Ukraine War, 25 September 2022
Good morning everybody,
this will be just a short update, entirely focusing on a relatively limited sector of the frontline in the south-eastern-most corner of Kharkiv Oblast.
This is where the latest drama in Putin’s ad-hoc/plan-less escalation in his war on the USA is taking place (yes, on the USA, then in his mind, and just like six-seven years ago in Syria, this is actually a war on the USA, ‘by accident’ taking place on ‘some territory there, named Ukraine’).
Essentially, the trounced 1st Guards Tanks Army — now probably including elements of the useless 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army and the lackluster 41st Combined Arms Army — gave way to attacks of the 25th Mech and the 66th Motor Rifle Brigades. Over the last 36 hours, the latter two have liberated Lozove and Pisky-Radkivski, then took the Russians by surprise by turning east, reached Nove, and, further north, Makiivka.
South of that area, the Russians report losing contact to two of their PMC units (Bars-13 and Bars-16), two nights ago, but another one — Kuban Regiment — should still be holding out in Lyman.
This ‘situation’ began unfolding on 23 September: as of yesterday in the morning, it was bad enough for the Keystone Cops in Moscow and the South OSK to rush the VKS into direct attacks on advancing Ukrainian units. Exactly like few weeks ago, this resulted in the Russians suffering heavy losses in aircraft and helicopters. Alone yesterday, Ukrainians have claimed as shot down:
1 Ka-52
1 Mi-8
1–2 Su-25s (apparently, both by the 25 Mech, in the Lozove area)
1 Su-30SM (by 25 Mech, in the Lozove area)
(Both Su-34 crews ejected safely: one was picked up by a CSAR helo, shortly after, the other had to walk back to own lines.)
6 UAVs
….is a normal situation when one is operating super-turbo fighter jets, equipped with radars with claimed range of 400km, LERX, canards and thrust-vectoring engines for super-manoeuvreability — but has no PGMs, and the crew has too little training in deployment of dumb bombs..
With other words: ‘System Putin’.
ADD-ON
Some are asking me, why are the Russians still fighting — indeed: launching repeated counterattacks against Ukrainian units advancing north of Lyman? At least according to Ukrainian reports (meanwhile nearly always confirmed by Russian complaints), all of these are easily repelled, usually with ‘catastrophic’ losses of involved VSRF units.
So, why aren’t the Russians withdrawing to defensible lines in the areas of Svatove and Kremina? Some are wondering if there is a total collapse in the Russian chain of command; at least about how comes this is so poorly informed; and making such poor decisions….?
Once again, cannot but repeat the same explanation I’ve offered already so many times: it is Putin who is in command.
At least it is so that nobody below his level dares issuing any kind of orders without his consent.
Putin is fighting ‘his own’ war, in total disregard for reality, for military doctrine, strategy and tactics — and he can’t care less about what the GRU and Spetsnaz might be informing him about, or about VSRF’s losses, or ‘conserving troops to protect whatever places in that territory’.
Thus, people like me ‘must’ forget nearly everything we thought we knew about the VSRF and the way it operates: this is not the VSRF’s, but Putin’s way of fighting a war.
If at all, all that matters to him is to buy time: time necessary to run his quasi-referendums, to mobilise reservists, refresh their training and deploy them in Ukraine. That’s taking days and weeks. Thus, Putin needs time.
By launching counterattacks — regardless how costly — he’s keeping Ukrainians busy, slowing down their advance (if nothing else, they have to mop-up the battlefield, collect POWs, check what of equipment left behind by the Russians is still useful, run additional recce to secure their flanks etc.).
Thus, regardless of casualties, about which Putin can’t care less, this is about buying time.
