DRAINING THE DESERTS OF AFGHANISTAN
15 years ago this corner of South West Afghanistan was nothing but sand. Following the fall of the Taliban regime a growing number of people began to come to this and other desert areas of south and south west Afghanistan.
Using percussion drills, farmers sank wells into the ground up to 100 metres deep. Then, with affordable diesel generators and pumps imported from Pakistan and China these farmers transformed what was once rocky desert soil into productive agricultural land.
Over time, increasing numbers of households came to these former desert areas driven by population pressure, the ensuing fighting between ISAF and the Taliban, as well as by efforts to ban poppy by the government of Afghanistan and its foreign backers. In fact it was illegal poppy that provided the means by which to settle these former desert areas. Were it not for the price premium associated with its illegal status this area would have remained as it was — free of both people and agriculture. Instead, illegal opium provided farmers with the capital required to establish their deep wells, to cultivate new lands, to build a home and to feed both their families and their livestock.
By 2013, there was an extra 300,000 hectares of agricultural land in the south west of Afghanistan alone, compared to 2003. This land provided both homes and livelihoods for as many as 1.2 million people.
However, by 2013 there were also signs of growing environmental stresses in these former desert areas. Increased salination, the mono cropping of poppy and poor plant husbandry resulted in consecutive years of low opium yields. Some farmers — particularly the land poor- were left unable to meet their production costs and feed their families. Some left the desert and went looking for new land elsewhere. Many persevered in the desert, conscious of the shortage of land in the well irrigated areas of south west Afghanistan, hoping their crop would eventually recover.
Those with few alternatives looked to find a solution to the failure of their opium crop. Some farmers sourced opium seeds from other areas where they believed it was not diseased. Those with capital installed solar panels to provide power for their tubewells, thereby eliminating the 450 litres of diesel needed for pumps to irrigate each acre of land, reducing their input costs. Each solar powered tubewell was accompanied by a reservoir 1–2 metres deep and up to 1,000 square metres in size. Although significant amounts of water is lost in evaporation, these reservoirs are topped up constantly by tubewells that farmers’ now consider free to run.
What started as a few isolated cases in 2014 became commonplace and by 2016 over 13,000 solar powered tubewells could be seen across this 300 km by 300 km patch of south west Afghanistan — the vast majority of which were established since the autumn of 2015 and funded by a doubling of opium prices over a twelve month period.
In 2016 the shift to solar powered technology in the deserts of Afghanistan supported crop diversification and a shift to wheat. With the recovery of opium yields and the high price of opium poppy it is possible that we will see even greater amounts of opium poppy in 2017.
Moreover, freed from the need to buy diesel to power their tubewells, it is even possible that farmers will turn to opium poppy in the summer despite the low yields. We may even see more households moving into the desert — and reversing the out-migration that were seen from these areas in 2014 and 2015.
However, the environmental implications of the dramatic uptake in solar powered technology are harder to predict. In the past farmers estimated the ground water had dropped up to a metre each year since moving into the desert. Now that the area is awash with solar powered technology and water is considered ‘free’ there is little incentive to manage it efficiently. The implications of draining this ground water will undoubtedly be felt further afield.
Surely it is only a question of time before this area once again returns to desert? But what are the implications of the loss of livelihood for the 1.2 million people who currently live in these former desert areas and where are they to go when the water eventually runs out?
