Ukraine War: 23 February 2023
Hello everybody!
Time for an update… and my usual disclaimer: enjoy the following with three spoons of sarcasm, or — if not — do not read. Thanks in advance.
Amid general expectation of a ‘massive Russian air-, ballistic- and cruise missile strike on Ukraine’, tomorrow, on 24 February — the official ‘Ignorant Media’s Anniversary of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine’ — let me act in similar fashion: I’ll ignore the fact that the Russian invasion of Ukraine began on 20 February 2014 (because, you know, there are ‘some contradictions and inherent problems’ with that date, at least in the West) and go over to the topic: air warfare.
AIR WAR
Many consider aerial warfare for a discipline that’s the ‘most complex’ and ‘hardest’ to explain. Seemingly, that’s so because ‘aircraft do not hold the ground’. Indeed, they’re ‘here’ at one moment, and ‘kilometres away’ in the next…. Apparently, that’s a reason why some of biggest nonsense about this (air) war ‘must’ be published and circulated — whether in the social- or in the mainstream media. For example…
Some anonymous instance on Twitter has posted a few lines, essentially, announcing a big aerial offensive by the Russian Air Space Force (VKS). Correspondingly, it’s 1000’% sure: there will be a big Russian aerial offensive in the coming days. Which is why somebody in the West then countered with an explanation — always based on anonymous sources within the intelligence community, of course — that the VKS actually withdrew the mass of its aircraft to air bases 200+ kilometres away from Ukrainian borders…
Meanwhile, Russian military experts are falling over each other while explaining things like, ‘even in the conditions of air supremacy, attack aviation cannot carry out tasks ….(even) at the forefront’. At least in their case, culprit is promptly found: NATO. ‘Target designation by NATO’ is to blame for the VKS’ lack of effectiveness. Because, you know, there’s another ‘NATO advisor’ behind every second tree in Ukraine, and a ‘NATO radar’ behind every third building… actually, most of Russians aren’t sure any more if it’s more of NATO or Nazis one can find in Ukraine — so much so, they’ve joined that into ‘NAZZO’ an d the Keystone Cops in Moscow are claiming the destruction of another ‘US-made radar’ about every second day…
In the West, all the possible experts remain fascinated by ‘underwhelming performance’ of the VKS — because, you know, they still expect it to operate like US Air Force. Others have busied themselves with explanations how the VKS can’t and doesn’t run ‘SEAD-operations’ (stands for ‘suppression of enemy air defences’). Think, this is, so far, the best explanation for all the Zvezda-TV-released photos and videos of VKS Su-30SMs and Su-35S’ carrying Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and why hardly any of them can be seen in operations against Ukraine without carrying wing-tip mounted Sorbtsiya or Khibny ECM-pods…
…and why there are ever more photos of VKS’ Su-34s equipped with Kh-31s and with massive SAP-518 pods under the centreline…
But, by far ‘the best’ are commentators from countries that are renowned as major importers of Russian military hardware. For example, one of them recently drew a bombastic conclusion: that in the months before the invasion, Ilyushin Il-20 and Sukhoi Su-24MR electronic reconnaissance aircraft of the VKS have ‘mapped’ the positions of Ukrainian air defences.
Electronic reconnaissance aircraft being used for electronic reconnaissance? Who would have ever thought that possible…
And, of course, the reader is advised that Ukrainians were so kind not to move any of their air defence assets ever again once the Russians have recorded their positions. Before the war. Indeed, not once until this very day — which is why the same expert, in the same article, then explained that the Ukrainian Air Force (and Air Defence; PSU) has, ‘demonstrated the ability to operate…air defence as pop-up units, rather than fully formed batteries’. Probably while still in the same poitions reconnoitred by the Russians back in January and February 2022…? Free along the motto: ‘a broken clock is shown the correct time, too: twice a day’…
Actually…
The VKS is still flying around 100 combat sorties a day. As the weather permits, or either ‘above-’ or ‘below-‘ weather: its crews remain poorly trained in ‘all weather’ operations, and its jets are poorly equipped for these. Thus, Su-30s, Su-34s and Su-35s are usually flying above clouds, Su-25s and attack helicopters below these.
Except for Ukrainian air defences (discussed below), a growing problem is the wear of the fleet: mind that Russian combat aircraft are made for, depending on type, some 200–600 hours of intensive operations, and then need a, de-facto, complete re-built. This war is well beyond that mark: after one year of operations, the mass of fleet is either undergoing overhauls, or in need of the same. Problem: there is a shortage of skilled workforce in factories running such works, while demand on the front remains high. Unsurprisingly, something has to give: if nothing else, there’s no time to apply a new coat of colour, and post-overhaul flight testing is kept on minimum — or jets are crashing into apartment homes (like it happened at least some two documented times, the last November and December). In other cases, they’re crashing on the way in or on return from missions over Ukraine (today a Su-25 came down close to the border, killing its pilot). Unsurprisingly, most of the VKS’ Su-25-fleet — the most often deployed type in this war — is nowadays looking as battered and weathered as, or worse than when US Navy’s aircraft are back from a six-months-long deployment on an aircraft carrier. Like this:
Notably: if my count is not wrong, Ukrainians have claimed some 110+ Russian Su-25s as shot down so far. AFAIK, visually confirmed are some 30. One way or the other: the fleet of these jets — and their fliers — took some very heavy beating, and replacing all of that is going to be a major problem. The type is out of production for decades already — and I doubt even Putin is going to order his ‘precious’ Su-34s to be used in their place, except there’s another such emergency like in south-eastern Kharkiv, last September: these have suffered heavy losses, too.
Effectiveness-wise, nothing changed in regards of the VKS, which is why now the Russians are vividly discussing an increased deployment of precision guided munitions (PGMs). Stupid Westerners who came to that idea… Problem: VKS’ stocks of PGMs were always low and — because domestic production is minimal — largely consisted of whatever was left behind by the USSR. Which is why now some are guessing that Beijing might have started clandestinely supplying weapons like its own variants of Kh-29, Kh-31 and Kh-58 to Russia. So far, I saw no evidence, but: this would be hard to obtain because the ‘Chinese versions’ of these are looking exactly the same like Russian originals…
Ukrainian Air Force (PSU) has its own problems. Primary between these are heavy losses and minimal effectiveness of its air strikes. The force is down to flying 13–14 attack sorties a day (from up to 30+ back in September-October last year). This is why Kyiv is demanding Western aircraft, and the West is discussing deliveries of the same. Meanwhile, PSU crews are flying stuff like this one, armed this way:
That’s a Su-24M, no doubt. But, what kind of markings is it wearing? Apparently: Ukrainian, outlined in red, to be easier to identify. That’s why undersides of both drop tanks and the entire jet are painted in yellow, too. All of this is indicating quite a lot of negative experiences with fratricide fire (see: ‘blue-on-blue’). Slightly more enigmatic is the weapon it’s carrying: looks like Kh-23M or, and more likely, Kh-29 — but: without its steering fins…?
Meanwhile, Ukrainian air defences are constantly on the move. At least those deployed to protect ZSU units on the ground. And yes, their units are ‘broken down’ to sub-units. For example; instead of grouping 4, 6 or more launchers, an average Buk SAM-site is operating in two or three sub-units of one or two launchers — always depending on availability of its fire-control systems. Ukrainians have developed a solution to deploy their Osa-AKM launchers as single units, too. This is why these two types remain a major threat for VKS’ fighter-bombers, and why they’ve scored so many kills.
All of this is why the Russians have so many problems with suppressing them: not only that each battery of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) is ‘broken down to its lowest functional element’, but they’re changing positions several times a day and keeping their radar emissions to a bare minimum. That way, the Russians have immense problems just in figuring out in what areas are Ukrainians operating what systems, not to talk about exactly pinpointing them so they could hit back with their PGMs (like Kh-31, or Kh-29, for example).
It’s similar further to the rear, i.e. in case of PSU air defence units deployed to protect major cities, for example: they do not need re-deploying as often as units closer to the frontlines, but they are still moving often enough. And, an ever-bigger number of them is operating Western weapons, like IRIS-T, MIM-23 HAWK etc. Most of the time, they’re not activating their radars until there’s an incoming major Russian air- or missile strike — early warnings about which are, yes, supplied by NATO. This in turn is why the Russians started releasing their helium-filled balloons equipped with radar reflectors into the air over Ukraine, recently: to force Ukrainians into activating their radars. That way the VKS’ electronic intelligence can record emissions by radar systems of NATO-supplied SAM-units — which is necessary so they can analyse them and develop electronic countermeasures — and also (at least temporarily) to record their approximate position.
Bottom line: currently, neither air force can fulfil its tasks. Neither can operate effectively. And neither has a solution on hand. The Russians are regularly supporting VKS’ operations with immense volumes of electronic warfare, but this has proven insufficient, time and again: Ukrainians are managing to counter the Russian EW and remain dangerous. And Russian air defences are available in such abundance (and bolstered by R-37M-equipped MiG-31s and Su-35s) that the small number of PSU fighter-bombers is taking exceptionally high risks whenever operating within 200km behind the frontline, not to talk about immediately above it.
Because of this, it’s going to be highly interesting to monitor if, for example, the PSU can improve its efficiency through the — reported — delivery of US-made JDAM-ER and GLDSDB PGMs with a range of 72km and 150km, respectively (though only if released from high altitude). And if the Russians can squeeze yet more UCAVs from Iran (read: China)…
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Generally, Gerasimov’s ‘biiiiiig’ offensive is in ‘full swing’ — which, essentially, means ‘going exactly nowhere, but more is underway’. And, generally, Prigozhin — except for bragging with ever more bodies of ‘his’ combatants — continues his fight with the Keystone Cops is Moscow (and the other way around). Meanwhile, they’re quarrelling over lack of supplies of ammunition. Ironically, now even the VSRF and Separatists are complaining about decreasing supplies of the same (and not only artillery ammo, but 7.62mm ammo for assault rifles, too!). Amid photos and documentation of this kind, no surprise… but, hey: at least they have suitably decorated toilettes, and be sure: Pudding’s going to solve all the problems. Believe in Pudding (and noodles)!
Kupyansk-Svatove… by now it appears ‘quite likely’ that the Russians might have secured ‘most’ of Hryanyvka: at least it’s so that the mass of Ukrainian monitors is either not mentioning the place any more, or marking it as ‘grey zone’: some even as ‘occupied by the Russians’. For me, more worrisome is the fact that the same seems to be valid for Dvorichne, too, which would be some very bad news (alone because it would be imposing the question if and how the ZSU managed to evacuate its bridgehead on the Oskil River in that area? ….if not, there must’ve been heavy losses). Still having no contacts on that part of the frontline, so can’t say.
Kremina… No news from Novoselivke, so seems the situation there is stabile? I’m always wrong with such conclusions…
Further south, and reportedly, the Russians launched another ‘all out’ attack towards Torske. Even the — meanwhile entirely pessimistic — Girkin is claiming ‘advance on Lyman’. Now, some (in Ukraine) say this attempt did ‘break through Ukrainian defences’, but also that the ZSU managed to push the Russian back. Right now, no idea what nor where exactly happened.
Instead, most of available reports from this area are indicating lots of fighting between south-western outskirts of Dvorichne down into the forest south of that place, with Ukrainians claiming not only the destruction of several T-90Ms (see photo of one knocked out on 19 February, below), but even the capture of one…with other words: the super-clever Russian commanders have sent their tanks into a forest and now are deeply disappointed when the ZSU is doing many nasty things with these…
Siversk…even the Russians are meanwhile admitting that ‘ZSU managed to recapture most of positions previously lost in the Bilohorivka area’. I doubt it lost anything there: the Russians failed to take anything.
Bakhmut….general…around 17–18 February, the VSRF has rotated its units in the Bakhmut area. Those operating there since earlier have suffered heavy losses and were replaced by fresh units….which is: a mix of Wagner, Redut, VDV, Spetsnaz, and whatever other mobiks Gerasimov is able to find. The ZSU did something similar with a part of its units, already two-three days earlier — and the Soledar Debating Club was reinforced: this time in form of an insider associated with the defence of Vuhledar, discussing the command performances of the former… Yup, no better idea but to discuss such issues in the public…
(Not that I’m a proponent of following practices, but permit me to observe that Pudding’s Russians have no such problems: troublesome commanders are simply shot and their radios taken away… )
Bakhmut…north…the last few days were bad for the ZSU garrison in this part of the town: on 18 February the Russians assaulted Stupka; on 19 February they secured the hill north-west of Berkhivka, and on 20 February they assaulted into Yahidne. Since two days, they’re assaulting into Berkhivka, too. That’s further west (which, BTW, I misreported as ‘10km north of Bakhmut’, few days ago: sorry for this, the place is small and I couldn’t find it on the map at first).
With this, the ZSU definitely lost the control over the M03 north of Bakhmut. The frontline is currently somewhere along the line ‘centre of Berkhivka — centre of Yahidne — centre of Skovoridka’, and the battle is going on without interruption.
Most notable here: Russian assaults are led by the Spetsnaz, meanwhile. I.e. Gerasimov is down to deploying ‘special forces’ as ‘line infantry’.
Bakhmut…centre…unless Patrice Lumumba Street is the new centre of Bakhmut, Pushilin’s claims about ‘Russian troops in the centre of Bakhmut’ are nonsense. I.e. the fighting is back into eastern outskirts of the town.
Bakhmut….south….the ZSU’s counterattacks of 17–19 February have stabilised the situation in the Chasiv Yar area, (apparently) removed the threat from Ivanivske, and pushed the Russians out of most of Opytne. AFAIK, most of fighting from this area of the last two or three days was reported from the Kurdyumivka area, further south.
Avdiivka… the last 8–10 days, the VSRF — which is: 1st Brigade DPR — seems to have been successful in Vodyane and Opytne, south of the town — even though suffering a loss worth an entire brigade in troops and equipment in the process. Both places are now under their control. The ZSU is still in control over a large trench system north of Vodyane, though. Furthermore, the Russians claim to be pushing into the centre of Novobakhmutivka. Their assaults on, Kamyanka and Vesele in the north were not as successful, though.
Mariinka… after failing to take Krasnohorivka in the north, or Pobieda and Novomykhailivka in the south, brilliant commanders of the 5th and 101st Regiments DPR, reinforced by the 150th Motor Rifle Brigade, came to an entirely new idea — and attacked through the centre of the completely devastated town. Reportedly, they re-took the School №2 in the north and the Tyre Works in the south. The last I’ve heard, artillery of the 79th Airborne Assault (ZSU) is causing them major problems, though.
Vuhledar….the Russians — who are back to their positions of 24–25 January — are still attacking — in ever smaller ‘units’ (or whatever was left of these), and still losing troops, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Indeed, the British MOD is expecting the VSRF to reinforce its offensive in this area, once again. Probable reason: appearance of T-90s in southern Zaporizhzhya:
STRATEGIC
Normally, I would put the ‘strategic section’ up front. Not this time. These days, I’ve found nothing as amusing as to monitor developments at the strategic level. ‘Amusing’, because every single nation — and, sometimes: entire continents — have an entirely different perception of what’s going on in Ukraine and, therefore, ‘what matters’. Therefore, today I’ll end this one with just a few examples, summarising the core essence in my usual fashion:
- USA: we know better than everybody else — but, and especially, better than those Europeans: they’re just making problems again; we’ve told them that Putin is a threat, and we’ll always do our best to control them, but they never listen and see now, they’re distracting us from what matters — which is China (and Taiwan…. a lil’ bit). Failures of successive administrations to take Putin seriously enough and/or deter him from an all-out invasion of Ukraine (so nicely described here) — even Trump’s cooperation with FSB….? Who cares. Decades of our oligarchy’s cooperation with Putin and subversion of our pluralism? You bloody Marxist: you’re a threat to our holly capital…erm.. freedom! Ah yes: and, every of Putin’s speeches is another announcement of the Doomsday…
- EU/European NATO members (‘Western flank’): we’re cultivated and civilised, and not the least racist or chauvinistic. We, simply, do know better (especially in comparison to US-Americans….others do not matter), and are Europeans (or not at all: we’re entirely different…. Just see the UK), but please don’t let ‘Germany’, ‘France’….(enter the country of your choice)…become too powerful within the EU or NATO, because they’re over-competitive, and too nationalistic, and we (enter country of your preference) are not….and yes, that about Ukraine is so sad, and we’re ah-so-very-much-surprised, and how could this happen? Therefore, the majority meanwhile switched from ‘our Russian friend (and source of cheap energy)’ to ‘that madman in Kremlin’… Decades of our oligarchy’s cooperation with Putin…? Who cares.
- EU/European NATO members (‘Eastern flank’): we know better (than the ‘Western flank’) and are more European and civilised, and less chauvinistic and racist than anybody else; we always knew Putin is a major threat and therefore always closely cooperate with the USA, which is important to prevent… (enter EU/European NATO member of your choice) from becoming too powerful in the EU or NATO. Hey, Western flank: we’ve told you not to cooperate with Putin — and while we’re at that: don’t forget to send us more money… Decades of our oligarchy’s cooperation with Putin…? Never happened, because Putin found it more profitable to cooperate with Germany, France etc. ….and green parties are to blame for everything that went wrong.
- Candidates for EU- and/or NATO-membership: we know better and thus remained neutral for decades — but, now that shit hit the fan… well, we know better and are thus going to join whatever alliance. Pronto. At least we need not to blame our oligarchy for cooperation with Putin. Publicly.
- ‘Balance’ of Europe (Non-EU/non-NATO-members & Hungary): we know better, and some of us know the best, and we’ve seen this coming: they all want war, while we didn’t even try to elect us a better government, thus it’s Orban to blame; and, this is all a well-known conspiracy; and we’re never going to admit it publicly, because we like EU’s financial aid, but…. it was NATO’s aggressive expansion that provoked Putin… Our own oligarchy, principally, does not matter, thus we’re not going to discuss it.
- Russia: ….war? ….invasion? We’re internationalists, humanists, and have never attacked anybody and thus have no idea what are you all talking about? But, we do know the best by our very nature — and you back-stabbed us in return…? The Red Man must prevail, Russia cannot survive as a nation without Ukraine, and we must fight your decadent Western conspiracies….ah, see there: Amazon is streaming that new TV-series…
….and so it goes on, from country to county… just: because my 1st-hand-experience taught me that ‘distilling’ similar ‘feelings’ and ‘perceptions’ from countries on other continents is certain to be considered for ‘politically incorrect’, even ‘racism’, I’ll abstain from that… this time: after all, and although I do not like even thinking about making predictions, one thing is 1000% certain already now. There’re going to be lots of opportunities in the future…
Why am I so sure? That would cause me to digress.
Point is: consider all of this while being Ukrainian — and then try to remain sane.
That’s nasty, nothing else. Therefore, lets — collectively — distract, one more time, by discussing US/NATO’s pledges for ever more of super-turbo-old-new weapons that might — or might not — be delivered to Ukraine. Sometimes in the future. Or whenever. And in Low Energy’s walk down the streets of Kyiv or stumbling while climbing the stairs up the Air Force One….or in Pudding’s speeches and circus shows….
Excuse me, please, but I can only wonder: what screenwriter has written this comedy?
