President Tsai Address Congress? Not Now, But Thanks
Symbolic moves sure feel good, but substantive policy changes are what is needed
When I first got married, my new wife informed me that I was never to buy her flowers. Flowers die, she explained, and the money spent on them is wasted. The recent letter from five Republican Senators (Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, John Cornyn, Cory Gardner, and Tom Cotton) asking House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to invite President Tsai of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to address Congress is that kind of gift. It feels good, but it is essentially an empty gesture.
Sober commentators are sounding the warning on this idea. Pro-Taiwan commentator J Michael Cole observed:
For one thing, only a handful of Republicans have issued the proposal, which by no means signified universal support. Also, we do not know whether the Tsai administration was consulted by the quintet before they made the letter public. Should the Tsai administration immediately signal its enthusiasm for an address to Congress, only for it to be shot down by Pelosi, the Democrats in the House or the executive branch of U.S. government, it would constitute a loss of face for Taiwan.
Similarly, Richard Bush III, a widely respected Taiwan expert, warned:
If the president of Taiwan were to speak to a joint meeting of Congress, any U.S. claim that its relations with Taiwan were unofficial would ring completely hollow. China would interpret the move as Washington’s reneging on the fundamental bargain at the heart of U.S.-PRC relations. Although I cannot predict exactly what Beijing would do in response, a radical downgrading of the relationship would be likely.
Bush couches his arguments in the careful language of the policy establishment, but there is no question in his mind, nor in the mind of many other commentators, that Tsai speaking to the US Congress would serve no good purpose for either the United States or Taiwan.
There is an element in Taiwan that thinks the President addressing Congress would be a great idea, because they are ready to embrace any move that increases Taiwan’s status and draws attention to the island’s plight. It is difficult not to sympathize with them. Yet, as so often true for actions that draw Deep Green support, this would represent an empty, purist move that offers little concrete benefit for Taiwan.
The flip side of this is the now-tired claim that Beijing would attack Taiwan if _______________ (add your own apocalypse). China will attack Taiwan when it can produce an internal consensus among top policymakers to do so. Once a consensus appears, the regime will simply point to some then-current event as a pretext. Until then, it will not attack Taiwan. Hence, the proper question to ask of any US policy action toward Taiwan is whether it will compel a sudden unity among the heads of major armed services and the Communist Party leadership on the use of force against Taiwan that would then sustain itself through the weeks of preparations necessary to attack Taiwan. Generally, the possibility of that occurring is rather remote.
The correct move by Taipei is to signal privately that it does not want an invitation, and instead, to ask for concrete examples of US support. A gift of twenty fast attack boats, help with accelerating Taiwan’s submarine program, or additional upgraded F-16s are good steps in that direction.
Then there are trade relations. The long dormant TIFA could be revived and signed with meaningful trade concessions from the US. Even better, the US could put Taiwan back on the developing country tariff schedule, and highlight that against the tariff punishment of Chinese products. By helping Taiwan’s domestic manufacturers, the US could harm China by offering incentives for Taiwan firms to move back to Taiwan.
There are also numerous international organizations where the US could take a far stronger stance on Taiwan’s participation. The flap last year over Taiwan’s participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) epitomized Taiwan’s struggle to gain international recognition. The US should be pushing harder to open international space for Taiwan.
If symbolic moves are wanted, the possibilities are endless. The US could consider sending high level officials to the island, or port visits by naval vessels, or sending a much larger flotilla through the Taiwan Strait to signal displeasure with China’s aggression and expansionism. If greater support of Tsai is sought, it would be a simple matter for US officials to praise her in public more often, and to signal that the US wants her re-election.
The US has vast power and a multiplicity of options. It would certainly feel good to have President Tsai address Congress, but in the end, as with almost all symbolic actions in this relationship, its effects would quickly whither. What Taiwan needs is not flowers slowly dying in a vase, but policy moves that put down deep roots and result in meaningful growth in the US-Taiwan relationship.
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