The Rockets decided to end their rebuild too early
Is Houston trying to genuinely compete prematurely?
American sports leagues are a bizarre phenomenon in juxtaposition to how international soccer leagues, among others, incentivize their teams to try their best. Virtually every soccer league in the world has their own version of a relegation and promotion system that places severe consequences for failing to perform on a yearly basis; a soccer club dropping from the top division of a league to a lower tier can indefinitely threaten the financial health and corporate structure of its business. Ironically, the most prominent soccer league without this kind of dynamic is America’s MLS. Similarly, the NFL, MLB, NHL and NBA all share this approach by not just straying from punishing teams who fall short of any form of prosperity, but they even encourage it in certain circumstances. While soccer leagues abroad have extremely intricate academy systems for young prospects to develop internally, many American franchises in the aforementioned leagues often prefer to rely on drafts to build up their youth system. “Tanking” is the informal way to describe a team who is covertly, or overtly, deliberately failing to be rewarded with a sought-after draft pick, and it’s become most infamous in the NBA; the San Antonio Spurs blatantly took last NBA season off and received a generational prospect in Victor Wembanyama as their compensation for their self-inflicted hardships. In essence, there is absolutely no rush to rebuild a franchise in the NBA’s era of persistent tanking. Every low-caliber NBA team seems fully aware of this notion, but this offseason has shown an anomaly on this front with the Houston Rockets.
For NBA sickos and Rockets’ fans who actually watched their games, Houston’s last season was the NBA equivalent of a pick-up basketball team who had just met each other for the first time trying to play together. In other words, it was a disaster. The Rockets’ ranked 27th in ORtg, last in TOV%, 29th in DRtg, last in 3P%, so I think my point is made. Former head coach Stephen Silas was not a steady hand in the process and clearly could not get a team full of projects to buy in; hell, he couldn’t even get the only real veteran on the team to accept a leadership role because of the dysfunction at hand. The Rockets’ ranked dead last in their frequency of plays coming off of a screen, and the fact that there was extreme reluctance towards even the most fundamental offensive set-piece somewhat encapsulates the free-for-all mentality of the roster.
Fortunately for the Rockets, they were handsomely reimbursed for these trials and tribulations with their top draft target, Amen Thompson, and the absolute steal of a pick in Cam Whitmore at 20. Two rookies will not immediately propel this squad to any glory, but with the additional hiring of former Celtics head coach Ime Udoka, marginal steps in the right direction seemed guaranteed. Udoka was known during his single year in Boston for emphasizing camaraderie and team chemistry, particularly on defense, and managed to get the Celtics to their first NBA Finals in over a decade. Udoka also made a good first impression towards Rockets fans regarding his desire to truly win by way of a proper rebuild through his rejection of Houston’s potential reacquisition of franchise legend James Harden out of concerns about his maturity and competitive drive. That’s why Houston’s decision to overpay for 3 players, none of whom are known for their consistency and personal winning pedigree, is so baffling.
The big splash was the Rockets’ decision to sign former Raptor Fred VanVleet to a 3-year/$128.5 million deal, where the final year is a team option. VanVleet deserved a big payday, but he’s not a safe fit for Houston’s volatile depth chart, in addition to how Houston unnecessarily broke the bank for him. On the surface, VanVleet’s box-score numbers look plentiful, but diving deeper into his degrees of efficiency are when concerns arise for a team that was plagued with such catastrophic inefficiency last year. VanVleet is not a rim threat; he ranks in the 29th percentile for shots at the rim per 75 possessions, as well as his insufficient rate of drawing fouls or being able to finish through contact. He is an excellent perimeter creator, and he has occupied C&S and spot-up roles before, but besides a 42.3% FG% for corner threes, he shot 35% or lower from anywhere out deep. He’s also proven that he’s most comfortable in a ball-dominant position, as he lacks the speed or work ethic to provide effective off-ball movement. This is going to be a major concern alongside Jalen Green, Kevin Porter Jr. and Thompson, all of whom are best with the ball in their hands. It’s possible that one of the three that I just mentioned moves into a more off-ball role, but Thompson should not have been drafted for that purpose (shot 25% from three in the Overtime Elite League last season), Green is so explosive that it would be a shame to slot him into a passive role and Porter Jr. has shown time and time again that he is only satisfied as an offensive facilitator. Focusing on their most recent prospective gamble though, I imagined Thompson leading the bench unit to start the season and then becoming Porter Jr’s successor once the time was right, but when is Thomspon going to be handed the reins if it comes at the expense of disgruntlement from VanVleet? It can be assumed that the team option was Houston’s exit plan in the case of a point-guard dilemma, but why even welcome that potential outcome in the first place? VanVleet can now be distinguished as a veteran, and that’ll surely help the team in terms of maturity. VanVleet is also still an elite playmaker, and a persistent on-ball defender, but his physical stature makes me wonder how a team-oriented defensive unit will work with a player like him who likes to battle on an individual level.
The Rockets’ second cap-filler was their 4-year/$80 million agreement with former Memphis Grizzly Dillon Brooks. Brooks to Houston is a perfect fit for a depth chart without any experienced 3-and-D wings, but that’s just too much money for a guy who is coming off the most inefficient year of his career. Brooks was never a reliable source of offense to begin with– his career FG% and 3P% are 41.6% and 34.2% respectively –but he was serviceable enough to become a critical aspect of the Grizzlies’ starting lineup. Not to mention that his defense made up for his various offensive shortcomings. My gripe with this signing is less about how Brooks’ skills will mesh with the Rockets’ newfound ideology under Udoka, but more so that it will be nearly impossible for him to live up to his contract. This is also money that could have been used to flesh out the rest of the depth chart, but the Rockets clearly believe that this is a go-big-or-go home type of move. Brooks is a part of the upper echelon of perimeter on-ball defenders (100th percentile according to BBall Index), and I am sure that he is itching to redeem himself after a shameful conclusion to last season, but I’m just not certain that this was the most secure use of funds for a team that should be prioritizing low-risk/high-reward decisions.
The last, and most confounding, big deal that Houston made this offseason was signing Jock Landale to a 4-year/$32 million. The Rockets paid this man because they respected his effort in the 2023 Playoffs, where Landale usurped Deandre Ayton’s role for the Phoenix Suns through unrelenting grit-and-grind. Landale is a high energy contributor, but I’m sure that it’s noticeable that my only compliments for the center are personal traits rather than objective production. Landale is nearly 28 years old and has barely two regular seasons to his name, neither of which showcased room for development. Landale is actually an extremely proficient offensive rebounder, but that is one of the few departments that Houston was already excellent at! The Rockets placed at the top of the league for ORB%, and although this may be a result of the sheer amount of misses they had, it’s still one of the few positives for a team that had so many lackluster areas to improve upon. It’s apparent that Landale is going to be Alperen Sengun’s backup, but why not go for a real veteran like Bismack Biyombo or even getting someone like Dewayne Dedmon on a minimum. Instead, they’re paying a veteran-aged prospect an average of $8 million per year off of vibes.
If the Rockets’ goal this offseason was to inject stability into a despondent unit of players, they succeeded simply by adding reinforcements, but fell short of choosing the right ones for the proper cost. The most troubling aspect of these offseason moves is how it feels like artificial expectations are now being placed on this team that should have spent their first year building a cohesive culture with Udoka. Now, the amount of fiscal investments evokes the proposition that there should be a realistic push to be within grasp of the postseason, something that seemed unimaginable at the end of last year. The Rockets are guaranteed to have their work cut out for them this upcoming season.
Stats are courtesy of BBall Index and Cleaning The Glass
