Ukraine War, 9, 10, 11 April 2022
Good morning everybody,
here’s my summary on Ukraine War for the last three days, 9, 10, and 11 April 2022.
CAA — Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG — Battalion Tactical Group (700–800 troops, Russia)
CBU — cluster bomb units
GCAA — Guards Combined Arms Army (Russia)
GMRD — Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA — Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD — Guards Tank Division (Russia)
Keystone Cops in Moscow — Ministry of Defence (Russia)
KIA — killed in action
LOC — Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass)
MBT — main battle tank
Mech — Mechanised Brigade (Ukraine)
MIA — missing in action
MRB — Motorised Rifle Brigade (Russia)
MRD — Motorised Rifle Division (Russia)
PMC — private military company/contractor
RFA — Russian Federation Army
South OSK — Southern Military District (Russia)
Tank — Tank Brigade (Ukraine)
TR — Tank Regiment (Russia)
VKS — Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space force, Russia)
West OSK — Western Military District (Russia)
WIA — wounded in action
STRATEGIC
Amid reports about ‘Western sanctions having no effect’, it turned out Russia began missing payments and defaulting on its foreign debt.
But don’t worry: glorious Austrian chancellor and strategic genious Nehammer travelled to Moscow, yesterday (11 Apr), to ‘intermediate’ with Putin. Nehammer is from the ÖVP: precisely the party that excelled for driving Austria into near-total dependence on the Russian oil and gas, over the last 30 years. His trip was so well-prepared, that even the Green Party that’s a part of his coalition government wasn’t informed about it — and that’s not to talk about the mass of EU governments. But, honestly: who cares, actually? For the Austrian oligarchy that’s paying Nehammer, relations to Putin and ‘the vision’ about dominance of the Russian bank- and oil/gas-sectors are far more important than any kind of Estonian, Latvian, Polish, French or whatever other feelings… Feelings do not yield profit, comprende?
To make sure, Nehammer declared he is expecting nothing from talking to Putin — prompting many to wonder: WTF did he travel to Moscow at all? I’m sure he wondered about this issue even more, considering this was a ‘business trip’ and he couldn’t take his usual entourage of (at least) 20 journalists with him. Thus, there are no photos. What a shame….But hey: at least Nehammer was in all the news, yesterday evening and this morning — which is about all that matters to every decent populist… Bottom line: alone discussing this tragicomedy is entirely pointless.
Army General Dvornikov seems to have concluded the complete mobilisation of all available males in the ‘DNR’ and the ‘LNR’, over the last few days. The aim is as obvious as cynical — as this is typical for him. The RFA is critically short on trained personnel and reservists, especially on infantry (the lack of infantry is one of reasons for heavy losses of its mechanised troops). Thus, nothing better but to draft Separatists: ‘if they want DNR and LNR, let them fight for them, too’. Plus, losses suffered by the Separatists are ‘no Russian losses’, and thus Putin needs not being worried about possible problems at home. In total, the DNR and the LNR can be expected to provide about 40–45 BTGs (each of 600–800 troops) to the frontline.
AIR
Over the last three days, the RFA intensified its missile- and artillery barrage of the Kharkiv area. Over 50 strikes were recorded every single day, and the local authorities are reporting a steady stream of civilian casualties. Most of strikes are entirely random and can hit everybody, any time of the day. Another eight were killed and 19 wounded in a missile strike this morning.
The worst of all was the Russian strike of the Kramatorsk railway station, on 9 April, where a big gathering of civilians waiting for a train to evacuate them was hit: at least 57 were killed (including 5 children), and 114 wounded.
Deeper inside Ukraine, the Keystone Cops in Moscow claimed the ‘destruction’ of an entire base of the National Guard in Zvonetske, in the Dnipropetrovsk region. They have targeted the airport of Dnipro City and nearby Pavlovhrad with Kalibr cruise missiles on 9 April, claiming to have destroyed four launchers of Slovakian-delivered S-300 system. Interestingly, it was official Bratislava that ‘categorically denied’ this claim. This morning, the Ukrainians claim to have shot down one of Russian ballistic missiles targeting the Dnipro area. In the south, on 10 April, the Russians targeted the Chornomorks area with cruise missiles: it remains unclear what have they hit.
NORTH-EAST
Ukrainian 92nd Mech seems to have launched another of its raids — this time north-west of Kharkiv, on 10 April. First reports indicate that it has liberated the village of Zolochoiv.
Following reports about the deployment of a big column of the RFA alng the road from Velykyi Burluk to Izium, Ukrainians claimed the destruction of the same, on 10 April, but so far I found no visual evidence. The frontline south of Izium was ‘quiet’, the last few days: that is, the Ukrainians are knocking out single Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles by a combination of UAVs, artillery, and anti-tank guided missiles.
EAST
The Russians spent the last three days with heavy shelling of most of the LOC between Severodonetsk, Rubizhne, Popasna and all the way down to Vuhledar. Between others, on 9 April they have hit a chemical factory in Rubizhne, including a cylinder with 4,000kg of nitric acid. This released a big toxic cloud — which then spread towards the Russian positions in the Kudryashivka and Varvarika area. Yesterday, they targeted Popasna by a single Tochka ballistic missile, and then attempted to expand their grip on the town, but that attack was repelled.
In turn, the Ukrainians are focusing on pounding whatever RFA mechanised units they can find — and then, primarily, by their artillery, like in this case: the RFA unit hit should have been the 70th MRR of the 42nd MRD, which lost its commander, too.
MARIUPOL
By now it is sure that — by deploying several additional Separatist BTGs and subjecting the defenders to relentless air- and artillery strikes — Dvornikov has managed the first major Russian success in several weeks. The Separatists are operating in relatively small assault groups, all well-armed with RPO-A Shmels: these are rocket-propelled grenades with thermobaric warheads. On 10 April, supported by the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (58th CAA) and the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment, the Separatists have managed to secure the Fishing Port, much of the Primorsky District, and the east bank of the Azovstal District. The garrison has thus lost the ability to maintain a contiguous defence perimeter and was split into three pockets.
There are extremely contradictory reports about what of Ukrainian units is holding which part. For example the 36th Naval Infantry is usually described as holding the north of the city, and the Azov Regiment the Azovstal area. But, others say it’s the 12th Brigade National Guard holding out in the Azovstal, and that the Azov Regiment should be holding southern part of the city (the latter is confirmed by some of videos released by the latter).
Last night, the social media was brimming with reports about a chemical weapon attack on the defenders of the Azovstal plan. Accordingly, this was undertaken by an UAV, and resulted in several of Azov’s fighters shown symptoms like suffering from Sarin attack. So far, I haven’t seen any evidence supporting this.
SOUTH
The Ukrainian advances on Kherson have been stopped by the 49th CAA, on 8 and 9 April, and, in few cases, reversed, too. Kherson thus remains under Russian control. The Russians then claimed to have knocked out a Ukrainian S-300 SAM-site deployed at the Chuhiv AB and Starobohdanovka, outside Mykolaiv. Regardless if truth or not, this might be an indication that the reinforced Ukrainians are now trying to curb the VKS activity over the frontlines between Mykolaiv and Kherson by forward-deploying their heavy SAMs.
