U.S. “Strategic Ambiguity” towards Taiwan is No Longer Sensible
Is it time for the US to make a public declaration of military support for Taiwan in case of invasion?
Is the TRA now DOA? This 40th year since the Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in response to then-President Jimmy Carter’s unilateral abrogation of the security treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The TRA, which the US treats as a compact with the people of Taiwan, helps define the framework for US relations with Taiwan. As China rises, calls to help Taiwan by openly committing the US to its defense have become an annual rite, with another from Joseph Bosco in The Hill earlier this month.
Although it is commonly claimed that the TRA binds the US to defend Taiwan, in fact it makes no such commitment.
Although it is commonly claimed that the TRA binds the US to defend Taiwan, in fact it makes no such commitment. Chris Nelson, a former Democratic Party staffer who was in on its drafting, had this to say in 2007:
In fact, the US is not obligated to defend Taiwan by law, and in the post-9/11 world, senior Republican officials and military brass have cast considerable doubt on the US moral obligation, if President Bush were to conclude that hostilities were the result of actions by Taiwan.
In fact, although the TRA includes language designed to discourage the use of force by the PRC against Taiwan, the TRA only obligates the US to consider arms sales under certain circumstances, period.
Take our word for it, as a junior staff-participant, even this language was extracted very reluctantly from the State Department at the cost of considerable blood on both sides.
The strongest language Congressional friends of Taiwan were able to add talks about a “grave threat” to US interests in the event of an upset in the peaceful status quo. That’s it…not exactly a mutual defense treaty.
Section 3b of the TRA is clear on who makes the determination on arms and other support for Taiwan: the President and Congress. Taiwan itself is not involved anywhere in the process, and there is nothing to stop the US from washing its hands of Taiwan by declaring at any time that the island has “sufficient” arms. Thus, whether Taiwan obtains needed weapons or needed defense from the US will always be the result of political calculus.
The TRA has shaped US policy via its “strategic ambiguity”. Since it does not prevent the US from defending Taiwan, it helps deter China, while at the same time the lack of commitment to Taiwan’s defense helps deter pro-independence forces in Taiwan from suddenly declaring an independent Taiwan and provoking a war. Or so the theory goes.
The reality is somewhat different. Throughout most of the TRA’s lifespan, China has lacked the ability to attack and take Taiwan, meaning that China was sufficiently deterred by Taiwan’s armed forces alone. Hence the deterrent effect on China of “strategic ambiguity” was always overstated by its proponents. At the same time, with martial law in power, there was never any chance of Taiwan becoming an independent republic. Nor was the KMT ever going to declare an ROC that did not include China. Someday future historians will explore whether “strategic ambiguity” was really just a euphemistic witticism for the inability of US officials to make up their minds about what to do with Taiwan.
However, the rise of Taiwan democracy and Chinese power, both growing rapidly over the last three decades, have cast “strategic ambiguity” into stark relief. China will shortly possess the ability to meaningfully threaten annexation of Taiwan by force while making US military intervention extremely costly. At the same time, the older generation of independence activists in Taiwan, chafing at the slow pace of progress on independence, is demanding a referendum on an independent Taiwan with its own Taiwan-centered Constitution. Has “strategic ambiguity” become outmoded?
The truth is that it has.
As China’s military continues to grow, the itch to use it will grow. One effect of “strategic ambiguity”, meaning the US commitment to Taiwan is vague, is it permits Chinese thinkers to convince themselves that the US will never intervene — that it lacks the spine, the money, or the military forces necessary to intervene in the Taiwan scenario. “Our enemies won’t fight/will be crushed in six weeks” is an all-too-familiar pattern in the run-ups to major wars.
The deterrent effect of “strategic ambiguity” may now be lost. The US may have given private assurances to China that it would intervene if China attacks Taiwan, but their very privacy casts doubt on them: why would the US keep them private if it really intended to intervene? After, private promises may also be privately disavowed, at no public cost to the promiser.
“Strategic ambiguity” also deters other nations: potential allies, who might come to the aid of the US and Taiwan in a war.
“Strategic ambiguity” also deters other nations: potential allies, who might come to the aid of the US and Taiwan in a war. Since they cannot be sure of the US commitment, they cannot formulate definite, long-term policies. This tempts them to cut deals with Beijing.
Ending “strategic ambiguity” would enable the US to make a firm public commitment to defending Taiwan, an important step in enhancing Japan’s role in Taiwan’s defense and in signaling the US commitment to Taiwan to other nations. It would also help pro-US and pro-Taiwan candidates such as current President Tsai Ing-wen get (re-)elected while making it more difficult for pro-China candidates to gain the presidency.
As I write these words, current Chairman and potential presidential candidate of the pro-China Kuomintang (KMT) Wu Den-yih has said he would pursue a “peace treaty” with China. Since Beijing will never sign any document that makes peace with Taiwan without formal acknowledgement that Taiwan is part of China, Wu is actually arguing that Taiwan should be quietly annexed to China. “Strategic ambiguity” enables Wu and other pro-China types to argue that the US will not defend Taiwan, so Taiwan should do its best to cut a deal with China before it is violently annexed. Thus, in Taiwan domestic politics, “strategic ambiguity” is effectively a pro-Beijing policy that casts doubt on US seriousness.
…in Taiwan domestic politics, “strategic ambiguity” is effectively a pro-Beijing policy that casts doubt on US seriousness.
It is fair to ask whether an open and public commitment to the defense of Taiwan will encourage Taiwan independence advocates to push for independence and trigger a war. At present the Deep Greens pushing a referendum and constitutional change in Taiwan are a group of largely old independence activists who will likely pass away in the coming decade, and whose influence with the general public is limited.
The under-40s who grew up in a democratic Taiwan are a post-independence generation, often described as “natural independents”, for whom independence is already a given and “independence” is largely a problem of getting the rest of the world to accept what they know is true. That generation is savvier and worldlier than its ideological predecessors, understands that independence would mean war, and has many of its members working in China. It will never provoke a war to gain formal recognition of independence. The careful, prudent policies of President Tsai, whose cross-strait relations policies are strongly supported in polls, reflect the understandings of this generation.
It should also be noted that despite formal security treaties with the US, neither Philippines nor Japan has provoked a war over Chinese expansion in Philippines waters and in the Senkaku Islands, respectively. The Japan case is especially instructive, since Chinese incursions in the Senkakus are routine and Japan has a powerful military of its own. Despite this, Japan has carefully avoided provoking a war with China.
For many years this author has argued against ending the US policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the defense of Taiwan. The rise of Chinese power and the persistent calls for a treaty with Beijing by the pro-China parties in Taiwan signal that “strategic ambiguity” is policy that has come to an unambiguous end.
