Ukraine War: Q & A, 24 July 2022

Hello everybody!

Because I’ve been asked quite a lots of questions — privately, but by several representatives of the media, the last few days, I’m ‘interrupting’ my ‘break/vacation’ from reporting on developments in Ukraine War.

It’s by accident that I’m doing this on this 24 July: while many are counting days of this war, I’m counting months — and today it so happens to be five months since the Fool in Kremlin has launched his aggression of Ukraine.

My usual disclaimer at this point: for all the fans of the Fool in Kremlin — in Russia and abroad, don’t worry, everything is developing along the plan for his 3–14-days-special-military-operation. There’s no reason to worry, and no need for you to continue reading this. Thanks for your attention.

For everybody else: there were no ‘major’ developments on the battlefield for the last week or so (well, except that lots of humans were killed, maimed or else….). Thus, today I’m going to address few questions sent my way the last few days — especially those related to outright mythology spread by different instances in the mainstream- and the social media (in Ukraine and abroad).

Q: Rumours are circulated about Western partners intending to supply advanced fighter-bombers to Ukraine: types like Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter EF-2000 Typhon, SAAB Gripen, etc.?

The mass of such stories are within realms of daydreaming. Ukraine might get ‘second-hand’ US jets — like Republic A-10A Thunderbolt II, perhaps even Lockheed-Martin F-16C Fighting Falcon — but I doubt any of European NATO-partners might become the first to make such a move.

As for why: right now, the USA have their own reasons why they’re considering delivering their fighter jets to Ukraine (principal of these is profit: once Ukraine gets such aircraft, it’s ‘tied’ to the USA for years and decades in advance, and will have to pay — one way or the other — for related training, spares, armament and other sorts of support). Not only the USA, but European NATO-partners are still lacking the understanding of the fact that Putin’s marauders have been mauled to the point where they cannot defeat Ukraine, not to talk about represent a serious conventional threat for NATO members in Europe. Therefore, they’re all still so scared that their emphasis remains re-arming their own armed forces (‘instead’ of sending their heavy arms to Ukraine so this can finish what Putin has started).

Furthermore, both the USA and European NATO-partners lack the industrial capacity to deliver any ‘new’ fighter jets to Ukraine within the next, say, 2–3 years. With there being no government ‘ready to weaken own armed forces’ by sending anything that’s currently in service (keep in mind how much were Bulgaria and Slovakia reluctant to send their old MiG-29s and Su-25s), this means: at best, and ‘right now’, NATO simply ‘can’t’ do more but deliver some of second-hand jets — either A-10s and/or F-16s stored at such places like AMARC in the USA.

Let me add that I’m old enough to clearly recall similar rumours being spread by Croats during their struggle with Serbian aggression, back in 1991 (especially around the time of the Battle for Vukovar, but through early 1992, too). At that time, the Croat press was ‘full’ of ‘announcements, predictions and analyses of effects’ of deliveries of all the possible NATO-operated combat aircraft (like F-16s, Dassault Mirage 2000…even BAe Harrier GR.Mk 7 was mentioned in one of articles I might still have in my archive). I understand the motives for such ‘rumours’, but simple matter of fact was (and remains) that all of that was little else but wishful thinking of the ‘journalists’ in question. Keep in mind: Croatia didn’t get any jets from NATO at the time, nor for decades after. Indeed, 20 years later, when Croatia attempted to buy second-hand F-16s from Israel, Trump blocked the deal. It was only the last year that Croatia then ordered Rafales from France in a purely ‘commercial’ deal…. (BTW, deliveries of these Rafales are yet to start).

Instead, back in 1994, Croatia — clandestinely — bought about 40 MiG-21s from Ukraine. Together with spares and weaponry. These jets flew combat operations during the final liberation of Serbian-occupied parts of the country.

However, that was back in the 1990s, when (East) Europe was full of old Soviet arms and it was, relatively, ‘easy’ to find so many such jets. Moreover, Serbian armed forces in Croatia were weak enough for MiG-21s in question to be at least reasonably effective. 25–30 years later, times are entirely different: there are no ‘entire air forces’ stored around this continent, air defences of the VSRF are an entirely different calibre than those of the Serbs, and, even if, Ukraine has no money to, say, ‘go buying something else, somewhere else’.

Bottom line: unless the USA provide something within this quasi-lend-lease treaty, nothing is going to happen in this regards.

Q: Is the destruction of the Antonovsky Road Bridge outside Kherson (photo above) ‘the end’ of the VSRF’s occupation of that Oblast; a situation that’s going to force Russians into withdrawal from that part of Ukraine?

I’m sorry for all those who fell for such illusions.

First and foremost: thinking one can force Putin into a withdrawal from Kherson ‘just like that’ (i.e. by killing a few of his generals, destroying stocks of ammunition, or a few of — Ukrainian — bridges) — that’s endlessly naïve. Fighting Putin’s Russia is like fighting the mythical hydra: remove one head, there are ’15 others’, and while you’re busy fighting these, the one that was cut is growing a new…

The Antonovsky Bridge was ‘just’ damaged. Arguably: in about two dozens of places. However, the structure is strong enough to survive that damage, and thus the bridge remains passable. Arguably, over the last 4–5 days Ukrainians then went on to hit a number of other road bridges in the Kherson area. For example, the Daryevka Bridge — on the Inhulets River, connecting Kherson with Nova Kakhovka — was hit (six times, in a neat row); it might be they have hit Yelyzavetikva, Halahinivka, and Novotymofiivka Bridges, too…

However…sigh….and I’ve stressed the following so often already, that I do not understand why are there still so many not comprehending it…. The essence of Russian logistics system are railways. Railways and trains, ladies and gentlemen: that’s what’s moving the VSRF’s supplies. Why? Because when Russians are fighting, they’re always fighting ‘big style’: a single freight train can move 5,000 tons of cargo. Now think about how many trucks are necessary to do the same… add the size of the Russian Federation; consider ‘even’ the USA and NATO are ‘mass-moving’ their armour by railways. Why should then the Russians be moving their supplies per truck….? That’s only done at the final stage: when they’re distributing ammo from forward depots to combat units.

If nothing else: a quick look at any good map of Ukraine can instantly show that all the Russians have done the last three months was to advance from available railway knots along available railway-lines.

Therefore: expecting that knocking out one road bridge is now going to something like ‘change everything’ in the Kherson area, while ignoring the crucial railway bridge…aw, come on… :rolleyes:

Instead of daydreaming about what effects is the damage of the Antonovsky Road Bridge going to cause to the Russians, ask yourself the following: is anybody talking about the Antonovsky Railway Bridge (photo below)….?

Ah yes… that forgotten bridge, few kilometres further up Dnipro, which is carrying the mass of supplies for VSRF’s units in the Kherson Oblast….

Nope, nobody is talking about it. At most, some are discussing the possibility of the Russians building a pontoon bridge nearby.

…with which this is another ‘closed case’: as long as that — the Antonovsky Railway Bridge over Dnipro — is in operation, nobody needs thinking about any kind of a Russian withdrawal from Kherson.

Why?

Not only because too many people still don’t understand that with the VSRF and its supply-by-train logistics system, but also because knocking out cantilever bridges like this one is awesomely hard. Yes, by ‘high precision’ munition, too: this tends to ‘fly through the structure’ — without causing any kind of damage. Should there be any doubts, ask veterans of the US Air Force about their experiences with the Paul Doumer Bridge in North Vietnam, or the Russians about their experiences with the Pidyomnyy Mist, outside Zatoka, in southern Ukraine…

Finally, interdicting VSRF’s supplies is nothing that’s ending a war with ‘few’ blows. Actually, it’s a process that never ends, or at least has to be regularly repeated. Means: destroying ’15, 20, 30 ammo depots and 5 headquarters’ one week is ‘nice’, but also an exercise that has to be repeated the next week, too. The Russians have certainly — and quickly — rebuilt them somewhere else, and have meanwhile re-supplied (because that Antonovsky Railway Bridge remains intact), and now the entire effort has to be repeated. Just like they’re constructing pontoon-bridges next to almost all the road bridges meanwhile hit by Ukrainian artillery in the Kherson area… or like they’re systematically repairing all the railway bridges knocked out by Ukrainians…

That’s, ‘simply’, the way the wars of this kind have to be fought and why such efforts are never-ending: one has to repeat them, again, and again, and again…

….especially considering the following: mind that achieving this — the destruction of so many ammo depots, headquarters, and damaging few bridges in the Kherson area — required so much effort by the diminutive Ukrainian M142 + NATO-supplied-artillery force, that meanwhile the Russians were left free to repair the crucially important railway bridge in southern Kupyansk, knocked out nearly a month ago. I.e. Ukrainians have not had enough HIMARS’ and long-range 155mm howitzers to at least ‘hinder’, not to talk about ‘prevent’ the Russians from repairing such an important facility. and to knock out bridges in the Kherson area — all at once, simultaneously. Result: since few days, the Russians are able to fully resupply their forces in the Donbass.

….with which we’re back about that with ‘fighting a Hydra’….

Q: ….related to the issue above (i.e. to the fact that Ukrainians still have far too few advanced multiple rocket launchers and artillery pieces) is something that’s, actually, not a question, but an issue several Ukrainian contacts have requested me to address. That’s the topic of the most powerful Russian weapon of the last four months: the combination of Orlan-10 UAVs and MSTA-S self-propelled howitzers calibre 152mm.

You’ve never heard of this? Well, to a certain degree: no surprise. In Ukraine, there’s a lots of talk about this issue. It’s been discussed by multiple local military experts for something like two months already. But: in Ukrainian language. Therefore, and then because it’s ‘no good news’, ‘nothing flashy enough’, ‘too technical’, indeed, ‘no story’ for the Western media, this issue is entirely ignored in the West….

Sure, time and again, all the possible experts are going to explain you how the battlefields of this war are dominated by the Russian artillery. Nobody is going to tell you details, though.

Fact is: since they have withdrawn from northern Ukraine and focused on the Donbass and Kherson, and since they’re ‘fighting frontally’, the Russians are deploying large numbers of Orlan-10 UAVs for reconnaissance. In turn, these are connected to their artillery with help of what’s called an ‘automatic tactical management system’. Called USS TZ, the latter is, essentially, very similar to the Ukrainian Kropyva ATMS, described in an earlier feature, nearly two months ago.

Point is: contrary to the situation during the first 2–3 months of this war, Russians are meanwhile ‘printing’ Orlan-10. Manufacturing them in huge numbers. They can do so because they are made of commercial parts easily obtained from the West and the PR China. They are deploying them in large concentrations over relatively limited combat zones to track down Ukrainian artillery in particular.

This is resulting in two major problems for Ukrainians.

The first is that they actually have no weapons to counter Orlan-10s (photo below). Sure, MANPADs — whether Martlet, or Stinger and Strela — are effective, but there are simply not enough of them. Light anti-aircraft guns are too short-ranged (Orlan-10s are mostly flying above the 1,000–1,500-metre-altitude they can reach), and there are not enough of them around, either.

The second is that the Russians not only have lots of Orlan-10s, but even more of their MSTA-S howitzers, and then at least as many BM-27 Uragan and BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers. This ‘combination’ is making the situation so bad that, on average, an Ukrainian artillery team has something like 1 minute — between 46 and 60 seconds, to be more specific — from the moment it positions its towed M777, or self-propelled Caesar, or Krab, or M109, and fires the first shell, until the Russians start hitting back. Arguably, Russian artillery is not particularly precise, but it’s firing back with so many shells, that ‘at least one of them is going to cause some damage’. And that’s happening too often.

Pay attention: not only that Ukrainians have no means to counter this combination, NATO has none, either. Sure, NATO would try to counter with electronic warfare systems, and ‘anti-UAV rifles’ and similar wizardry, but it would simply not be enough — because of sheer numbers of Orlan-10s and Russian artillery pieces.

This is why there is a serious need for an urgent solution. Not only that Ukrainians need lots of artillery, and lots of electronic warfare systems, but the entire NATO needs a ‘solution’ at least for that ‘Orlan-issue’. Since I doubt anybody can pack an anti-aircraft gun calibre 57–60mm (because this would offer a range sufficient to combat Orlans flying at 2,000–3,000 metres altitude) to a platform the size of Toyota Hilux (because combating Orlan-10 needs a platform that can move at high speed, while a gun calibre 57–60mm is too big and too heavy) — any time soon, and then in anything like sufficient numbers… this means that not only Ukrainians, but the entire West needs a different solution.

….and that, ‘pronto’.

Q: Spain is about to deliver 10 Leopard 2A4 tanks to Ukraine. Equipped with smooth-bore 120mm Rheinmetall gun, these tanks are going to change the balance of forces on the battlefield and enable Ukrainians to run major counteroffensives…(?)

Oh dear… Up front, I’ve ceased even trying to monitor all the winding of the Scholz administration to send any kind of heavy weapons to Ukraine. This has reached such absurd levels, that it’s pointless to complain about it. Thus, let me just remind that the idea with Spain supplying Leopard 2s to Ukraine — which, apparently, requires a German permission — is nothing new. At least I recall to have heard of it back in early June. First there was a talk about 40, and now, in late July (i.e. two months in which nothing has happened) they’re down to 10…. 10 Leopards of an obsolete sub-variant, stored for 10+ years, in need of overhauls before anybody might come to the idea to use them at least for training…

Sure, the Rheinmetall’s gun is ‘oh, so good’ it’s de-facto ‘NATO standard’, i.e. installed in almost all the tanks there are in NATO, including US-made M1 Abrams. But, its calibre alone is nothing special: all the Russian- and Ukrainian-operated T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s have guns calibre 125mm. Foremost, alone the experience with the Polish delivery of 100+ T-72M1s back in April, should have taught at least somebody out there a lesson. Yes, they arrived quickly, and enabled Ukrainians to re-equip several of their brigades. However, dozens of them were knocked out by now. No: not ‘because they’re Russian-designed and thus trash’, but because they are too few, not supported by enough artillery, and not supported by an air defence system capable of combating the Russian Orlan-10 UAVs.

Because USA and NATO are persistently failing to re-arm Ukraine in systematic fashion.

….with which we’re back to the same old story haunting Ukraine’s partners in the West: as long as politicians (and the oligarchy bribing them) are ‘doing something’, without actually thinking about what exactly are they doing, and for their actions to make sense in the long term, there are going to be no fundamental changes in this war. This is valid to the degree where I cannot understand what kind of an idiot anybody must be to think that Ukraine can something like ‘win a war’ with ‘help’ of ’12 M142s, 10 Leopard 2s, 14 M113s, and 5 Stormers’ — all taken out of mothballs…

By side that such haphazard, ‘we must do something’ -style of arms deliveries is creating a logistical and maintenance nightmare for Ukrainians (just imagine having to maintain and operate 20+ different types of cars — in ‘field conditions’ — 2,000+ kilometres away from sources of spares….then think about doing so with vehicles weighting 20,000–60,000kg!), or that ’20 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles’ are something like ‘one afternoon of fighting’ in this war… but: Ukraine needs at least two dozens of mobile integrated air defence (sub)systems (so it can not only protect its cities, but strategically important installations, plus major troop concentrations), PLUS a ‘fleet’ of 200+ multiple rocket launchers, PLUS a fleet of 1,000 main battle tanks, PLUS, plus, plus, plus…

Anything else is ‘nice’, and ‘helping Ukrainians’, no doubt. But, in grand total: ‘not even ambient noises’.