How Do We Derive A Value From A Fact?
A lesson from Hume’s Skepticism
Hume’s skepticism about induction challenges the empiricist view of the role of Reason in drawing conclusions from the method of induction. This is the method of reasoning where empirical conclusions are drawn from empirical premisses. In this way, one is warranted to conclude that the next raven he sees will be black because all the other ravens have been observed to be black.
Hume was not skeptical about the conclusion in itself, only the role that Reason plays in making the conclusion. He argued that Reasoning had little to do in making the inference from general to particular. Rather, it is a matter of habit that we rely on induction to make these conclusions. For example, our association of lightning with thunder is derived not from Reason, but from a habit formed by constantly observing the two phenomena in conjunction with each other.
Any inference from induction, then, faces the problem of explaining just how the conclusion is warranted since it is not derived from Reason.
The Gap Between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’
Hume’s skepticism about induction raises the further question of how one can infer value from a fact, an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. In other words, how is it possible that our value judgment came to…
