv was stopped by growing Russian resistance, early on 19 April. As reported two days ago, the reinforced 92nd Mech pushed south-east of Chuhuiv, in the direction of Kupyansk — and thus deep into the western rear of the RFA concentration in the Izium area. No doubt, this operation began very well and resulted in the liberation of numerous villages along the P07 highway, including Lebyazhe and Bazalievka. Indeed, late on 18 April, the 92nd liberated Shevchenkove, only 35km west of Kupyansk.
However, the latter is of immense importance for the RFA in this part of Ukraine. By side that it’s housing the HQs of the 35th and 20th CAA; it’s positioned on the P79 (the sole north-south highway east of Oskil River); has a major bridge over the Oskil River, and a major railway station. Unsurprisingly, Dvornikov couldn’t ignore this threat. The situation became urgent enough for him to slow down the advance south of Izium, withdraw several BTGs and throw them into the path of the advancing Ukrainians: thus, the 92nd Mech was stopped as it attempted to advance from Shevchenkove towards Mykhalivka and Borivske.
That said, this counter-offensive had the desired effect in disrupting the Russian operations: if nothing else, the defenders south-west, south, and south-east of Izium have got at least two-three days (if not longer) to bolster their defences, and Kyiv has got more time to rush reinforcements into this area.
Foremost, this Ukrainian counterattack has once again exposed both the critical shortage of RFA units and troops, and the ignorance of Putin and the GenStab in Moscow. To effect his breakthrough, Dvornikov concentrated 20+ BTGs south of Izium, but had only a thin screening force consisting of battered BTGs of the 144th MRD to protect his western flank. As soon as the Ukrainians hit the latter, there was a major crisis and units advancing in southern direction had to be re-deployed to counter. From that point of view, this is also a confirmation that the RFA simply has not enough forces to do both punch through the Ukrainian lines and drive deep into central eastern Ukraine: it cannot envelop the Ukrainian forces deployed along the LOC.
Knowing this, one should not make a mistake and think the RFA can’t go on: there is no doubt it can continue making minor advances and causing all other sorts of problems to the Ukrainians.
For example:
- The VKS has targeted forward command posts in Husarivka and Andrivka (both villages outside Balakliia), and claimed the destruction of an Ukraiinian Osa-AKM system in that area. yesterday.
- South of Izium, the Russians have secured Dibrovne, and are in the process of assaulting Dovhenke.
- The Ukrainians were forced to withdraw from Pisky Radkivski to Lozove, and the Russians have shot down one of Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopters near Korovii Yar.
- Further east, there is meanwhile no doubt the Russians have captured Kremina (north-west of Severodonetsk). Indeed, they seem to have secured Zarichne too, and are pushing in direction of Lyman and Mykolaivka.
- Despite the deployment of the 4th Rapid Intervention Brigade of the National Guard and Georgian Battalion, Ukrainians seem to have lost most of Rubizhne, which is a crucial position north-west of Severodonetsk.
- The RFA is advancing in Popasna, i.e. on the best way of forcing remaining defenders out of the ruins of that town.
- Ukrainians say they have repelled all the assaults in the area between Toretsk and Avidiyivka (both are west of Horlivka), and there is no doubt that the RFA and Separatists have suffered heavy losses there, but one can’t expect the Ukrainian troops there to hold out forever.
- Finally, the Russians and Separatists have launched a counter-attack on Marinka, late on 19 April: results are not known to me, right now.
I.e. the big Russian offensive has not been ‘stopped’, but is in full swing.
The only thing ‘positive’ I can report this morning is that the RUMINT has it that the recruitment efforts in Russia, in the LNR, and in the DNR, achieved relatively little. The latter two have been literally ‘drained’ of able-bodied men. Instead, Moscow now seems to be increasingly depending on Wagner private military company (PMC) to compensate for losses. The latter is said to be in the process of creating ‘at least’ 10 BTG-sized formations.
MARIUPOL
One detail I missed in my earlier reports: on 14 April, the commands of the 1st Battalion Azov Regiment, and the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade were merged. Even since, what’s left of both units is commanded by Major Serhiy Volynsky/Volyn, of the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade.
While withdrawing from their last pockets south of the Kalmius River into the compound of the Azovstal Works, the united formations have managed to evacuate 500 troops of the National Guard and the Border Guards from the port. Now all the surviving defenders are concentrated within the Azovstal Works.
Russian ‘authorities’ (apparently Separatists from Donbas) have announced a ceasefire, evacuation of civilians and have offered an ‘evacuation’ to the defenders of Mariupol, for yesterday, 20 April, in the afternoon: of course, and as usually, nothing of this was then realised. Instead, they brought in the Somali Battalion of the DNR to the city.
