Ukraine War, 31 January 2023: Tactical Level
It’s been two hectic weeks, with lots of work and thus no reports. At least none published: have written quite a few, reviewing different developments. However, nothing appeared really ‘fitting’ at that moment in time. It required some more reflection.
Anyway, a lot has happened on the strategic level, relatively little on the operational-, and few things at the tactical. Thus, let me start reviewing the developments of the last two weeks with the latter.
BATTLE OF DONBASS
Generally, the mass of the frontline remained where it was in mid-January. That said, the VSRF has launched at least two powerful counterattacks, and whatever is left of Wagner is still attacking in the Bakhmut area. However, the price extracted by Ukrainians is so massive that meanwhile it’s primarily the VSRF’s and VDV’s ‘mobiks’ that are assaulting. In this regards it’s fascinating to monitor how Putin and his generals seem to remain insistent on demonstrating they not only have no other ideas but ‘frontal infantry assault with some mechanised- and lots of artillery support’, but simply no solutions for predicament into which they’ve put themselves.
Kupyansk… kind of ‘no news’, except for sporadic exchanges of artillery fire.
Svatove… since the failure of all the Russian counterattacks on Novoselivske, no news. Sure, some of related videos were shown VSRF’s tanks driving around the edge of the village, but they’ve failed to recover it. In turn, Ukrainians didn’t launch new attacks in direction of Svatove. Seems, both sides are preoccupied with bringing reinforcements and improving their current positions.
Kremina… Some 4–5 days ago, the VSRF launched a powerful counterattack in this area, involving the 237th Armoured Regiment, the BARS-13, at least two motor rifle regiments, and well-supported by artillery. Have driven Ukrainians away from the northern and southern fringes of the town, but failed to advance in western direction, on on Zarichne and Torske, for example. Actually, the centre prong of that counterattack was stopped cold well to the east of Dibrova. This was a costly operation involving too few forces to achieve anything meaningful, and run in dumb manner: frontally. It’s so pointless, I cannot but wonder about its exact intention. Perhaps it can be described as ‘successful in tying four brigades of the ZSU’ in this area’? See: buying yet more time for construction of the Russian ‘defence in depth’ along the P66 highway, further east. (As mentioned earlier, the VSRF is working feverishly on establishing a massive line of fortifications, all protected by deep minefields, all along the frontline from the border in north-western Luhansk, all the way down to the Dnipro River.)
Bakhmut…. This is the only area where the Russians managed to make some advances, the last two weeks. Even then, and ‘up front’: reports from ZSU units deployed there are kind of ‘no problem, everything’s fine’ — and that regardless of what is going on. More precisely:
- North of Bakhmut, on 25 January, the Wagner and VDV have crossed the Bakhmutska River and advanced into Blahodatne with the aim of assaulting northern Paraskoviivka and Krasna Hora in the south, but also from Blahodatne towards the M03 highway in the west. Blahodatne turned out to be largely empty of Ukrainian troops, though: instead, they’ve entrenched in the hills west and above the village, thus having an excellent field of fire upon whatever is moving below them. Moreover, the ZSU has meanwhile brought in another artillery brigade (at least third, if nor the fourth…I know of the 40th, 43rd and 45th there; now they’ve been reinforced by another one) to the Bakhmut area, and subjected the Russians to such barrages that WarGonzo was left into village on 29 January, only. That said, even as of the last evening, Wagner still had no firm control of the village: it was losing troops while trying to establish any kind of positions there.
- Eastern Bakhmut: Russians claiming this or that house, or this or that section of this and that street….but actually going nowhere.
- Klishchivka… the ZSU definitely withdrew out of the village, but is in firm control of the hill above it, on the western side, and thus smashing whatever is trying to come its way — or trying to bypass south of Klishchivka, in direction of Stupochky.
Bottom line: Bakhmut remains in Ukrainian control, the M03 and the road to Kostyantyvka remain open for the flow of Ukrainian reinforcements and supplies (and evacuation of the wounded). Indeed, the reorganisation of the ZSU garrison seems to have been completed. The 61st and 63rd Mech, supported by the 4th Tank, are now holding the line north of the town; the 1st Special, the 3rd Assault, the 24th Mech and the 57th Motor Rifle are holding Bakhmut, and the 28th and 60th Mech are holding the southern side. Foremost: instead of ‘elements from too many units’, most of involved brigades are now present in full force — and that usually means they have all of their 4–5 battalions in this area (yup: the mass of ZSU brigades nowadays include 4–5 battalions; several have 6). Several brigades are held ‘in reserve’ west of the town, too.
Avdiivka… I have no idea who is in command on the Russian side of the Donetsk sector. Can only assess that the character in question simply has no solution for any of his tasks. And his troops are facing some of the best Ukrainian fortifications at all. Unsurprisingly, on 28 January, another assault on Vodyane was easily repulsed.
Marinka…at least the local Russian commander did come to a new idea, and was trying to bypass the southern side of this completely ruined town, the last few days. Without success: the DNR units there (meanwhile all officially integrated into the VSRF) suffered only additional losses — foremost to the artillery of the ZSU.
Vuhledar….This area was the scene of another pointless major counterattack by the VSRF, the last few days. On 25 January, the Russians deployed the rebuilt 40th and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigades, Vostok Battalion, Kaskad Battalion, several minor units of the GRU, and at least a regiment of Spetsnaz to assault from Mykilske over the flat and open terrain towards north. Announced as something like ‘big offensive’ by such instances like Rybar, and regardless how often repeated, all the attacks have been smashed by Ukrainian artillery, with heavy losses in Russian MBTs, IFVs (must be a new record in turret-tossing), and infantry: the mass of involved Russian units never managed to at least enter the range of Ukrainian machine guns. On 27 January, the ZSU then counterattacked the nearest Russian group of forces south of Vuhledar, and overrun it. As of the last night, the Russians were thus back to their starting positions, east of Pavlivka. Must admit I’m a little bit confused about ZSU units deployed there, though: some say the 72nd Mech, others say 79th Airborne. Could be both, too.
Southern Zaporizhzhya and the Dnipro ‘front’ were ‘quiet’ the last two weeks — bar usual small-unit action (see: patrols, reconnaissance, artillery barrages etc.).
Note for the end: pay attention at the lack of effectiveness of the Russian artillery. This is still superior in numbers to that of the ZSU (at least some 5–6 times), but — and as ‘announced’ already back in June-July 2022 — due to the cold weather, it’s Orlan UAVs are out of action (or when used, crashing, having frozen optics etc.). The VSRF remains short on forward controllers, and its communication remain poor. Thus, and for most of the time, the VSRF’s artillery is firing ‘blind’. Of course, it must be expected this to change as soon as the weather gets better. In turn, the VKS is nowadays often forced to intervene with its Mi-24s and Ka-52s (not sure if all of the takes in the latter video are ‘recent’).
