Ukraine War, 24 May 2022
Hello everybody!
Just a short update today, for I’m busy elsewhere (sorry, but I’ve got to pay my bills), while there are few important developments in the Donbass.
On popular request, I’m back to the practice of starting this one with the list of Abbreviations:
AAB — Airborne Assault Brigade (Ukraine)
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
CBU — cluster bomb units
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
KIA — killed in action
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MIA — missing in action
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
PMC — private military company/contractor
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)
TR — Tank Regiment (Russia)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
West OSK — Western Military District (Russia)
WIA — wounded in action
Airborne to the Rescue
For the start, the Ukrainian GenStab has re-deployed the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade all the way from the Mykolaiv area to the Severodonetsk Cauldron. The unit already had its first clash with its Russian pendant, the crack 76th VDV Division, probably in the Volodymyrivka-Vrubivka area. The last I’ve heard of the 76th, this had at least three BTGs deployed there, one of which was trying to outflank Ukrainian positions north of Oleksandropillia by passing from Komyshuvakha to the north before turning west to attack Vasylivka.
This morning, a video surfaced, released by the 80th AAB and shown arms captured from troops of the 76th VDV.
Related to the 80th AAB, there are two interesting developments. As reported yesterday, the unit shot down a Su-25 of the VKS. I thought this would’ve happened ‘somewhere south of Kryvyi Rihh’ — because the 80th AAB used to be deployed there. Well, obviously, this was wrong: this happened somewhere over the Severodonetsk Cauldron. That said, the point about importance of this bit of news was the pilot of that jet: Major-General Kanamat H. Botashev.
At first look, some might jump to the conclusions like, ‘hey, this is great, another Russian general KIA’.
However, Botashev was a retired officer of the VKS, not active any more.
So, why is this important?
Car Sharing
Because Botashev flew for Wagner PMC during the sortie that ended with his death.
We’re all the time focusing our attention at the RFA and trying to find out how many BTGs it’s got and where, and what is its supply situation. This is understandable considering its sheer size and the importance it has regarding logistics. However, the importance of the regular Russian Federation Armed Forces is decreasing: the party that’s ever more important is the Wagner PMC. This is not only so because it was the Wagner PMC that forced the Ukrainian 24th Mech out of Popasna, and thus instrumented the first major penetration of the LOC in this war, but because meanwhile it seems that the mass of reservists drafted by Moscow over the last few weeks were all actually recruited by — or at least ‘re-routed’ to — Wagner.
As is known from its operations in Libya since 2019, Wagner is not limited to ground forces: Botashev’s death is confirming the involvement of its flying units in Ukraine. Now, perhaps some of these are something like ‘car sharing’ aircraft with the VKS: more likely, though, is that they have their own Su-25s. At least this would explain why are there Russian-operated Su-25s to be seen in the skies over Ukraine, wearing no national insignia, or having these repainted by that big white ‘Z’ across the fin.
Wagner to the Rescue
Few other points to think about: when Popasna fell, there were ‘reports’ in the Russian social media about ‘this RFA unit being gauged by Wagner as good…another as not so good’ etc. Didn’t understand the importance of that at first: after all, come on, I said, since when should a mercenary outfit be in a position to ‘gauge’ the quality of regular armed forces?
However, gauging by the performance of the Wagner BTG in combat in the Popasna area, they do seem to be much more combat experienced and -effective than RFA’s ‘regulars’ — even if the latter are all supposed to be ‘kontraktniki’, i.e. contracted professionals, just like those serving with Wagner.
….and now comes the next piece of bad news: while I was still busy trying to track down that ’11-kilometres-long’ convoy of RFA tanks reported as approaching the Popasna area, the last few days, the Keystone Cops in Moscow have taken care to get some rest for that Wagner BTG that took Popasna, and then re-deployed it further south. At least some 2–3, perhaps 4 days ago, it appeared on both sides of the Ukrainian 30th Mech Brigade, deployed in the Troitske area.
The Wagner simultaneously attacked the northern and eastern flanks of the 30th Mech, which is — or, better said: was — defending the area between Troitske in the north, and Myronivskyi in the south.
It’s the Railways, Stupid
The area selected for this attack by Wagner might appear strange: it’s on the northern side of Horlivka, a town controlled by DNR-Separatists since 2014–2015, but surrounded by some of most massive Ukrainian fortification of the entire LOC — and that from ‘2,5 sides’. For three months, the Separatists were assaulting the Ukrainian frontlines there, without much success (bar for a narrow penetration in direction of Toretsk, ‘easily’ contained by the Ukrainian Army). They only suffered massive losses.
However, by assaulting the 30th Mech from the north, from within the Popasna Pocket, the Wagner could attack much poorer Ukrainian fortifications than those constructed along the LOC over the last 7–8 years.
Moreover, just like the Kadiivka-Alchevsk-area east of Popasna, so also the Horlivka area has a well-developed railway system. With other words: there are no supply issues for the RFA — nor for Wagner — ; and, even if, they bring in their railway troops to repair the line, as shown on this video released by the Zvezda TV.
Now, while I do not know if the Wagner attack on Troitske was successful, by now it is sure, the Wagner did take Myronivskyi, on the Lugan River — either yesterday, or already a day before.
This is unlikely to sound a lot: Lugan is only some 150km long and no big water obstacle, and Myronivskyi is no Las Vegas or Monte Carlo. But, well: by taking this place, the Wagner not only effected another major penetration of Ukrainian fortifications along the LOC but probably forced the 30th Mech to completely withdraw to the western side of the Lugan.
Moreover, Wagner (and the RFA, both bolstered by supplies flowing along that well-developed railway network in their backs), then pushed on and secured Svitlodarsk — and, as even a brief look at the map is clearly shown, that is a very important piece of real estate. With Svitlodarsk in their hands, the Russians not only have a direct route to approach Bakhmut from south-east, with next to no obstacles in between, but are going to be able to connect the railway systems between Popasna and Horlivka, thus further improving their supply situation.
Unsurprisingly, there are now reports about the 76th VDV managing to cut off the T1302 — that crucial road connecting Bakhmut and Lysychansk, too.
***
Overall, in comparison to all these developments, and sorry to say it but: reports about the Ukrainians running a successful counterattack south-east of Severodonetsk, and to have recovered Toshkivka (on the southern bank of Siversky Donets) are ‘peanuts’.
