Ukraine War, 23 September 2022
I’m still busy preparing the ‘Part 3’ of the story of Iranian UAVs. Thus, ‘and instead’, let me review developments on the frontlines of the last few days.
While Putin has broken his promise (given in a speech from 8 March) and announced a ‘partial mobilisation, light’, on 21 September, and is diligently preparing ‘referendums’ in (from north towards south); Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaproizhzhya, and Kherson, his negotiators arranged an exchange of about 215 Ukrainian servicemen — including commanders of the Azov Regiment from Mariupol — for about 57 Russian POWs.
Mind: usually the last few years, the VSRF would call about 130,000 recruits to service in spring, and another 130,000 in autumn. Usually, about 90,000 of these would actually turn up, of which the VSRF proved capable to train around 70,000. If they’re recalling 300,000 reservists now, these might need slightly less training (i.e. some 3–6 weeks of re-training), but no major reinforcements should be expected to reach Ukraine within less than 15 days — because the VSRF lacks the cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers necessary to organise, train, and form coherent units of all the new troops.
BTW, about two weeks ago, the VSRF was planning to establish another new Army Corps, and deploy it to Ukraine by the end of this month. Seems, this plan collapsed due to the lack of troops (might have caused Putin to announce this ‘mobilisation’), and thus this new, IV Army Corps was to be reinforced by about 6,000 inmates from different Russian prisons collected by Wagner PMC. I would say, they might need at least two months of training, but Prigorzhin is surely keen to get them to the frontlines much earlier.
AIR/MISSILE WAR
The VKS flew air strikes using PGMs against unknown targets in Studenok, Slovyansk, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrivsk, Vasyilivka, Zaporizhzhya (5–6 places were hit), and — especially — Mykolaiv.
The latter was hit by up to two dozens of missiles, the last three days. On 20 September, the Russians claimed to have hit the Mykolaiv Armour Works (the largest of its kind I Ukraine). Yesterday, they have targeted the local electricity-, gas- and oil supply network, and a hotel.
In turn, Ukrainians have HIMARS-ed Novoaidar, in eastern Lukhansk (some 60km behind the border), several times on 21 and 22 September. A train carrying a load of T-62 main battle tanks blew up while entering Yasinovatya, north of the Donetsk, yesterday. Reason is unknown.
In the south, a combination of Ukrainian missile- and guerrilla-attacks hit a number of railway lines and airports from Melitopol via Tokmak to Smyrnove.
On the Dnipro, the ZSU artillery has destroyed at least two ferries near Kherson and Nova Kakhovka, the last three days. However, and as reported back on 18 September: the Russians filled the dam lock at Nova Kakhovka with rubble and earth, and constructed three bridges atop of that. That’s going to be very hard to knock out by the ZSU’s artillery — indeed, even by HIMARS. In this fashion, they can keep their troops in Kherson Oblast resupplied by about 200 truck-loads of ammo, food and equipment a day: i.e. deliver perfectly enough to keep these operational.
From flying up to 30 strikes a day, earlier this month, Ukrainian Air Force is down to about 10 strikes a day, but meanwhile targeting ‘even’ Russian positions behind the frontline. This is possible thanks to extensive use of AGM-88s installed on MiG-29s and Su-27s: these claimed hits o 10 Russian air defence systems, yesterday alone.
The biggest news of this morning, though, was a strike by several Iranian-made Shahed-136 loitering PGMs on Odesa. One was claimed as shot down, but two should have hit an administrative building in the port. Supposedly, these were ‘launched from the sea’, but, AFAIK, they do have enough range to reach Odesa from the occupied Crimean Peninsula, too.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
The frontlines have moved — significantly — since my last review of this kind. Thus, cannot but recommend the use of some kind of good map of eastern Ukraine to follow this.
Kupyansk… the 92nd Mech has expanded its bridgehead from Dvorichna to Tavilzhanka and from Kupyansk to Petropavlivka. Indeed, Major-General Tsokov, CO of the 144th Motor Rifle Division — one of 20th CAA’s primary units, was reportedly wounded during the fighting ‘in the Svatove’ area.
Oskil River… The 25th Airborne and the 80th Airborne Assault appear not to have been successful in trying to cross the Oskil and reach Borova: but, further south, Ukrainians have crossed the Oskil River near the town with the same name. Advancing from there, they have liberated Jazkivka, Rubtsi and Lozove and are pushing on Karpivka, further east. The Russians report that it’s the Ukrainian 66th Mech that’s involved in this operation.
With other words: the frontline of the 20th CAA is slowly crumbling. BTW, the Russians claim this has only 3,000 troops and these would be facing 30,000…
Lyman… while failing to wrestle the control of the town from the I Army Corps (Luhansk Separatists), the ZSU has flanked Lyman, around 18–19 September, and along Russian reports is already passing ‘freely’ to the north and south-east of it. That said, Ukrainian units seem not to be driving deep into the Russian-controlled territory, but to cut off road connections between Lyman and logistic centres supplying it. For example, Drobysheve (next place north-west of Lyman) was liberated, and probing attacks are run on places like Zelena Dolyna (north), Stavky (east), and Zarichne.
Siversk… Ukrainians have liberated Serebyanka and Bilohorivka east of Siversk, and then repulsed a Russian counterattack on Bilohorivka, on the 20 September, but they seem to have been stopped while trying to reach Lysychansk, the last 3–4 days (although, I’m not sure if the ZSU really ‘tried this seriously’: AFAIK, it’s got only the 115th TD Brigade there). The frontline further south was stabilised by interventions of the 4th Tank and the 93rd Mech, and is running roughly from Spirne (liberated), via Soledar and Bakhmutske to Bakhmut — even more so because the Russians withdrew the Wagner PMC from the latter, to bolster defences of Severodonetsk. That said, the Separatists are still trying to reach Bakhmut from the south: the ‘6th Cossack Regiment’ and PMCs have secured Zaitseve and Kodema, and from there are pushing on positions of the 72nd Mech in Odradivka and Opytne.
Down the LOC…. Ukrainians have stabilised the situation in the Krasnohorivka area; Avdiivka is holding out (and hundreds of people living there are still there, too), Pisky is ‘largely’, though still not ‘completely’ under the Russian control, but VSRF and Separatist attacks north and west of it have all been spoiled, the last few weeks.
Zaporizhzhya is ‘quiet’ — except for constant artillery duels, shelling, and above-mentioned Russian air strikes. That said, this seems to be the area with most intensive deployment of Iranian-made UAVs and UCAVs, meanwhile: a Shahid-129 each (reconnaissance UAV, though capable of being armed, too) was claimed shot down by Ukrainians there, yesterday and the day before. Four Shahid-136 loitering PGMs were claimed as shot donw, too.
BATTLE OF KHERSON
Northern side of the frontline is ‘frozen’ for nearly two weeks now: seemingly, the 128th Moutnain currently has no solution for taking Novovoskresenske, and is still in northern outskirts of the village.
The 35th Naval Infantry is fighting to widen the Inhulets Bridgehad: has troops inside Krasnosilske and Charivne, but neither is under firm control — yet.
In the south, on 20 September, the 28th Mech has liberated Pravdyne, but just for a few hours: the Russians counterattacked, knocked out numerous vehicles and forced Ukrainians to withdraw. In turn, Ukrainians have forced the Russians out of Kyselivka, but still do not control the place. Similarly, the VSRF has managed to recover Sofivka and its troops are still holding out in Stanislav and Shyroka Balka.
