Ukraine War, 25–26 April 2022
Good morning everybody!
Up front: I gave up writing my commentary of all the PRBS, sensationalism, and hysteria about Transnistria, Lavrov’s statements, German tanks etc. circulated in the mainstream- and social media of the last few days: entirely pointless waste of time and energy, surpassing even the levels of all the nonsense that was flying around during the worst times of the Syrian War (and that was a LOT!). Thus, there’s no ‘Strategic’ section today: the only thing that really matters right now is that the Ukrainian railway system is largely back at its full speed, that first batch each of US-made M142 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers and M777 howitzers is in Ukraine, and Ukrainian Army troops are undergoing training on Panzerhaubitze 2000, which is going to be delivered at least from Italy, if not from Germany, too (BTW, the latter is going to deliver 50 Gepards — which, contrary to what nearly everybody is reporting, are no ‘tanks’, but a pair of Swiss-made, Oerlikon autocannons calibre 35mm installed on the chassis of the Leopard 1 tank….and so complex, training on them is taking long).
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
CBU — cluster bomb units
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
intel — intelligence
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
KIA — killed in action
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MIA — missing in action
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
OPSEC — operational security (prevention of inadvertent revelation of potentially critical or sensitive data)
PMC — private military company/contractor
POL — petrol, oil, lubricants
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)
TR — Tank Regiment (Russia)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
AIR
After a 24-hour break on 25 April, yesterday, the VKS and the Russian Navy continued striking infrastructure objects in Ukraine. Around 06.50hrs in the morning, three missiles have targeted installations in the Zaporozhye area. One was shot down near Spasivka, but two others hit an aluminium plant (purportedly, the video below is shown the results of that attack), killing one and wounding another person.
EDIT: today, the Keystone Cops in Moscow are reporting that this strike on that aluminium plant in Zaporozhye has destroyed a ‘large shipment of Western armament and ammunition’… ho-hum…
The ‘efficiency’ of Russian cruise missile strikes was ‘nicely’ illustrated in attack on the Zatoka Bridge, in the Odesa area, too: a crucial link in the road- and railway connection between south-western Ukraine and Rumania. The Russians targeted it by three missiles: one crashed harmlessly nearby, another fell into the water, and the third damaged the bridge. The Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed the bridge as ‘blocked’, but according to Ukrainian authorities, traffic resumed shortly after (even if along one line only — due to repairs on the railway line).
The Russians are also priding themselves with this highly-precise Kalibr-strike on an ‘ammunition depot’ : so much so, nobody’s paying attention about the lack of ‘secondaries’ (additional explosions caused by ammunition set on fire by the strike).
…a part of me thinks I shouldn’t write and publish the following: after all, the Keystone Cops have demonstrated remarkable skills in following the social media, over the two months of this war. But, sorry, can’t hold back.
A) Despite eight years of war, the Ukrainians seem never to came to the idea to duplicate an installation of importance and vulnerability of the Zatoka Bridge?
B) In general, the Russian ‘cruise-missile offensive’ is beginning to remind me of the Iraqi aerial offensive against the Iranian economy, in 1986–1987 period. Whenever the Iraqis badly damaged oil-exporting installations on the Khark Island, in the northern Persian Gulf, they would switch their focus and target something else, or Saddam — who never understood even the bare basics of ‘air power’ — would order a missile strike on one of Iranian urban centres, distracting everybody away from what mattered…. is speaking ‘volumes’ about …sigh…. military skills of the strategic genious and Great Marshal Vladimir, and the capability of the Keystone Cops in Moscow to withstand his nonsensical orders…
….ah me and my questions and ideas…
Anyway, on 25 April, the Ukrainians claimed the downing of three VKS aircraft and four bigger UAVs, and yesterday, one of their Su-25 should’ve shot down a VKS Su-25, by cannon fire, in the Kherson area (Ukrainian Su-25 are not R-73 compatible), plus photos surfaced confirming the downing of the Su-34 serial number RF-95858, and the Ukrainians found a downed Mi-28 outside Kyiv (the latter must’ve been knocked out early during the war).
In this regards, there are at least three things that are certain:
A) Ukrainian air defences remain effective over the battlefield;
B) after enduring 25+ years of endless hyping of that type ever since it was shown in the public for the first time, at Farnborough Air Show, back in — from memory — 1995–1997, there is a specific dose of satisfaction to see in what numbers is the Sukhoi Su-34 shot down in this war.
C) There’s rarely a sight as encouraging for ground troops but for own jets to force those of the enemy to run away — especially in this case: along reports from the Donbass, VKS Su-25 are really causing lots of problems to the Ukrainian troops there…
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Over the last two days, the Russian ‘reconnaissance’ south of Izium that (according to Ukrainians) ‘was quickly stopped’, went on in direction of Pashkove, Dovhenke and Velkya Komushuvakha — and because the Ukrainians ‘stopped this attack so quickly’, already two days ago, on 25 April, the RFA took Dovhenke and entered Dibrovne and Pashkove. The latter is only 5km north of the road and railway line connecting Barvinkove and Slovyansk.
Surely enough, the Ukrainians managed to recover at least Pashkove, perhaps also to force the Russians out of Dibrovne, yesterday, but gauging by the… erm… ‘quality’ of related Ukrainian reporting, I doubt the situation there is that great. The only Russian attack in this area that was really stopped was the one on Zavody, on 25 April: apparently, the 93rd Mech bushwacked another of RFA’s ‘convoys’ attempting to reach the place.
The Russians pushing from Borova in southern direction have reached the northern outskirts of Yatskivka, which is also no good news — even more so because it seems their artillery has heavily hit an Ukrainian unit entrenched in the forest south of that village, early on 26 April.
Ironically, the Ukrainians are still explaining about holding off the Russians in the outskirts of Zarichne, but meanwhile it’s clear the RFA attempted to reach Lyman, 15km further south-west, because on 25 April they ambushed one of Ukrainian Army units and captured about a dozen of defenders…
…hm…misreporting about developments on the battlefield is never a good idea, because maps are speaking a very clear language…
Rubizhne is a scene of a bitter battle for at least the fifth consequent day meanwhile. Precise details are not available, though. Nyzhnye and Orikhove were under fierce attacks, too: apparently, the RFA there first shells and rockets, then sends Separatists, and only then follows with own troops. No surprise the Ukrainians are regularly reporting 10–15 assaults a day — and how kind of Russians: at the times Lavrov is almost in tears while explaining about all the mishandling of Russians in Moldova and Ukraine, Moscow’s care for ‘brothers in need’ remains…touching…
North-east of Popasna, it is now confirmed that the Russians have captured what was left of the town of Novotoshkivske: read, ruins of what used to be that place, then after two months of intensive shelling I doubt even one wall is still standing upright.
Popasna — or what was once Popasna — remains a hot-spot, with the Russians shelling, rocketing and bombing Ukrainian positions with all available means, and nearly all of the time.
Russians are now not only pushing all-out on Marinka, but are trying to storm Krasnohorivka north of it, and Novomykhailivka, south of it.
Overall, yes, the Russians are, ‘still’, pushing forward with immense pressure, and they’re still advancing — especially south of Izium. But, make no mistake: all their gains are extremely slow and minimal by nature. They seem never to have something like ‘2nd echelon’ to exploit whatever little success they do have. Once again: I do not see them being capable of achieving at least some sort of major victory at operational level. Foremost, their operations are depending on massive volumes of artillery fire and air strikes, and, at least so far, the mass of these is not enough: Ukrainians are well entrenched and even if their forward-most units are beginning to get tired and short on supplies, still holding out.
That said, the issue of keeping troops in forward lines between Rubizhne and all the way down to Vuhledar resupplied and rested is beginning to be a problem for Ukrainians. At least it’s certain that the disruption of the railway network in western Ukraine of the last two days was promptly felt all the way to the East. Not only is the constant Russian barrage ruining their nerves, but if the supply situation is not improved, they’ll have a problem of having to fight the Russian assaults with their firearms only, and these are not particularly effective against tanks…
Still, I do not see the purpose of all these assaults on massive Ukrainian fortifications in the east, when the same troops could’ve been deployed north and south of the LOC, where their presence could’ve changed a lot about the situation…but then, that’s me…
MARIUPOL
Because Putin ordered an end of assaults on Mariupol, during the night from 25 to 26 April, the defenders of Azovstal have counted 35 air strikes. Some of civilians sheltering in the dungeons underneath the factory were buried by the rubble, prompting Ukrainian troops to launch recovery attempts. Another critical issue is the condition of hundreds (estimated at more than 500) of wounded: they have to be kept in big groups, in unsanitary conditions. Alone the availability of clear water is a big issue (i.e. there is simply none).
SOUTH
The 58th CAA seems to have breached Ukrainian positions south-east of Zaporozhye: at least it has reached, if not taken, Trudoliubivka, near Orikhiv, and Polohy, north of Molochansk. As usually, the Ukrainians claim the situation under control, but there’s no doubt that they’re facing very bad odds. If for no other reason then because there’s so much of Russian artillery around, and this has so much ammo, that it is heavily shelling multiple places in this area: Komyshuvakha, for example, was hit by a volley of BM-27 rockets.
Further east… to my big surprise, the 70th GMRR has survived the Ukrainian fire from two directions and really captured Novosilka, near Zelene Pole: could it be the defenders are short on ammo?
Kherson…. the situation there is meanwhile short of becoming absurd: while the Ukrainian authorities can’t stop announcing a growing concentration of Russian forces north of the city, an ‘incoming’ RFA offensive in direction of Kryivy Rih, and vivid reconnaissance activity of the enemy, they are also reporting continuous advance in direction of the city, including taking Blahodatne, Kyselivka, and Klapya, and attacks on Velyka Oleksandrivka, Novodmytrivka, and Bilousove. With this, they’ve actually widened their ‘corridor’ to Chornobayivka, a north-western suburb of Kherson (interestingly, Kyiv didn’t confirm the liberation of Chornobayivka, although this should’ve taken place already three days ago).
