Remembering Karbala, Honouring Hussein and Imagining Post-Madhabi Religio-Politics
“Every Muharram,
Peace be upon you, Hussein.
Never forgotten.”
Always nice to begin with a Haiku poetry effort. Alhamdulilah, the Muslim Ummah has now entered 1445 AH. There is much to reflect upon looking back at 1444 AH, positive and negative, as well as lots to ponder between now and the next Ramadan. Every Islamic new year begins with the month of Muharram. For many Muslims though, the opening of this month is not a cause for celebration but rather a time to reflect once more upon the life and legacy of Imam Al-Shuhadā’, Hussein ibn ‘Ali (رضي الله عنه). The first ten days of Muharram in the build up to tenth day, Yawm-e Ashura, is Karbala Memorial Season in many parts of the Islamicate worlds.
In the town where I live, the local Sunni masājid are all running evening programmes and poetry recitations on the virtues of the Imam, the need to love the blessed Ahlul Bayt (the Prophet’s Household) and the continued significance of Karbala in Muslim lives. The masājid have attracted great crowds who attend to listen to a speech that lasts for a few hours between the ‘Asr and Maghrib Prayers. After the sunset prayers are made, we collectively eat an evening meal and socialise as one body. Remembering Karbala performs a useful social function in bringing otherwise disparate members of the local community together which is necessary and immense blessing as we continue to live in uncertain, neoliberal times…
The story-tragedy of Karbala (61 AH/680 CE) is well known and so I will not be repeating it word for word here. Rather, for this commentary piece I am more motivated in extracting the didactic lessons that characterises the legacy of this Imam with a view to analyse sectarianism, potential conflict resolution and ecumenist politics going forwards. A basic historical outline is still required to facilitate the directions I would like to take this article. After the martyrdom of Imam ‘Ali رضي الله عنه (d. 40/661), the caliphate office briefly passed into the hands of his son, Imam Hasan رضي الله عنه (brother of Hussein and the other grandson of the Prophet) before he voluntarily gave it up several months later for the sake of broader Muslim Ummatic unity.
Rightfully, he is remembered as a noble Peacemaker. Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan (r. 40AH/661–61/680 CE), a political rival of Imam Ali and the son of the one-time arch enemy of the Noble Messenger ﷺ, Abu Sufyan, took office for the next twenty years, signalling the beginnings of the Ummayad dynasty though this permanent turn-to-the-dynastic was not yet recognised as a reality by other Muslims until it was too late. As documented by copious amounts of objective evidence which Sunnis will not contest, Mu’awiya’s rule noticeably departed in many ways from his predecessors, known collectively by Sunnis as Al-Khulafā’ Al-Rāshidūn (“The Rightly-Guided Caliphs”). He shifted the centre of caliphate power away from the cities of Medina and Kufa to Damascus, and promoted many members of family clan into positions of power and influence.
At the end of his life, rather than hold ad hoc elections like previous caliphs to determine the next leader of the Ummah, Mu’awiya did the unprecedented move by naming his son, Yazīd (a known drunkard, gambler and fornicator AKA a known sinful Muslim) as his successor. Yazīd’s nomination led to strong accusations of corruption and nepotism amongst other Muslims, already reeling from the not-so-distant experiences of the great tribulations that characterised the caliphates of ‘Uthman رضي الله عنه (mainly at the end) and ‘Ali, now even more disasitsafied that other, more worthy contenders were passed over without being given a chance, including pious members from the Ahlul Bayt. Yazīd’s legitimacy to rule was openly contested by Imam Hussein and another contemporary figure, ‘Abd Allah ibn Zubayr رضي الله عنه, who set up his own oppositional counter-caliphate in Makka that lasted between 683 CE until his death by the Umayyads in 692. The inhabitants of Kufa, a garrison town in southern Iraq where Hussein’s father ‘Ali had based his caliphate, invited Hussein over to overthrow the corrupt Umayyad dynasty they were deeply disillusioned with. With a party of about seventy followers, including his own kinfolk and loyal followers, Hussein attempted to reach Kufa to facilitate support.
On his way to confront Yazīd directly, Umayyad forces intercepted Hussein and a confrontation eventually ensued at Karbala. A fierce battle occured during which Hussein achieved martyrdom along with most of his relatives and companions, while any surviving family members were taken prisoner. In essence, Yazīd was the Zālim (oppressor) in this context, and Hussein and his massacred party at Karbala were the Mazlūm (oppressed). Karbala was the major religio-political event that cemented the Sunni/Shi’ite divisions that have managed to survive throughout the centuries gone by since, flaring up palpably and violenly on certain occasions. The Sunni/Shi’ite — Islam’s “global majority” — rivalry (which is in no way precisely analogous to the Catholic/Protestant division in (West European) Christianity; ditto Eurocentrism) has reared its head on many prominent historical occasions; the Seljuk/Fatimid wars, the Crusades, the Safavid conversion of Iran to Shi’ism; Sunni/Shi’ite tensions between Iran and the Gulf States post-1979, in Iraq post-2003 and Syria/Yemen post-2011 “Arab Spring”.
Inter-Muslim sectarianism is one of the most prominent hallmarks of the ugly conditions that Muslims find themselves afflcited with at this stage of colonial-modernity (the Salafi/Wahhabi and Sufi divide, in addition to numerous intra-Sunni sectarainism, are also other points of heated contention that deserve exploration, but not the main focus of this article). It is a tremendous fitnah which has seen much blood being shed by and amongst Muslims, much hatred and anger allowed to grow unabated and has ensured Muslims remained divided indefintely. Cui bono? The Kuffār, obviously, inadvertently, happily. Etc.
Karbala, it should always be stressed, was/is a post-Qur’anic and post-Muhammadan event. It was a massive tragedy that Muslims have nonetheless chosen to remember fiercely, building their own Islamicate traditions, rituals and even mythologies out of it in the process. Without doubt, Karbala lead to major breakdown in Muslim religio-political unity. A group of Muslim soldiers who otherwise would have perfomed their daily prayers intesnely, paid their obligatory zakat tax, fasted inside and outside of Ramadan amongst other superogatory acts of worship, seemingly had no qualms in then killing the grandson the Noble Messenger ﷺ.
The Prophet ﷺ is reported to have said on one occasion: “Hussein is from me and I am from Hussein. Allah loves anyone who loves al-Hasan and al-Hussein. They are two of my distinguished descendants.”*. The callous slaughter of a an individual so endeared to the Prophet ﷺ himself obviously marks a serious rupture between belief and practice, reminiscent more of Qur’ānic category of Al-Munāfiqūn (The Hypocrites), ranked worse than the overt, aggressive Kuffār and the inhabitants of the deepest pits of the hellfire. In the aftermath, unjust persecutions of ‘Ali’s claimed descendants (the Alids) continued by the Umayyads and even by the succeeding Abbassids. The Shi’a have always remained a minority party (except in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and parts of Syria and Lebanon). This reality alongside persecutions and villifications from Sunnis has shaped their politics and their legal-ethical fiqh discourses (the Shi’ites are not totally innocent though — the reverse oppression of minority Iraqi Sunnis by the Shi’a majority in post-Ba’athist Iraq is a case in point. That unjust, overt oppression, among other factors including Western interference, contributed to the rise of The Islamic State of Syria and Iraq AKA Daesh Takfiri Jihadist terror group).
Naturally for the Shi’a, Karbala has a central place in their history, tradition, and theology, and has frequently been recounted in their literature consistently. For them, Hussein’s suffering and martyrdom became a symbol of sacrifice in the struggle for right against wrong, and for justice and truth against injustice and falsehood. Many non-Shi’ite Muslims typically accuse the Shi’a of over-exagerrating Karbala. For some (Sunni) Muslims, they would prefer to forget that Karbala ever happened or they are content to downplay its significance and ‘ongoing legacy’. Such trigger-quick dismissals undermine the impact that Karbala has managed to have on subsequent Islamicate history and prematurely closes the door about how to interpret the event creatively to merge with present concerns. For instance, the contemporary Shi’ite political theorist Amr G.E. Sabet asks the interesting rhetorical question: could the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1400/1979 have happened if the tragedy of Karbala did not occur? Significance of an event in the eyes of the beholder…
On an Anarchist note (I write as a Muslim-Anarchist), Karbala also pinpoints the violent nature of the state (dawla). The reification of the caliphate by the Umayyads into a statist-imperialist enterprise (cemented by the coercive measures enforced by the later Caliph Abdul Malik I, r.685–705) marks a decisive breaking point with Al-Qur’ān and the Prophetic Project at the political and ethical level. Pragmatism, opportunism and the legitimacy to kill fellow Muslims whimsically for worldly power became to be seen as a natural and ‘inevitable’ fact of life, not to be contested. The dawla and all its faults have also managed to survive over the centuries gone by (now firmly enmeshed with colonial-modern European nation-state thought/praxis), and Muslims suffer from this, not for the better. That is not to position the heroic martyrs of Karbala as anarchists in opposing Yazīd’s dawla but it nonetheless highlights how the source of this tragedy has its roots in corrupted statist-power structures, something that Muslims of whatever sect today need to seriously examine and interrogate at all times. Interestingly though, Shi’ite fiqh developments tended to distrust the state, and Shi’a ‘ulema have historically preferred to maintain the moral high ground in critiquing the state but abstaining from it in the absence of the ‘Hidden Imam’, excepting the unique modern case of post-1979 Iran.
Redirecting attention to the Imam, Hussein was undoubtedly a Man of Action, he was a Fā’il (doer). To put it casually and crudely with all due respect, Hussein put his money where his mouth was and embarked upon a fatal jihad. For some Sufi mystics, Hussein was an ‘Ārif Allah (a gnostic) par excellence who accepted his worldly destiny and made his unique way back to his Rabb through his altruistic sacrifice. Obediently, he embraced his martyrdom fate without complaint, a model to emulate in praxis. In stark contrast to today’s transhumanists who arrogantly seek to transcend death somehow through science and technological means, Hussein ‘conquered’ death paradoxically by embracing it. He achieved his immortality through jihad. He is gone from this dunya but never forgotten. Clearly then, Hussein is much more than the name of an historical figure. He is a message, a mentality, an attribute, a guiding light for the Muslim. Hussein is a reminder that one (the individual/minority) must not always follow the group/majority because they may prove to be clearly in the wrong.
The legitimacy of Yazīd was/is questionable but he resolved the issue through pragmatic, violent coercive non-Islamic means, including the murder of a grandson of the Noble Messenger ﷺ. Yazīd’s brute force, reminscent of the unlawful behaviour of one of the Two Sons of Adam in the Narrative found in the fifth Surah of Al-Qur’ān (Q5:27–31), was his proof, the foundation of his powerbase. For Hussein, his proof was none other than following Al-Qur’ān and the Sunna of his Noble Grandfather ﷺ with the utmost fidelity. All Muslims today, unless they hate Hussein and the Ahlul Bayt (as oxymoronic as that sounds) and cover up Karbala, universally recognise the Imam as being on the right side of history, a testament to the profound political-ethical teachings of Islam that emphasises in no uncertain terms one should not submit oneself to anyone other than Allah, the True Creator and Owner of everything.
Going further and keeping the Imam’s sacrifice relevant, Hussein could be seen as a rallying point for “Post-Madhabism” (non-sectarian religio-politics)**. Al-Qur’ān (3:103) exhorts the Muslim to hold onto together Habl Allah (“the rope of Allah”, which some expert commentators assume is Al-Qur’ān itself) and it warns against dividing into warring sects that privilege their particular concerns over the universal and absolute, collapsing the former into the latter without maintaining a barzakh barrier. The notorious Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966 CE) was essentially correct in his assertion that tyrants, disbelievers and hypocrites naturally detest hearing the Kalima: “There is no God but Allah”. Hussein’s rebellion against Yazīd and the Umayyads was nothing short of the Islamic ideal. It was an bona fide Islamic act against tyranny. Islam cannot exist except without being in a state of tension with Tāghūt, Zulm, Kufr and Shirk. The Muslim (ideally) cannot live under the rule of anyone/anything other than Allah (link this to foundational Anarchist teachings that resonate with the Message of Islam built upon Tawhīd — referring the unique Unicity of Allah). Hussein was unwilling to live under Umayyad rule and paid his life for such politics.
The Islamic act of Hussein is not something to be claimed by one sect exclusively but by all Muslims universally. The Muslim (Sunni and/or Shi’ite, or any other recognised sect) who embarks upon the Husseini tariqa (pathway) is someone who stands up for haqq (truth) at all times, without compromising for some fleeting material gain. He/She is someone who is willing to sacrifice his/her nafs (ego) for the betterment of the broader Ummah — an inherently selfless act of love and bravery that carries over the generations. For the Husseini, worldly wealth and material posessions are but dust in their sight. Hussein and the Husseini follower also brazenly defy any and all pure rational analyses that would caution against embarking on a Karbala trajectory, rendering them meaningless and irrelevant, a power in its own right.
A cursory glance at Islamicate history demonstrates that there have been Sunni/Shi’ite co-operation and attempted inter-Muslim efforts at ecumenicism (alongside the standard sectarianism, wars and social strife). For example, the founder of the Hanafi madhab (the largest practised madhab globally, in fact), Nu’man ibn Thabit (AKA Imam Abū Hanīfa) supported Imam Zayd ibn Ali (the Fifth Imam for the Zaydi Shi’ites; d. 740 CE) in his rebellion against, of course, the corrupt Umayyad authorities, even issusing a favourable fatwa (legal opinion) and giving monetary support to Zayd (the rebellion was unsuccesful and Zayd followed in his forefather’s footsteps by attaining martyrdom). During the early period of the medieval Crusader onslaught on Muslims in Palestine, some notable Shi’ites preachers such as the Qadi Abu’l-Fadl ibn al-Khashshab (d. 1125 CE) indiscriminately exhorted Muslims, Sunnis and Shi’ites, to take up a counter-Crusade jihad. Al-Khashshab himself died participating with Sunnis in militant self-defensive jihad against the Crusaders, practicing what he preached.
Moving forwards along the centuries, one finds the Iranian ruler Nadir Shah (r. 1736–1747 CE) attempting to get the Sunni Ottomans to recognise the Ja’fari Shi’ite madhab as the fifth madhab of Sunni Islam, and in return he banned the common Shi’ite practise of cursing the first three caliphs of Islam instituted by the Safavid monarchs. The later Naser Al-Din Shah Qajar Shah (r. 1848–1896 CE) recognised the Pan-Islamist champion Sultan Abdulhamid II of the Ottoman Empire as Caliph despite Sunni/Shi’ite tensions remaining effectively unresolved. In the twentith century, the most famous Sunni educational centre, Al-Azhar (Egypt) under the rectorship of Imam Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963 CE) issued a famous fatwa recognising the Ja’fari madhab as a valid means to practise Islam.
Switching over into Shi’ite territory, one sees in Ayatollah Khomeini’s (controversial) legal governance doctrine of Vilayet-e Faqih (The Rule of the Jurist) an innovative attempt at reducing gaps between Sunnis/Shi’ites at the political, jurispudential and methodological level by removing the need for an Imam from the Ahlul Bayt to rule over Muslims in favour of a pious Muslim figure (Sunni or Shi’ite) who proves capable enough of being able to apply the Shari’a in society. Amidst the ongoing “War on Terror”, In 2004, the Amman Message hosted by King Abdullah II of Jordan (Sunni; his Hashemite household claims descent from the Noble Messenger ﷺ) led to the formal recognition of eight legal fiqh schools (madhāhib) of the Shari’a, as well as and the varying schools of Islamic theology:
- Sunni Hanafi
- Sunni Māliki
- Sunni Shāfi’i
- Sunni Hanbali
- Sunni Zāhiri
- Shia Jā’fari
- Shia Zaydi (Yemen)
- Ibadi (mainly found in Oman but also in small pockets across the northern countries of Africa)
Scholars who backed the ‘post-madhabist’ orientation of this ecumenical Message also agreed to forbid the declaring an apostate anyone who is a follower of:
- The Ashʿari/Maturidi creed (upheld by most Sunni Muslims)
- Tasawwuf (Sufism)
- The Salafi Athari creed
(What of the Mu’tazila/Neo-Mu’tazila though? Hmm…)
The Amman Message was not legally binding upon any Muslim (few Muslims today rememeber it, let alone agree to uphold it in practice) but the religio-political implications it engenders is a postive step in the right direction. It sets yet another historical precedent. Many Muslims would like to see their differences ironed out. Therefore, one can assert with cautious and reserved optimism that the ground is there for inter-Muslim ecumenism to assert itself under favourable socio-political circumstances involving Muslim actors. It is a matter of maturity and willpower to actualise this from the abstract realm to the concrete world. The significance of these historical ‘Post-Madhabi’ strains are yet to be researched in great detail and spun together into a coherent narrative to impact contemporary Muslim discourses, policy-making and politics. This is a task that Sunnis, Shi’ites and other sects must embark upon together if they are serious about resolving factionalism looking at the long-term and the health of the Ummah. If the Ummah is not well, neither will Al-Ard and its inhabitants be.
Personally, I am all for dissolving Sunni and Shi’ite sectarianism in favour of non-sectarian politics. By that I mean a fostering more inclusive, pluralistic ecumenical front (religio-political sectarianism will undoubtedly reoccur; it is about what frameworks and choices we make to manage them effectively and check any ‘excesses’). I am not bothered about re-reading Shi’ites or Sunnis without sectarian lens because fundamentally you cannot. Since Karbala, the Sunni and Shi’ites have needed one another to prove themselves correct. Being Post-Madhabi in orientation does not mean that one throws the past and all of its contents into the dustbin prematurely. Being Post-Madhabi simply means that one refuses to be bounded stubbornly by post-Qur’ān/post-Muhammadan developments that may actually impede upon the practice of Islam. This does not entail the negation of the legalistic madhāhib that already exist, but simply the recognition that positions exist beyond affiliation to just one or any of the legal madhāhib (perfect for the Anarchist seeker). Certainly, every sect has a right to defend its own narratives and identity-subjectivities if their are reasonable grounds for doing so.
The Post-Madhabi then would ideally draw upon the best that Sunni and Shi’ite madhāhibs offer and enact a novel synthesis. Muslims would be better off asking themselves at this particular historical juncture whether or not continuing to engage in inter-Muslim madhabi sectarian disputes is worthwhile. To my mind, they have clearly run their course and only serve to divide Muslims internally at a crucial time when unity and cooperation in the face of overwhelming odds is a desideratum. Post-Madhabi Muslims should uphold the following principle: A united Ummah is always better than a divided Ummah. Internal issues means that the external issues that could pose as existential threats to the Ummah may be crazily ignored in favour of infighting, an act beloved not to Allah but the Shaytān the Rejected himself. Disputes will occur because that is human nature. Humans tend to disagree more than they agree, as the diverse premodern Islamic(ate) traditions readily testify in favour of. Planet Earth boasts over eight billion inhabitants, including nearly two billion Muslims.
Evidently, humans do not all follow one way of life (which Al-Qur’ān actually sanctifies and warns the reader/listener not to intefere with) and at the socio-political level, humans always strive to formulate coherent-enough frameworks to enact consesnus and prevent any contentious issues from getting out of hand on a regular basis. For Post-Madhabi Muslims, it is not actually about eradicating differences between sects but managing them and checking any ‘excesses’. Some Shi’ites may blame Sunnis and Sunni Islam for what happened to Hussein, for example, but that does not preclude the ability of these bitterly hurt Muslims to co-operate with their ‘others’ and practice Islam effectively in the here and now. Hussein remains a unity figure for all parties. As my own masājid demonstrate, many Sunnis revere Hussein and the Ahlul Bayt with some intensity (perhaps more than a Shi’ite!). To reiterate the crucial point, Post-Madhabi Muslims would need to come up with critical, enduring and empathetic religio-political ecumenical approaches (detailing the precise details is another discussion and one for a future post perhaps, insha’allah).
Certainly, Sunnis and Shi’ites must give-and-take reciprocally, irrespective of whatever directions they opt to follow. For Sunnis, this could potentially mean taking full responsibility for the Karbala tragedy and reflexively reviewing their historical and contemporary legal-ethical fiqh discourses to see if they can be, if they are not already, co-opted to serve worldly tyrants who simply see Islam as a tool to rule over subservient populations with coercive and authoritarian measures. Shi’ites could then advise on what to disregard, what to keep and what to change. On the part of the Shi’a, they absolutely need to give up their hatred for some of the companions of the Noble Messenger ﷺ that Sunnis hold in high esteem. This has always been a needless bone of contention, (rightfully) detested by Sunnis, and needs to change permanently. Fortunately, the current Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has already issued a fatwa backing this approach many years ago, which can only be welcomed and applauded by Sunnis.
What is done is done. Muslims need to move on with (near-)full closure and redirect their attentions to matters facing them in the here and now. That is what Imam Hussein would want for the Ummah of Muhammad. Our Islamic(ate) traditions of adab, akhlāq and akhuwwa are not their for posterity. They are not abstract discourses only to be discussed and never practised. They are to be actualised at all times whenever appropriate between Muslims.
Imam Hussein also demonstrates that when it comes to attempting resolutions, or at least mutual inter-Muslim dialogue and co-operation, one must at least try even if the effort is near-certainly likely to lead to nowhere. Action that holds potential to break new ground is always preferable to a docile-inducing apathetic fatalism. In Islam (as in Anarchism), the emphasis is on the effort (juhd, a word that shares the same etymology with jihad/struggle). Muslims will readily concur that Allah will always reward the sincere seeker for his/her efforts in upholding Islam. A successful outcome is simply an additional bonus of blessings (May our Rabb grant us this!). Thus, thinking-about Post-Madhabism and thinking-through sectarianism should not be done on the basis of a capricious optimist/pessimist dialectic (which has no basis in the primary sources of Islam) but on the platform of taslīm (self-surrendering) to whatever Allah demands of the Mu’min(a) on the occasion, even if that means certain death (consider this also in relation to ongoing resistance efforts against colonial forms of technology and artificial intelligence — Neo-Luddites as Husseinis?!).
We ought to tie our camels by doing our bit in whatever relative capabilities and capacities we possess, and leave the rest to Allah, the Real Actor. Regardless, whatever you may think/believe, whatever party/faction you align yourself with, whatever religio-politics you practice, one thing is for sure — this Ummah blessed by Allah the Most High desperately needs healing. Otherwise, we once more fail Allah and therefore we fail our Noble Messenger and ourselves in the process. Muslim-led politics will not progess in any positive and life-affirming direction if things stay as they are. They will only regress at a time when Planet Earth is literally boiling, minority elites hoard most of the world’s wealth, justice is found absent ubiquitously and various social/cultural tensions in societies continue to exacerbate globally. Muslims as reflective healers should be putting out fires, not causing them or remaining silent about their existence. Perhaps that is one way to interpret the prophetic narration to continue planting trees even at the end of times (?). Hmm…
At this late volatile stage in colonial-modernity, the Ummah of the Final Messenger of Allah ﷺ is at an historical crossroads. Something has to give. In navigating their way out of uncertain, dangerous times, Muslims need to make mature, informed and ethically-infomed decsisions regarding their ‘other’ brothers and sisters and resolve their internal “family quarrels” as soon as possible. If non-Muslims disbelievers against the Message of Islam can fight two, not one, but two World Wars leading to much devasation across the planet and still co-operate effectively in the aftermath with newer frameworks to reflect changing conditions (such as NATO and the EU), then I do not see why it is made out to be impossible for Muslims to co-operate with one another and chart newer forms of religio-politics meeting the demands of the age (unless of course the Muslim = Non-White, Non-Westerner is incapable of doing politics per a Eurocentric, Orientalist and Racist claim).
Such dismissive statements are not normative declarations, they are inherently political. Indeed, the rabid Islamophobe does not want to confront a united Ummah, his/her biggest fear. He/She prefers a divided Ummah quite naturally. Post-Madhabism is a wonderful ideal, inspiring the concerned believer to aspire towards a tractory that will surely find pleasure with Allah and His Messenger ﷺ. Perhaps the Sunni/Shi’ite dispute may never be resolved definitively. It can, however, be managed and mediated creatively, enough to stop it from remaining a needless impediment to righteous action. It is up for thinking/doing-Muslims to move from the abstract realm of thought to the concrete world of action as soon as possible. Tick tock goes the clock…
Peace be upon you, oh Hussein! Allah the Most High comforts us all by stating that those who are slain in the way of Allah are not ‘dead’ but alive and in the sweet presence of their Rabb. Your biographical narratives and selfless sacrifices continue to be a larger-than-life lesson and inspiration to us all, including non-Muslims. It will be an immense honour for Muslims to greet you in Jannah with your esteemed Father, Noble Grandfather ﷺ and Brother by your side. Hussein, you are no mere formality, no footnote of history — may we all die in a state of sincere Imān!
My writings do not praise you, Hussein.
Rather, my writings are praiseworthy because they talk of you.
May Allah assist us all with this timely affair! !آمين ثمّ آمين
Endnotes
*Hadith Source is Sunni. Original Arabic can be found here: https://sunnah.com/adab:364#:~:text=He%20put%20one%20of%20his,of%20my%20distinguished%20descendants.'%22). Al-Albani grades it as Hasan.
** I am indebted to Professor Salman Sayyid (University of Leeds) for coining the term Post-Madhabism. All credit goes to him. Allah preserve you, Salman.
