An Ineffective Statesman? Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Anticolonial Endeavours in Indochina
Few words elicit such disdain in the American psyche than that of Vietnam. It alludes to a war which would become a fundamental failure of foreign policy, spanning nearly twenty years and four presidencies. In 1972, in the midst of the conflict, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of hearings hoping to understand the origin and evolution of American involvement in the region, calling upon academics with “widely different viewpoints”. [1] They all agreed, however, that the problem began with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who “abandoned a supposed commitment to post-war independence for the French colony.”[2]
Like many liberal, American politicians before him, Roosevelt cultivated a staunch anti-colonialist reputation. The president publicly framed empires as inherently opposed to the ideals represented by and held within the United States. His commitment to this sentiment was seemingly cemented by his insistence that the Philippines, a colonial holding passed to the United States after the Spanish-American war, be prepared for independence. The global instability of the Second World War was the perfect occasion for the President to peruse a larger anti-colonial strategy. As the democratic, capitalistic, and modern United States surged in wartime power, its European counterparts faltered, struggling to maintain their lofty imperial territories, revealing their out-of-touch policies. When speaking to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1942 in regard to the fate of European colonial holdings, Roosevelt enthusiastically proclaimed that “a new period has opened in the world’s history, and you will have to adjust to it.” [3] Dramatic change seemed inescapable and Roosevelt was eager to encourage American idealism and independence movements throughout the third world and particularly in Indochina. But by the end of the war, things remained largely unchanged and Indochina was returned to the French.
Indochina did not capture specific attention from Roosevelt until it was invaded by Japan in September of 1940, by that time France had already fallen to the Nazis. While Indochina had begun an independence movement at the end of the First World War in response to president Woodrow Wilson’s promises of self-determination, these efforts were quickly stifled by French brutality and the status of the region went unquestioned by the international community. Although, with the invasion by Japan, the fate of the developing state became highly ambiguous. The French were in no position to challenge for control, but the territory was at risk of being incorporated into the growing Japanese empire, a fate the Americans were eager to avoid. Some historians indicate that Roosevelt specifically targeted Indochina as the beginning point of his anti-imperialist crusade because of his personal dislike of the nature of French colonialism, but this sentiment is not clearly supported in the historical record. American officials did inform the Vichy government that they could not support a French return to the region due to their use of “force and conquest”, but these remarks were made in 1942, two years after Roosevelt began perusing independence for the region.[4] Roosevelt himself stated that he believed Indochina was “in worse condition after 100 years of French rule than it had been before the French arrived”, but again these remarks occurred after 1940 and just served as further justification for actions the president had already taken.[5]
Indochina most likely became the central focus of the American president’s anti-colonial efforts because it was an ideal candidate. With the collapse of France, Indochina’s colonial administration had very little support and by 1941, the Japanese had not taken significant measures to establish political control. Roosevelt became convinced that France was a global power on the decline, he once even suggested that it should be totally disarmed at the end of the war.[6] Its failure to defend itself from the Nazis and its accelerated road to surrender were unimpressive to Roosevelt.[7] The country’s equally poor handling of war with the Japanese, became proof that France was incapable of governing and grew weaker by the day.[8] While Roosevelt’s view could be deemed highly pessimistic, in many ways he was not wrong. France was ravaged by war and left in considerable political upheaval, they faced decades of rebuilding and were in no position to maintain a vast empire. For these reasons, it became obvious to Roosevelt and his advisors that foreign interference in Indochina could be easily removed and with a pre-existing independence movement, the region was ripe for self-governance.
It would appear that Roosevelt was seemingly committed to the pursuit of anti-colonialism and he recognised the developments within Indochina. The war would make the United States the most formidable power in the world, and the political and economic support they would provide Britain and France gave them a definite upper-hand in international negotiations. Roosevelt’s anti-imperialist political ideology had found its opportunity to enact real and permanent change, and yet despite years of diplomatic negotiations and reiterated foreign policy desires, Roosevelt conceded Indochina back to the French. So, the question must be asked: was president Franklin D. Roosevelt an ineffective statesman? Was he a politician who fundamentally failed to capitalise on diplomatic opportunity?
To answer these questions, one must first examine the root of Roosevelt’s anti-colonialism. It may be naïve to assume that Roosevelt pursued a policy which encouraged self-determination and the liberation of colonies merely for its sentimental value. Colonial holdings liberated from the weight of imperial monopolies would create potential alliances and economic opportunities for the United States, so it would be of benefit to appear sympathetic. With the support of these new nations, the United States would grow even more dominant and could incorporate them into its sphere of influence. If Roosevelt’s primary goal in Indochina was the pursuit of American economic and political interests, it may explain why he so dramatically compromised. Additionally, it is important to place Roosevelt’s efforts within the realistic context of the war. Several issues complicated the president’s diplomatic negotiations, such as his primary need to maintain military alliances with imperial powers, his complex relationship with Charles De Gaulle, and the unpredictable shifts in the international balance of power. Roosevelt was undoubtedly directly responsible for many failures of foreign policy implementation as his statements were often inconsistent and he lacked concrete post-war plans. Yet, placing responsibility for the failed liberation of Indochina upon him may be a drastic overstatement which fails to incorporate a holistic view of the period.
Most historians agree that Roosevelt had a clear “antipathy” of formal empires.[9] John Darwin felt that Roosevelt regarded colonial empires with the “same suspicion and dislike as Woodrow Wilson”.[10] This view was reflected by Kimball, who noted that the leader’s aversion seemed rooted in his desire for global peace and that his critique of the colonial system was “consistent” throughout his presidency.[11] Similar sentiments can be found within the work of John J. Sebrega who stated that “colonialism was foremost in [Roosevelt’s] mind”[12]. However, where historians diverge greatly is in the true nature of Roosevelt’s anti-colonial project.
After the war, historians related Roosevelt’s policies to those of Wilson — highly idealistic and grounded in the liberation of peoples and promotion of peace. These accounts become glorified portraits of FDR and were undoubtedly influenced by the successful post-war years within America. The work of Willard Range is a good example of this type of tradition, he spent an entire chapter of his 1959 publication Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order outlining the noble intents of the president. He explored Roosevelt’s political career and attempted to argue that the president underwent a colonial “conversion”.[13] Range admits that FDR initially appears similar to Theodore Roosevelt and could be classified a “humanitarian imperialist”, but he perceives a gradual deterioration of this identity and a definitive collapse upon FDR’s visit to British Gambia.[14] Within the work, Range consistently reiterates that even during FDR’s initial imperialist years he placed the “welfare of native peoples” before any economic or trade considerations.[15] To Range, Roosevelt’s anti-imperialism was legitimate and grounded in a genuine belief in self-determination.
A similar sentiment can be found in Rexford G. Tugwell’s 1957 book The Democratic Roosevelt: a Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt, which drew attention to the president’s “noble objectives”.[16] Tugwell’s work affirms Range’s proposition of a political evolution, labelling FDR a “slow developer”.[17] However, Tugwell’s account will always be problematic as he was heavily involved in the Roosevelt administration and, while he attempts to remain “scholarly and objective”, “one could hardly expect…aloofness and detachment”.[18] Additionally, both Range and Tugwell face a similar criticism: the sources which they relied upon. Unlike most historical periods or figures, Roosevelt’s presidency seemingly struggles under the weight of excessive documentation. Critic Robert H. Farrell deemed Range’s work overly dependent upon “trivial comments thrown off in rapidly dictated letters or in ill-considered remarks to visitors and reporters”.[19] Both works fail to create a distinction between Roosevelt’s public persona and his more serious identity as a policy maker. While it is undeniably complicated to attempt to access an individual’s thoughts and motivations, there are not attempts to reconcile serious deviations from FDR’s anti-colonialism during the war. Part of this problem inherently lies in the time period the historians were working in, as they would not have had access to a more comprehensive archive and they were still living under the shadow of Roosevelt’s celebrated legacy. In many ways, the works lacked the appropriate level of objectiveness that an analysis of this sort requires.
Moving forward into the 1960s, revisionist historians took a drastically different path. Disillusioned by the war raging in Vietnam, academics began a critical reappraisal of Roosevelt’s colonial policy seeking the root of conflict in the region. Many pessimistically disregarded any notion of humanitarianism or idealism and instead proposed American, capitalistic greed as the true motivator of post-war desires. Most prominent and influential among them was William Appleman Williams. Williams was initially labelled the “lonely radical” of his time, but he was soon followed by a wave of likeminded, New Left scholars.[20] He was a fervent believer that Roosevelt’s decisions were fundamentally influenced by an underlying belief in the “Open Door Policy”, and nowhere is this more clear than FDR’s colonial policy.[21] Within The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Williams labelled Roosevelt’s actions in Indochina “the ultimate manifestation of the tragedy and the terror of American foreign policy”.[22] He stipulated that Vietnamese independence was most likely incompatible with American economic desires, stating they would “very probably use a free election to self-determine themselves out of the orbit of Western capitalists”, and that this was the reason Roosevelt allowed the return of the French.[23]
Williams use of Open Door Policy was widely embraced and reiterated consistently. Gabriel Kolko in 1968 labelled American post-war policy a “classical pursuit of national self-interest in an ill-fitting wrapper of internationalist rhetoric”.[24] Lloyd Gardner, a doctorial student under Williams, consistently examined commercial considerations within the region and their impact upon decision making.[25] In 2000, Gardener would restate these theories, by reminding readers that Indochina possessed goods “essential to both wartime and peacetime economies” and they were “potentially important markets for American exports”.[26] Kolko and Gardner also integrated political elements, suggesting Roosevelt was aware that Vietnamese officials were left-leaning and this caused him to fear for the future of the colony. These inclusions were undoubtedly intended to draw comparison to the contemporary struggle for spheres of influence, the fear of the domino effect, and the desire for containment. Kolko specifically cites OSS reports from 1945 which claimed that the political movement in Indochina was the “a product of Moscow”, creating ties between Vietnamese communism and that within the Soviet Union, despite few concrete links actually existing.[27] Similar sentiments were formed by Gardner, who seemed determined to prove Roosevelt’s first and foremost desire was the maintenance of Western dominance even in the face of an impossible challenge. To articulate this point, Gardner draws attentions to an instance in which Stalin commented that the weakness and destruction of post-war France meant it should be excluded from the peace negotiations, Roosevelt quickly denied this, stating he believed the nation would rebound quickly.[28] Gardner reminds the reader that this “was not [FDR’s] view”, and is evidence of the lengths the president was willing to go to contain opposition to the United States and its allies.[29]
The criticism William Appleman Williams and his fellow Revisionists faced was widespread. In the Cold War climate, works which so heavily emphasised the liability, and in some cases sole responsibility, of the United States in the escalation of Cold War tensions were unpopular. However, even outside this context, critics remain who see genuine problems in the methods utilised within these Revisionists’ work. Bradford Perkins in 1984 suggested that Williams had too readily attempted to assimilate ideas into his narrative framework, “selecting and organizing the data not only to prove a conclusion but also to isolate it from competing ideas”.[30] While for the sake of this essay, Williams’ The Tragedy of American Diplomacy was only examined in relation to Roosevelt, it is important to note that the intention of the work was to create a common thesis of American foreign policy beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, a difficult task considering the period spans innumerable changes of context. Perkins stipulated that this undertaking was impossible, the pursuit of a “system into which all eras and events may be fitted” would fail, and that future, post-Revisionist endeavours would be but the “narrowest studies of episodes in American foreign relations”.[31]
Revisionist accounts attempted to isolate a definitive, continuous strategy within American diplomacy, but this often meant they failed to sufficiently contextualise their topic. Binoy Kampmark in 2010 noted that Williams and others had a “heavy reliance on domestic sources” and viewed “American power as an engine room insular and unfed by the world”.[32] This belief is a fundamental weakness in the study of diplomacy which is inherently reliant upon the interaction of nation states in a grander international arena. Williams’ tendency to “downplay the interactive dimension… does to a certain extent mar his work” and this makes drawing conclusions about specific historical figures or administrations very difficult.[33] A similar criticism falls directly upon Kolko, who “all but ignores the fact the war was going on”, making it seem as though “U.S. post-war policy planning was the major activity of Washington in the 1943–45 period”.[34] It is important to remember that under Roosevelt, foreign policy was often a collection of ad hoc decisions, meant to counter the various challenges of the war and the shifting dynamics within global politics. While there is evidence of post-war planning as early as 1942, this should not suggest an overall strategy was decided or even implemented. The volatility of war created an opportunity for anti-colonialism, but also destabilised governments and leaders, making planning and negotiations difficult.
By the 1970s, historians had more “official archive collections” to utilise and began placing American diplomatic efforts, particularly those of anti-colonialism, within the larger framework of the war.[35] Rather than attempting to simplify events into a coherent interpretation, historians allowed the era to demonstrate its complexity. Historian Roger Louis portrayed Roosevelt as a president committed to decolonisation for a number of interwoven reasons, grounded in both morality and American self-interest. According to Louis, Roosevelt was genuinely shaken by the atrocities he saw within the colonies, desiring the formation of an international coalition which would ensure colonial development, raising literacy rates and decreasing instances of death and disease.[36] Simultaneously, Louis acknowledged that Roosevelt felt imperialism was the root of many modern conflicts, and its dissolution was in the best interest of the United States, but also the greater international community.[37] Christopher Thorne, like Louis, believed that Roosevelt’s true anti-colonial feelings were multifaceted, but they were not a part of some sinister strategy. [38] A weakness of both Thorne and Louis’ work, however, is their overreliance upon a single primary source: the memoirs of Elliot Roosevelt, FDR’s son. While the memoirs have received criticism for their unreliability, this has been largely confined to details, and Thorne believed that the works can be trusted to capture the “spirit of the President’s observations”.[39] Additionally, no other work so intimately captured Roosevelt’s internal thoughts during the crucial years of the war, giving insights not contained within official memos or statements.
Importantly, what draws the work of Thorne, Louis, and fellow post-Revisionist Walter La Faber together is their acknowledgment that Roosevelt’s anti-colonial enthusiasm appears to have dwindled as the war continued. Roosevelt was compromised by the state department adopting policies “at odds with the President’s sympathies” and by the end of the war, he was “prepared to tolerate” the continuation of European imperialism.[40] Walter La Feber noted the dramatic changes within China, Japan, France, and Indochina within the final years of the war made Roosevelt recognise his initial anti-imperialism was impractical. [41] La Feber believed that above all the President and most American officials wanted “an orderly, non-revolutionary Southeast Asia open to Western interests” and when this could not be secured through self-determination, the return of colonialism was preferable.[42] These historians acknowledge the noble intentions of Roosevelt, but also see his desires faltering in the face of legitimate challenge.
These views have been countered, however, in Warren F. Kimbell’s The Juggler, where he adamantly states that Roosevelt led an “unceasing public and private campaign aimed at eliminating European empires and settling the colonial world on the road toward independence”.[43] Kimbell views Roosevelt’s temporary concessions not as a collapse of ideology, but rather a minor compromise on the larger journey to complete anti-colonialism. In this way, Roosevelt was a classic “moderate American reformer, seeking the middle ground between reaction and radical change”.[44] Essentially, while Roosevelt tolerated a return of the French to Indochina, this is not an indication of an abandonment of his principles, but rather evidence in his belief that empires would fade, and the process of their removal would be complicated and lengthy. Roosevelt himself stated in 1945 he would only agree “to France retaining these colonies with the proviso that independence was the ultimate goal”.[45] In the mind of the President, the French were returning on a temporary basis and this was a regrettable, but necessary stepping-stone in Vietnamese independence.
The complexities of Roosevelt’s motivations are evident; it is difficult to conclude complete commitment to the cause when his actions were sometimes contrary. However, it would appear that the President genuinely believed in the anti-colonial cause and was not simply perusing veiled American expansionism. To cite Kimball, Roosevelt seemed to be“a serious world leader who believed that decolonization and independence were the directions in which the world were going” and the United States should not run from this task but rather embrace it.[46] If this is to be believed, how did Roosevelt not negotiate a better fate for Indochina than a return to their imperial overseers?
Roosevelt’s initial plans for Indochina began to take shape during a number of Allied high council meetings throughout 1943. In Cairo and Tehran, the President raised the issue of Indochina to Stalin and China’s Chiang Kai-she, believing their nations and Britain would form the Big Four at the conclusion of the war.[47] Roosevelt hoped that together they could formulate a trusteeship plan under the United Nations, overseeing colonial development until it had reached appropriate levels for independence; this idea echoes the League of Nations mandates at the conclusion of the First World War. Roosevelt understood the hesitance the British would have in supporting an anti-colonial policy, but he was confident he could make them “fall in line”.[48] Importantly, Roosevelt did not stop at Indochina, he outlined many areas that would be placed under the control of the UN, including Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the Dutch West Indies.[49] Roosevelt’s confidence grew after Stalin agreed to these colonial plans and was met with similar sentiments from Chiang.[50] However, the political and military situation within China began to worsen in the summer of 1944 and Roosevelt began to lose hope.[51]
Essential to Roosevelt’s plans was “the emergence of a strong China” as the President hoped to utilise them as a moderator between the West and other regions within Asia.[52] In one sense, it would appear that China was the nation Roosevelt’s plan was most contingent upon, as he repeatedly insisted to British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden that they must be included in the Big Four.[53] However, this all changed when the Japanese led an aggressive invasion during the Battle of Changsha and the state was greatly weakened. While the concept of the trusteeships was not lost, it now had to be quickly reformulated. Roosevelt would propose that the wider international community would participate in the process rather than strictly the Big Four, but this was highly hypothetical and placed under the larger, conceptual umbrella of the UN.[54] While Roosevelt clearly demonstrated his initially planning for a post-war world, he struggled in the context of the war to form lasting political relationships. This feeling of separation may be explained by the fact that the United States was not facing a war on home soil. Every other nation was threatened by invasion and this made governments and popular movements all the more unstable. The strong ally the President sought and needed in China could and would not solidify, and Roosevelt spent the end of the war desperately trying to gain Russian cooperation “in propping up the Nationalist regime”.[55]
Roosevelt also had a deeply complicated relationship with leader of the French resistance Charles De Gaulle. While De Gaulle continued to have open communication with Britain, he was not as successful with the United States. Roosevelt had a fundamental mistrust of the French leader, believing him to be “out to achieve a one-man government” and criticising his use of secret police and spies.[56] Importantly, Roosevelt felt that De Gaulle was no more “interested in seeing a colonial empire disappear than Churchill”, leading him to become suspicious of the two leaders support of one another.[57] Roosevelt was eager to remove De Gaulle entirely and he treated him as such. De Gaulle sent René Pleven to represent the Free State in Washington in 1941 and his reception was “decidedly cool” — he was only allowed to sit in on Anglo-American meetings as an expert rather than a representative.[58] Roosevelt also maintained communication with the Vichy government, taking the gamble that it would survive the war; he would be wrong.[59] This initial introduction between De Gaulle and Roosevelt deeply compromised their abilities to work together in the future. However, the responsibility Roosevelt must bear for the break-down of relations must be equally shared by De Gaulle.
De Gaulle insisted there was a fundamental difference between American and French politics and this meant he was reluctant to negotiate with Roosevelt at all. Unlike Churchill, who was willing to discuss the topic of post-colonialism with the United States, De Gaulle refused entirely. He viewed the French empire as inherent to French power and identity and assumed that if they were to leave Indochina, their presence would only be replaced by the Americans.[60] The French leader wrote in his memoirs that American idealism blinded them to their “dominating instinct” and he alleged he could see their hidden ambitions.[61] This belief seems to stem from De Gaulle’s “faulty understanding of international politics”.[62] He alleged that Roosevelt was “unable to accept the notion that international politics is an arena in which all states rightly and inevitably peruse their national interests through unceasing, but not necessarily violent, conflict”.[63]De Gaulle felt that Americans were disillusioned to believe that nations would come together for the international common good, so his ability to participate in post-war negotiations was fundamentally compromised.[64] So while Roosevelt’s refusal to extend diplomatic niceties dampened relations, they were always doomed to fail, as De Gaulle never considered the desires of the United States legitimate or worthwhile.
While Roosevelt clearly faced unfair opposition and unpredictable difficulties during his attempts to diminish colonisation, he also degraded his own plans through his inconsiderate diplomatic strategy. Requiring the support of several imperial powers to accomplish his tasks, the President struggled to propose the idea to each without garnering backlash, so he often lied. He spoke to Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands and assured her that “the Netherlands Indies must be restored”, but several days later he confided in a British official that the Dutch were “unlikely to get the East Indies back”.[65] Other American officials were no help in this sense, as they often made “reassuring statements, public and private, about the future of French territories”, Robert Murphy directly stated that French sovereignty in Indochina would be re-established.[66] When reminded of these contradictions they “did not give the President pause” and he stated things would be rectified in the “ironing out”.[67] This inconsistent rhetoric began eroding relations with not just the French, but the Dutch and the British as well, often viewing the United States’ planning as secretive and sinister.
Roosevelt also failed to make any concrete plans for the post-war world other than the rare conversation with a world leader. While the trusteeship plan was his most reiterating and framed idea, he “preferred to keep policy formulation largely in his own hands rather than to work closely with the state department.” For this reason, it gained an “indefinite status”.[68] Roosevelt’s diplomatic strategy was “highly personalised”, reliant on individual interactions, and this made his work “shambolic” and incapable of developing.[69] Additionally, his lack of a definitive approach benefitted his imperial allies, especially his most important one. The Yalta conference would unveil the “sharp contrast between well-intentioned American generalisations about colonialism and the crisp, specific approach of the British to that subject”.[70] The lack of definitive action that haunted Roosevelt’s foreign policy meant the British could remain largely inactive. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, in the British Foreign Office, encouraged Churchill and the government to not become too upset about Roosevelt’s post-war plans as “in a year’s time, [he] may be merely a historical figure”.[71]The lack of formulation meant when Roosevelt died, before the end of the war, there was no official agreement that would ensure the French would prepare Indochina for independence. When Truman entered office, he initially attempted to “to secure the proper pledge from France, but he mostly just wanted the problem to go away”.[72] While Roosevelt cannot be blamed for his untimely death, he should have better prepared the United States government and the international community for the task at hand. However, this was clearly difficult under the stress of the war, as other issues were consistent, varied, and more pressing.
Franklin D. Roosevelt was a firm anti-colonialist and he pursued this ideology to the best of his abilities. While Indochina was an ideal candidate for Roosevelt’s trusteeship system, it could never be effectively planned with the instability of the war. The very incident which caused the opportunity for the dissolution of empires was also the root of their continuance. While Roosevelt could have more effectively articulated his plans, the international coalition needed for this effort would never solidify. Roosevelt’s hesitance to pursue the issue individually is evidence he was not an expansionist nor merely using anti-imperialism as a veiled attempt at an Open Door Policy. The return of the French to Indochina was a regrettable misstep in the history of the liberation of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but the American war in Vietnam cannot be allowed to cloud the remembrance of the era. The complexity of war-time politics should not be underestimated and Roosevelt’s actions should be liberated of some responsibility, for they were merely a temporary answer to a chaotic, long-term problem.
[1] Lloyd C. Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54.” The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom, edited by David Ryan and Victor Pungong, (London, 2000), p 121.
[2] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 121.
[3] Paul Orders, “‘Adjusting to a New Period in World History’: Franklin Roosevelt and European Colonialism.” The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom, edited by David Ryan and Victor Pungong, (London, 2000), p 63.
[4] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 122.
[5] Garry Hess, “Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina.” The Journal of American History (59, no. 2, (1972), pp. 353–368.
[6] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 127.
[7] Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War 1941–1945. (Hoboken, 1965), pp 1–12.
[8] Hess, “Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina.” pp. 353–368.
[9] Orders, “‘Adjusting to a New Period in World History’, p 63.
[10] John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World. (London, 1988), p. 38
[11] Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman, (Princeton, 1994), p. 128
[12] John J. Sebrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal.” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 1, (1986), pp. 65–84.
[13] Willard Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order, (Athens, 1962), p. 102.
[14] Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order, p. 105.
[15] Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order, p. 104.
[16] Orders, “‘Adjusting to a New Period in World History’, p. 64.
[17] Harold F. Gosnell, “The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt by Rexford G. Tugwell” The American Political Science Review 52, no. 2, (1958), pp. 554–555.
[18] Gosnell, “The Democratic Roosevelt”, pp. 554–555.
[19] Robert H. Ferrell, “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order by Willard Range”, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review vol. 47, no. 2, (1960), pp. 352–353.
[20] Paul Buhle and Edward Rice-Maximin. William Appleman Williams: the Tragedy of Empire (Routledge, 1995), p. 212
[21] William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. (London, 1972), p. 204–206
[22] Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p. 8
[23] Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, p. 8
[24] Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943–1945. (London, 1969), p. 254.
[25]
Orders, “‘Adjusting to a New Period in World History’, p 64.
[26] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 130.
[27] Kolko, The Politics of War, p. 610.
[28] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 129.
[29] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 129.
[30] Bradford Perkins, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-Five Years After”, Reviews in American History12, no. 1, (1984), pp. 1–18.
[31] Perkins, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy”, pp. 1–18.
[32] Binoy Kampmark, “William A. Williams’ Tragedy Fifty Years On”, The Historical Journal 53, no. 3, (2010), pp. 783–794.
[33] Kampmark, “William A. Williams’ Tragedy Fifty Years On”, pp. 783–794.
[34] Leonard Wainstein, “Reviewed Work: The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–45 by Gabriel Kolko”, World Affairs 132, no. 1, (1969), pp. 81–82.
[35] Orders, “‘Adjusting to a New Period in World History’, p 65.
[36] William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: 1941–1945 ; the United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, (Clarendon, 1977), p. 226
[37] Louis, Imperialism at Bay”, p. 226
[38] Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941–1945, (London, 2011), p. 216
[39] Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 216
[40] Orders, “‘Adjusting to a New Period in World History’, p 65.
[41] Walter La Feber, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942–45”, The American Historical Review 80, no. 5, (1975), pp. 1277–1295.
[42] La Feber, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina”, pp. 1277–1295.
[43] Kimball, The Juggler, p. 126
[44] Kimball, The Juggler, p. 132
[45] Lloyd C. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: from World War II through Dienbienphu, 1941–1954. (Norton, 1989) p.46.
[46]
Kimball, The Juggler, p. 131–132.
[47] Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It, (New York City, 1946), p. 224.
[48] Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 224.
[49] Ernst B. Haas, “The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System”, International Organization 7, no. 1, (1953), pp. 1–21.
[50] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 129.
[51] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 129.
[52] Hess, “Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina.” pp. 353–368.
[53] John J. Sebrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal.” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 1, (1986), pp. 65–84.
[54] Sebrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt”, pp. 65–84.
[55] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 130.
[56] Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 72–73.
[57] Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 72–73.
[58] John E. Dreifort, Myopic Grandeur: the Ambivalence of French Foreign Policy toward the Far East, 1919–1945. (Kent State, 1991), p. 220.
[59] Dreifort, Myopic Grandeur, p. 222.
[60] Anne Sa’adah, “Idées Simples and Idées Fixes: De Gaulle, the United States, and Vietnam .” De Gaulle and the United States: a Centennial Reappraisal, by Robert Owen Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, Berg Publ., 1994, pp. 302–303.
[61] Sa’adah, “Idées Simples and Idées Fixes”, pp. 302–303.
[62] Sa’adah, “Idées Simples and Idées Fixes”, pp. 296.
[63] Sa’adah, “Idées Simples and Idées Fixes”, pp. 296.
[64] Sa’adah, “Idées Simples and Idées Fixes”, pp. 296.
[65] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 127.
[66] Dreifort, Myopic Grandeur, p. 221.
[67] Louis, Imperialism at Bay”, p. 228.
[68] Hess, “Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina.” pp. 353–368.
[69] Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 715.
[70] Sebrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt”, pp. 65–84.
[71] Sebrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt”, pp. 65–84.
[72] Gardner, “How We ‘Lost’ Vietnam, 1940–54”, p 130.
