Ukraine War, 23–24 June, 2022
Good morning everybody!
Let me start with some analysis.
Seems that much of the Western media is following in fashion of the Austrian ORF and reporting ‘additional Russian gains in eastern Ukraine’, creating the impression of the Russians advancing along the entire 1,000km+ of the frontline. This is simply wrong. They did make an advance on the northern side of the Popasna Bulge, the last four days, but this is limited to an area of about 9 by 6km — and cost them about 30% of one of Wagner BTGs and the 4th Regiment of LPR’s ‘People’s Militia’.
Have been asked if the RFA really has 55–60% of all its BTGs deployed between Izium and Popasna: AFAIK, yes. Though, one should keep in mind that about 50% of ‘battalion tactical groups’ in question could only be described as ‘weak companies’: have suffered such losses, that their ‘average’ strength is something like 4–5 APC/IFVs, 2–4 MBTs, and two companies of 15–20 surviving combatants (this is also the average ‘size’ of local Russian attacks, nowadays). Airborne units (like 76th VDV Division, for example) have been completely withdrawn from Ukraine: they were shot to pieces and have to be re-built from the bottom. Only the Wagner BTGs and some of Separatist units seem to be in seriously better shape. Means, the RFA has to concentrate as many BTGs just to hold the frontline, not to talk about continuing to push — and even then, what is keeping the Russian lines glued together nowadays is foremost the RFA’s artillery, of which there is ever less, because it suffered heavy losses to the Ukrainian counter-battery operations of the last week.
Is it any ‘better’ on the Ukrainian side? In some cases — not — but overall: yes. The 57th Mech and 118th TD Brigades were badly damaged in latest fighting. It’s going to sound cruel, but each appears to have lost about a battalion in killed and wounded. The former was withdrawn and replaced by the 28th Mech, the latter seems to be still holding at least a part of the frontline south of Lysychansk. The 17th Tank was also pulled back and now serves as tactical reserve.
Foremost, Ukraine has still not touched its strategic reserve — of about 30–35 battalions. Seems, this is continuously built up, trained on NATO-provided weaponry etc.. That said, RUMINT has it that Dvornikov and Zhidko are building up their new ‘operational reserve’ consisting of about 14,000–15,000 reservists that are currently drafted all over Russia, for some kind of a new offensive, probably on the Severodonetsk Cauldron.
AIR
The last few weeks Ukrainians have repeatedly reported air strikes by ‘three missiles’ — foremost on Mykolaiv, but also in other areas (Dnipro, for example). Must admit this confused me, because VKS combat aircraft are usually deploying pairs of air-to-ground missiles. Foremost Su-34s are carrying either two Kh-59s (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘AS-13 Kingbolt’), or two Kh-29s (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘AS-14 Kedge’). In similar fashion, the mass of Russian Navy’s warships and submarines in the Black sea are usually launching salvos of 4–8 3M54 Kalibr cruise missiles…. Thus, it took me some asking around about what have eyewitnesses seen or heard to figure out what should that with ‘three-missile-strikes’ mean. Meanwhile, I think the word is about Kh-22 air-to-surface guided missiles (ASCC/NATO codename ‘AS-4 Kitchen’) released by Tu-22M-3s. Have mentioned these several times before. These are huge weapons with a warhead of 1,000kg and range of about 500km: were originally developed back in the 1960s, for strikes on US Navy’s aircraft carriers and major targets on land (their radar seeker requires a target with a radar-cross-section of about 200 square metres to ‘work’).
Point is: three Kh-22s are the maximum load of the Tu-22M-3; two on underwing stations and one under the centreline, like on attached illustration. Seems, such a combination was used to hit a depot with sunflower oil in Mykolaiv, yesterday in the morning, and then to hit another facility inside the industrial zone of that port, later during the day.
BTW, the Keystone Cops in Mosow claimed these strikes to have ‘killed 500…’ sorry….’650 troops of the 59th Mech Brigade’…
In similar fashion, there are lots of reports about Ukrainians striking selected targets behind the Russian frontline with 3–4 Tochka ballistic missiles, the last few days. Indeed, the rate at which the 19th Rocket Artillery Brigade is firing its Tochkas is ‘like there’s no tomorrow’: at least like if Kyiv would be keen to spend its entire stocks — perhaps because somebody there is certain Ukraine is going to get an unlimited supply of M142 HIMARS…? We’ll see. Certain is only that Ukrainians seem to expect a lot from this weapon. So much so, there are reports the Russians are adding additional S-300s to their air defences in Ukraine.
Few hours ago, an Il-76 transport of the Russian air force crashed near Ryazan, reportedly due to engine-related issues. Three were killed and six badly wounded.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Kharkiv… Ternova….or what once used to be that village… seems to be under the Russian control now, but Rubizhne is still in Ukrainian hands. Moreover, Ukrainians seem to have evacuated their forces from the bridgehead east of the Siversky Donets (which used to stretch roughly from Buhaivka to Khotimiya). Everybody is still zip-lip about the area from which Russians are shelling northern Kharkiv, thus have to guess this is from somewhere between Pytomnyk and Borschova. That said, there have been no changes in the frontline in this area for days.
Sviatohirsk-Sloviansk…Russians spent yesterday and this morning with shelling and attacking Dolyna and Bohorodychne, but as far as I can say: the lines of the 80th and 81st Airborne Assault Brigades are holding there. Both sides appear very exhausted, but the 80th claimed a VKS Ka-52 shot down there.
Severodonetsk…Russians are pounding the Azot Works with everything they have: ballistic missiles, air strikes, artillery rockets, tube artillery, and mortars. The 111th TD and the ‘Foreign Legion’ Brigades seem to have withdrawn from the part of the factory complex, but elsewhere they’re holding out — and that the way down to Borove, and thus buying yet more time for Ukraine.
NOTE: I’m not following the media-reports (except in the case of specific air/missile-strikes), and was thus caught by surprise when several people drew my attention at media-reports that the head of the Luhansk Oblast ‘ordered a withdrawal’ from Severodonetsk, this morning.
It caught me by surprise because what I’ve heard from the troops in Severodonetsk as of the last night was that they’re exhausted, no doubt, but still willing to fight. ….’but’, now it seems that a decision was taken ‘higher up’ that it’s ‘better to withdraw’.
To me it appears this was ‘the dilemma’ going all the way up to the GenStab and Zelensky’s government, the last few weeks (and mind, I’m not gauging anybody, just drawing my own conclusions): troops wanted to fight, no matter how exhausted, but commanders and politicians preferred to leave. Think, one should keep in mind the points of view in such cases: troops are responsible for themselves, for their immediate surroundings; their commanders and politicians are responsible not only for entire oblasts, but for the country and millions of people. Plus, one should hope the latter have better information about what is the enemy doing, and how many of its troops are around and where…
Popasna Bulge…with the end of fighting for Zolote and Hirske, there’s no ‘bulge’, anymore. The frontline is now along the T1302 road from Volodymyrivka up to Mykolaivka, eastern side of Vovchoyarivka, and the southern side of Lysychansk, with Russians and Separatists in (from south towards north) Vasylivka, Mykolaivka, Loskutivka, Pidlisne, Myrna Dolyna, and Bila Hora. Fighting along this frontline is described as ‘fierce’, with Russians pushing in multiple directions simultaneously: probably trying to find a weak spot in Ukrainian positions.
Garrisons of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk are now supplied along the T0513 to Siversk, then along a secondary road via Vekrhnokamyanske.
‘For the records’ (i.e. for subsequent cross-checking and analysis), the Russians continue reporting ‘fierce fighting’ for Hirske: indeed, an entire ‘Ukrainian pocket with 2000+ troops’ there. By best will, I do not know what kind of Ukrainian troops should still be there: the last have withdrawn at least two days ago.
Bakhmut…to my big surprise, despite about a dozen of major attacks, the Russians have still not captured Klynove and Vershnya. Even the ‘Ukrainian withdrawal’ from Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirsk Powerplant seems to have been limited to evacuation of the local population and foreign NGOs. With other words, despite losing Myronivsk, Ukrainians are still holding most of the M06 south of Bakhmut to the Luhan River, and their positions south of it (except for Dolomite).
Further south… the Russians claimed the capture of two French-made Caesar howitzers calibre 155mm, and this is ‘celebrated’ over a lot of the Russian social media. No evidence has been shown so far, though.
SOUTH
Southern Zaporizhzhya….There’s not a word about the fighting in the Polohy-Tokmak area. Most likely because this is not only including the Azov Regiment, but because Ukrainians are having earlier-described problems with overpowering local Russian strongholds, too. There are only reports about another advance south of Vuhledar, in direction of Shevchenko.
It’s similar regarding the Kherson Oblast: everybody’s zip-lip about developments there.
