Anti-Oedipus 2.3: The Connective Synthesis of Production

In this section Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari explain the first paralogism.

Figure One: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Image Link.

The objective of this blog post is to elucidate three out of the five paralogisms outlined in Anti-Oedipus.

What is a paralogism?

According to a quick Google search, a paralogism is “a piece of illogical or fallacious reasoning, especially one which appears superficially logical or which the reasoner believes to be logical.”

To delve into how desire represses itself, Deleuze and Guattari initially embark on an exploration of the three syntheses of the unconscious — my blog post on that topic can be found here. However, it’s important to note that the three syntheses of the unconscious are often misused or used improperly by desire. In fact, the three paralogisms, out of a total of five, isolate how each of the syntheses of the unconscious is commonly misused. Deleuze and Guattari write:

“Given the syntheses of the unconscious, the practical problem is that of their use, legitimate or not, and of the conditions that define a use of synthesis as legitimate or not” (AO, 68).

We are not analyzing why desire represses itself in this section, but instead, analyzing how desire represses itself.

Note 1: For 2.3–2.5, Deleuze and Guattari title each section with the paralogism’s correlative. For example, as 2.3 is titled The Connective Synthesis of Production, Deleuze and Guattari describe how the connective synthesis gets misused in this section.

Note 2: I will clearly bold what each paralogism is.

**Citation Note: The citation for this text is at the bottom of the blog post

Chapter 2.3: The Connective Synthesis of Production

In this section, Deleuze and Guattari embark on an insightful analysis of the works of renowned French novelist and literary critic, Marcel Proust. Through their examination, Deleuze and Guattari elucidate a crucial dichotomy between the molar and the molecular.

The molar is composed of statistical aggregates:

“Everything begins with a nebulae, statistical wholes whose outlines are blurred, molar or collective formations comprising singularities distributed haphazardly…” (AO, 68–69).

Deleuze and Guattari illustrate the concept of the molar with examples presented in Proust’s work, such as “a living room”, “a group of girls”, and “a landscape.” Evidently, these examples exemplify a molar aggregate or “collective formation” that is viewed as a singularity in and of itself. For example, a living room contains various elements and parts — we group these elements together in order to call this space “the living room.”

Figure Two: A Living Room. Image Link.

Deleuze and Guattari proceed to describe the molar in greater detail:

“Within these nebulae or these collectives, ‘sides’ take shape, series are arranged, persons figure in these series, under strange laws of lack, absence, asymmetry, exclusion, noncommunication, vice, and guilt” (AO, 69).

Elements coalescing within this collective framework give rise to distinct entities; these entities are governed by a set of distinctive principles characterized by notions of lack, absence, and deficiency. Each element in the series appears to lack or stand apart from the other elements as clear distinctions emerge. To simplify, each figure is perceived as an autonomous entity, distinct from the collective whole. Yet, as we know, all partial objects remain inherently interconnected to one another, never truly severed from the collective.

Figure Three: The Lack. Image Link.

It is necessary to note that none of this implies that the molecular cannot encompass a multitude of elements. The pivotal difference between the molar and molecular relies on the concept of ‘global persons’.

Turning their attention to the molecular, Deleuze and Guattari offer a contrasting perspective:

“Next, everything becomes blurred again, everything comes apart, but this time in a molecular and pure multiplicity, where the partial objects, the ‘boxes,’ the ‘vessels’ all have their positive determinations, and enter into aberrant communication following a transversal that runs through the whole work; an immense flow that each partial object produces and cuts again, reproduces and cuts at the same time” (AO, 69)

Deleuze and Guattari emphasize a return to ambiguity, a dissolution of boundaries, but this time, at the molecular level. Here, the partial objects possess “positive determinations”, engaging in seemingly unconventional communication through a transversal network. The partial objects are all interconnected through flows of desire — no partial object is lacking anything as they are all interconnected at the molecular level. Notice how each element is not considered an independent entity separate from the group.

Figure Four: Interconnectedness. Image Link.

To clarify: Within the molecular context, it is crucial to observe that each partial object possesses “positive determinations” as they contribute to a comprehensive network. Notably, no partial object lacks anything since they all interconnect seamlessly at the molecular level. In stark contrast, when we look at things from a molar perspective, individual figures are arranged in such a way that emphasizes their separateness from one another. They are treated as distinct, separate entities with clear boundaries, which sets them apart from each other. However, the reality reveals that all the partial objects within the molar group remain interconnected, despite the deceptive appearance of isolation.

So… what’s the first paralogism?

Paralogism 1: A partial object is lifted out of the multiplicity.

• “There we have a curious paralogism implying a transcendent use of the syntheses of the unconscious. We pass from detachable partial objects to the detached complete object, from which global persons derive by an assigning of lack” (AO, 73).
• The first paralogism isolates a “global and specific use” of the connective synthesis (AO, 70).

Clearly, a partial object never leaves the multiplicity because all partial objects are interconnected. However, in the case of a global and specific use, “desire… receives a fixed subject… and complete objects defined as global persons” (AO, 70). As such, the multiplicity is deemed to be lacking the partial object lifted from the group. And as we are well aware, psychoanalysis conceptualizes desire in relation to a lack (i.e., one desires the phallus because they lack it):

• Freudian psychoanalysis: one desires their father’s phallus. Why? Because they lack it.
• Lacanian psychoanalysis: one desires the phallus — not in the literal sense of the father — but in the sense of a lost object. Why? Because they lack it.

This is why psychoanalysis fails us. The phallus is lifted from the multiplicity and deemed as separate from the group. Psychoanalysts assume the group is lacking the phallus, when in reality, nothing was ever lacking — the partial objects have always been interconnected. To argue that desire is solely in relation to one’s father or mother (or any global persons for that matter), is to assume that desire knows what a father or mother is. “This is not the case: the mother and father are produced through desire receiving these complete objects which are a result of repression” (AO, 71).

Desire knows no father. Desire knows no mother. All it knows are connections.

Deleuze and Guattari continue:

“In reality, global persons — even the very form of persons — do not exist prior to the prohibitions that weigh on them and constitute them, any more than they exist prior to the triangulation into which they enter: desire receives its first complete objects and is forbidden them at one and the same time” (AO, 70; italics mine).

To understand this “triangulation” of desire, it is essential to have a foundational understanding of psychoanalysis. In Freud’s Oedipus complex, the triangulation of desire consists of: mommy-daddy-me. This framework assumes that desire fits neatly within these roles, which oversimplifies desire’s complexity. In this reductionist perspective, the phallus is elevated, while other partial objects within the multiplicity are arbitrarily labeled as lacking.

While we have primarily focused on Freudian psychoanalysis, it is crucial to consider psychoanalysis in a broader context. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the concept of lack is not solely confined to the literal absence of the father’s phallus; instead, Lacan’s approach builds upon Freud’s framework by asserting that all individuals desire the phallus as a lost object. According to Lacan, a perpetual sense of lack defines human existence. From the psychoanalyst’s perspective, when one seeks psychoanalytic treatment, they enter the clinic as a molar-entity that is already lacking the phallus. Is there such a thing as a perfect patient? Not at all! When a patient fits neatly into the Oedipal triangle, they are classified as neurotic. Conversely, if they reject the Oedipal triangle, they are labeled as psychotic. The theme of lack remains a central element in psychoanalysis, regardless of whether one lacks the father’s phallus in a literal sense (Freud) or whether one is lacking the phallus in the sense of a lost object (Lacan).

Figure Five: Jacques Lacan. Image Link.

As we move forward, it is important to recognize that the triangular structure is not limited to one’s immediate family. Deleuze and Guattari argue that “the triangle takes form in the parental use, and reproduces itself in the conjugal use” (AO, 72). This suggests that the mommy-daddy-me triangulation of desire, central to oedipalization, is not solely rooted in one’s genealogical lineage (parental use); it also influences a broader spectrum of human interactions, especially the alliances we form with others (conjugal use). In essence, this means that the triangular dynamics of desire extend beyond one’s immediate family and permeate all our social interactions, whether with family, friends, or even strangers.

Deleuze and Guattari present Oedipus as a ‘3 + 1’ formula, comprising ‘mommy,’ ‘daddy,’ and ‘me,’ with the ‘One’ symbolizing the forever unattainable transcendent phallus (AO, 73). What’s intriguing is that this ‘transcendent phallus’ is eternally elusive, making any attempt to attain it a never-ending journey due to inherent lack. Yet, turning away from the triangle is seen as a response to this lack, creating a true double-bind.

As we conclude this section, let’s revisit the insights drawn from Proust’s works, which initially served as the foundation for Deleuze and Guattari’s exploration. From a molar perspective, individuals are traditionally categorized along the lines of sex and gender: male or female, man or woman. However, this categorization is primarily a product of molar aggregates, which tend to simplify and generalize complex human experiences.

Deleuze and Guattari reveal the existence of molecular sexes, which intricately intersect and criss-cross the boundaries set by molar aggregates. In this light, they argue that “everyone is bisexual*, everyone has two sexes, but partitioned, noncommunicating; the man is merely the one in whom the male part, and the woman the one in whom the female part, dominates statistically” (AO, 88).

*Note: In the English translation, the word “bisexual” is used. However, the proper translation from French is “bisexuated”.

In a similar vein, these insights also extend into the realm of sexuality, an area of significant preoccupation within psychoanalysis. As Deleuze and Guattari articulate, “We are statistically or molarly heterosexual, but personally homosexual, without knowing it or being fully aware of it, and finally we are transsexual in an elemental, molecular sense” (AO, 70). This perspective suggests that molar constructs tend to classify individuals in heterosexual terms on a statistical level, our personal experiences of sexuality often exhibit more nuanced and complex patterns, including aspects of homosexuality and even transsexuality at a molecular level.

Consequently, one’s molar classification does not imply a strict adherence to the molar aggregate, as molecular nuances continually intersect and influence one’s understanding of self and sexuality.

A poignant quote on this issue of oedipalized sexuality explains Deleuze and Guattari’s stance: “We do not deny that there is an Oedipal sexuality, an Oedipal heterosexuality and homosexuality, an Oedipal castration, as well as complete objects, global images, and specific egos. We deny that these are productions of the unconscious” (AO, 74; italics mine). In essence, Deleuze and Guattari challenge the notion that Oedipal structures and categories are inherent productions of the unconscious. Instead, they assert that these molar aggregates arise from the misuse of desire, shaping what they call “global persons.”

Hence, overarching categorizations, like Man-Woman, Mommy-Daddy, and Parent-Child, are not innate productions of the unconscious; rather, they are constructs that emerge through the misdirection of desire. This transformation is perpetuated and reinforced by psychoanalysis itself, leading to the construction of these global persons (AO, 73).

“Psychoanalysis itself ensures this conversion of the unconscious” (AO, 73)