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Digital Impact on Human Lives

Humans and the digital – where we started and where we’re going

Guro Langøigjelten
Antropress
Published in
26 min readJun 23, 2020

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“I predict the Internet will soon go spectacularly supernova and in 1996 catastrophically collapse.” (Forbes, 2015).

That is the exact quote from Robert Metcalfe, founder of 3Com, a company that used to specialise in manufacturing routers, switches and wireless access points, the very components needed to access the world wide web. The statement from 1995 has been proven to be spectacularly wrong and shows up now and again to remind us of how hard it can be to make predictions on something so rapidly evolving as technology. In retrospect, it is easy to laugh at all the failed predictions surrounding the emergence of newer technology, because Metcalfe is by no means alone at making predictions where the exact opposite has been the result. However, one can argue that perhaps he was not so wrong after all, because if we think back to what “the internet” was back in 1995 and try to envision it used in the same way we require of it today, it would indeed probably “catastrophically collapse”. Today, the capacity needed in terms of receiving, processing or sending data that is required just for someone to simply consider using a computer was not there 25 years ago. Like all technology, it has had to evolve drastically since its inception. Arguably, however, on the flip side, hadn’t it evolved, the world would not know the solutions we now to an extent take for granted; hence the collapse is only probable, and not absolute. As mentioned, it is hard to make an assumption on something as rapidly changing as digital technology.
In this essay, I want to look at whether or not digital technology’s advancement has moved too fast for us, and if so is the case, what unforeseen issues might occur. To do this I will focus on perceptions of personhood, both how it is presented to us and who can acquire it, as well as traces and means of power.

My main interest in this topic began during a discussion regarding artificial intelligence with a friend studying cybernetics at NTNU on whether or not an AI could potentially be classified as a person if it was advanced enough and be capable of rational thinking and feeling like a human. My friend’s stance relied more on the potential outcome of Alan Turing’s Imitation Game, meaning whether or not a machine was capable of tricking a human into believing it was talking to another human with no other prior information. Still, the question remained if the passing of the Imitation Game was enough, or if there needed to be at least a degree of the natural involved, rather than being entirely artificial. There are no definite answers as to what has personhood and what has not, but there seems to be an idea in parts of the world that personhood is tied to humans, even though legally we know that that is not necessarily true. There is corporate personhood, legally giving corporations the same rights as people, and the EU debated back in 2018 on whether or not machines should be considered people, which would make them accountable for mistakes or damages. Several experts on AI, ethics and robotics advised the European Parliament against granting machines personhood (Mind Matters, 2018) and the debate ended up as discarded for the foreseeable future (Pagallo, 2018). One might argue that this debate between legislatures and developers and experts could potentially suggest that understanding the concrete hard and software that goes into digital technology does not necessarily mean we fully understand it’s place in society.

Culture and the digital

As pointed out by Richard Handler in his article on Reinventing The Invention of Culture (2002), through people’s actions they do not only reproduce culture, but they are also creating it all over again, with both old “conventional” parts and new ones. This combined with the development of digital technology made me wonder whether or not the reinvention of culture happened at the same speed as digital technological advances, and how would our relationship to the digital be different based on the outcome of that question. In this essay, I want to look at how rapid technological advances has impacted us as humans and if technology may be moving too fast for us to keep up with it. We will never consider going back to the internet anno 1995, but one might question if the development we have seen in the past 25 years has in a way surpassed our comprehension of it. From issues surrounding sharing of personal data and surveillance technology to more “mundane” and lesser evils, such as the use of VAR (Video Assisted Refereeing) in modern sports, arguably the technological advances come first and laws, regulations, social acceptance and demand are created after because it is hard to imagine an existing a law regulating something rendered impossible until a company made it the opposite, or to have a name for something that has not been invented yet. These are some of the thoughts that have made me question to what extent we are capable of keeping up with technological growth because our relationship with technology and the digital is perhaps changing at a slower pace. Creating laws and regulations takes time, separating what’s right and wrong when it comes to human meddling with nature is an impossible discussion and we barely have time to accept a social media platform’s terms and conditions before they are once again updated.

I choose to focus on the digital side of technology advances, thus leaving out the question on things such as reproductive technologies and traditional weapons technology, and instead turn to look at potential issues surrounding advances like artificial intelligence, use of personal data and surveillance.
Firstly it is important to define and identify exactly the meaning with the word “digital” as the word can entail a great many things. As Daniel Miller and Heather Horst point out in their book on digital anthropology, it can involve everything from virtual displays to new media and digital communication. A common factor, however, is that the word has ended up becoming a catch-all phrase for novelty (2012, p.5) and has a broad sense of meaning when used in everyday life. The definition used by Horst and Miller, also later used by Miller again in an article from 2018 (2018, p.1 ), is that the digital is anything that can be reduced to a set of 1’s and 0’s, in other words, a binary code. This definition also has the benefit of largely dating when the first digital components emerged. There is also the point of distinguishing the digital and technology because while they are both frequently used as meaning the same, technology cannot be reduced to a binary code in the same way as the digital can. Technology can be described as applied scientific knowledge for practical purposes, and while the digital might fit into that category, technology can contain much more such as reproductive technologies as mentioned above or something different as an analogue clock or nuclear weapons.

Is the perception of personhood changing?

The exact concrete aspects that go into creating or establishing personhood are hard to define, and the answer will also differ from research to research, depending on where it was conducted. As Fischer and Marcus point out in their book on anthropology and culture, our idea of what human agency entails are culturally constructed, and simply comes down to empirical research in a specific society (1986, p. 48). From that, one might say that personhood is the aspects in which we believe makes a person, but exactly
what those aspects would be cannot be universally stated. The conversations in the earlier parts of the 20th century circled mainly around the assumption that any phenomena that were described through a social theory also had to be understood through the actions and behaviours of individual actors because individuals actors were the clear units that together made up society. Louis Dumont was one of the researchers that brought up the interjection that in other cultures, there could be the possibility that people acted out from a different understanding of what it meant to be an individual. In the cases of his examples from societies like feudal Europe and the ancient state of Greece, individuals were not units themselves, but rather entities that together made up a larger one (Fischer & Marcus, 1986, p. 45–46). The contrasting views on personhood across cultures are further pointed out by looking at Clifford Geertz’s description of Balinese concepts of personhood from his research. Geertz’s description shows the ways in which Balinese societies seems to place focus on interpersonal relationships running smoothly, rather than on the autonomous person that is favoured in Europe (Fischer & Marcus, 1986, p. 47). Based on this, one can say that personhood in a social context is culturally embedded, and therefore hard to define with certainty.

The Legal Person

However, that does not mean that at times in some situations, such as the ones dealing with law, there isn’t a need for a clearer definition. After all, there is a specific type of person that is easier to get the grasp of, namely the legal person. In simple terms this is the term given for entities, people or other actors acting as people, that has the ability to do things such as sign contracts, sue or get sued or own property. In “Leviathan” from 1651, Thomas Hobbes describes a person as an entity that acts either on his own actions and wants, or on someone else’s, which determines whether or not a person is “natural” or “feigned” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 110). Hobbes’ distinguished types of persons resemble to a degree one of the terms used for corporations acting as persons, namely artificial personality.

Benefits of having a concept of a legal person are among others granting the abilities mentioned above to objects that are not humans, and at the same time a state also can issue a higher degree of control over their population through the attributes needed the be a legal person. An area where this comes into play out in the world is in the case of self driving cars. In the case of any potential damages done by such a machine, who would be held responsible? The manufacturer, or will the car have to encompass some sort of personhood that renders it juridical responsible? In the case of the self-driving buses that operated in Oslo for a period of time, the problem was solved with having a “host”, not a driver, but a person who could interfere in dangerous situations or take over control in case of malfunction (TEK.no, 2019). If the buses had been given some sort of legal standing they could’ve been perceived as autonomous objects in charge of their own decisions and so could’ve been held accountable for any damages. But as it stands there were too many potential hazards as well as the technology being relatively new in this context and perhaps the convenience of having an already decided autonomous person, a human individual, as the responsible figure outweighed the need for a debate on whether or not such technology should be considered eligible for being a legal person.

Arguably, the legal person as a concept with their own rights and duties, and that could encompass other entities than humans, came as a consequence of states issuing means of control over a population as one could argue from James Scott’s claim about legal standing further down. First, James Scott’s book “Seeing Like a State” highlights several important aspects of how a state imposes measures to make a population legible, in that it is easier to understand or read (Scott, 1998, p. 53). Among several examples, he points out how something that is now considered quite an ordinary thing such as surnames were implemented by a state to control the payment of taxes, forced labour or conscription (1998, p.65). While the surname did not always carry much meaning to the persons themselves or their local community, it was the way of the state to keep the population being transparent and clear, with no mistaking who was who. Scott points out an important aspect of the early uses of surnames, which is while the surname might’ve had something to do with a person’s job or family, it did not always exist in real-life or in a social context. In one’s home town it would still be easier to talk of “John, the blacksmith”, however on a formal, national scale, there might be many blacksmiths named John, and such the name that did not exist socially got its life simply by being an inscription in a census. However later on, individuals also got their own interest in abiding by their surnames, which was, for example, to avoid paying tax to the state twice. By using a surname as an indicator to distinguish the people with the same first name, one could prove that they had already paid their taxes. In the years following, there has been the emergence of passports, social security numbers, fixed addresses or other types of identification papers. Todays these are aspects to a person that gives standing in law since those are papers that decided whether or not someone is recognised as a citizen by their country, and is arguably important for our personhood. As Scott puts it in his article, it is not merely a way for the state to make a population legible, but “are an authoritative tune to which most of the population must dance” (Scott, 1998, p.83). Quite similar to the way populations today must dance to other modes of control from some governments. As we will come back to later, measures such as surveillance through the use of cameras, the use of tracing movement online and tracking of digital devices such as mobile phones can arguably be seen as new ways for the state to issue control over its population. Scott mentions that what is best for the state might not have been the best for the individual, in the same way, that some states new modes of surveillance might not be for the benefit of the individual either.

Personhood Online

The above concerns what personhood, and perhaps more importantly, the legal person means to the state, and it says about people’s ability to gain and execute their rights. But personhood is not just an issue of legal matters. Perceptions of personhood in culture are transferable into the digital domain and can be useful tools when looking at the ways in which digital, social platforms are built to cater to one’s individual needs. Steffen Dalsgaard notes in his article on the presentation of the self on Facebook how social media websites are built up of seeing people as nodes or nexuses in a network which creates the ways in which we experience the platform in question. This, he goes on to explain, is a mainly new concept to the west where individualism has been the focal point of understanding personhood and social identities, however, we are now in a period where we are moving closer and closer to a new understanding of personhood, one that or example resembles the one we find in Marilyn Strathern’s descriptions of personhood in Melanesia (2008, p. 8). Strathern argues that “society”, in the way it is often understood, acts as a mode for connecting between individuals and is thus created through the ordering of persons in relation to each other, but it is still the persons who decide the nature of said relations (1988, p. 12). What was argued to be the cause in Melanesia however was that individual persons were not their own separate entities leading the creation of society, but were as “dividually as individually conceived” (1988, p.13). This is the case that Dalsgaard argues for in his introduction, that while Facebook might’ve been created to cater to the western view of the individual as the centre, it is built up in a way that resembles other views on personhood and society. On a site like Facebook, one can distinguish themselves by clicking like on profiles for organisations, sports teams or artist and add people to a list of Facebook friends. While this as mentioned places the user’s ego in the centre of his network, it is the network itself that creates the experience of the social medium and decides what content is presented for the user (Dalsgaard, 2008, p. 9).

One useful way of seeing the importance of representing ourselves on social media platforms in a productive way, not just for ourselves but also for our social network, could be to look at how some employers will look up potential employees on sites just like Facebook, or how landlords will google tenants before offering a lease. The latter example combines both the formal aspects to our person given to a population by the state as described by Scott and the “informal” information about persons that can be picked and chosen through what is “liked”, “followed” and “friended” on social media. E24, a Norwegian newspaper based on new trends in the economy, reported in 2011 that companies specialising in renting out properties had a company policy on always checking a potential tenant’s credit history, to guard against missed out payments in the future. This practice means acquiring the explicit consent from potential tenants, and a refusal to provide it would likely set them out of the list of hopefuls. They also would normally search the names of potential tenants in an open source such as Google (e24, 2011) to get an overview over their life online which could arguably mirror somewhat their life offline. With this in mind, one might argue that in the cases of what would be considered as background checks, the aspects to our person created by the state such as addresses and taxes combined with the ways in which we choose to build up the network we want to represent ourselves on social media and that we are the centre of, lays the foundation of how our personhood is perceived by the outsider. One could say, with the western emphasis on individualism, a populations legibility combined with a person’s digital, and online networks result in highlighting their individuality when it is perceived by others.

Personhood for Non-humans On the flip side, there is not only a question of how or if our personhood has changed for those who already have it, but increasing digital advances also raises the question on who gets to acquire personhood or not. As mentioned above, there is legal personhood, where corporations become a legal unit with the potential to sue or be sued, among other things. However, that does not mean that most people would classify a corporation as a person with individual rights, feelings, dreams and the ability to forge friendships or connections. Arguably these aren’t attributes which are always conditions for personhood either, but they are a small part of being human and from what is both seen in Strathern’s depictions of Melanesian personhood (1988, p. 13) to what Daalsgard’s says about western individualism (2008, p.8) there seems to be an assumption that personhood is thought to be something connected to humans, regardless of juridical rights. However, there are examples where one might argue that something not entirely human has been granted something that resembles personhood, or full personhood, one such example is the artificial intelligence robot, Sophia. I say something that resembles personhood because there is a debate on whether or not she is as advanced as she is marketed to be (2018, p. 3) and the personhood she has received is more for the sake marketing purposes than actually challenging the idea that human personhood is tied to nature.
Pagallo points out, Sophia the Robot was granted citizenship in Saudi-Arabia back in the fall of 2017, and later went on to be the first non-human to be awarded an UN-title (2018, p.3). Because of the aspects such as the citizenship in Saudi-Arabia, that would also imply she is the holder of an identification number, two vital aspects to a persons legal standing as mentioned from Scott (1998). As well as these to legal aspects, she is also put into one of the two arguably most important boxes when it comes to separating people, in that she is given a gender and a female name. The debate on whether or not creations such as Sophia is eligible for personhood is interesting because the EU did have that debate only a few years ago, the main topic being the possible creation of electronic legal personhood that could be applied to autonomous robots. A law like that would, in turn, make them responsible for any potential damage they would cause and for their own autonomous decisions. Several other institutions have also written reports, letters or articles on the matter, spanning out issues such as safety, accountability and transparency (2018, p.4), but a solid conclusion has seemingly yet to take place. The point of this debate, as outlined by Pagallo in his conclusion (2018, p. 10), is not necessary to give personhood or natural agency to artificial intelligence, but rather to decide to what extents these inventions can be held accountable and have legal standing on the same level as corporations with legal personhood, for example. It can be argued that they are simply looking for a way to classify said technology more clearly, so they can fit into a policy on how it is set to be treated. And after all, as Pagallo said, the case of personhood when it comes to our human fellows is about dignity, consciousness and worth (2008, p. 10), and as there is still doubt as mentioned surrounding whether Sophia or any AI have been extensively scripted or not. It is perhaps unlikely still that she would’ve passed the Turing Test, and perfectly imitated a human. In which case, one can argue that while there is little doubt that she is not eligible for personhood as of yet, the technology that created her has still moved faster than the legislatures have managed to classify it. Based on the debates surrounding AI robots the world is seeing now, one can wonder which stance legislature will take later on, if AI does become so sophisticated the lines between natural human and artificial robot becomes blurred.

Traces we leave behind and where they go

As the world becomes increasingly more digitalised, we are leaving more and more traces behind when we move around through both the virtual and real world. The possibility for surveillance of entire populations is no longer simply a vague idea for the future, but a very real reality for many people, which I will come back to at a later point. Every new account, web page search or text message can ultimately be a stepping stone into finding your exact location or identity. To an extent we are aware of what is happening and that we are giving up sometimes quite sensitive information about ourselves, but as shown in Ling and Lai’s article on micro-coordination it can almost be required of us (2016). Whenever we click on the “agree” button on web sides or under a long list of terms and conditions we are most likely agreeing to something we will not bother to read through. It has to be agreed to in order to proceed, meaning we have little choice if we want to use digital solutions, which we most likely do. Ling and Lai’s article is based on a study of communications habits among people in Singapore and Taiwan. As pointed out in their introduction, the use of particular apps can sometimes be a requirement coming from friends and colleagues, more than acts of completely free will. Not being available on the same platforms as everyone else firstly creates the need for an extra effort from your social circle in when it comes to including someone in social plans, but it also means rejecting the mediated social platform and in a way not choosing to embrace the community (Ling & Lai, 2002, p. 835). All because maybe in the beginning one simply chose not to accept terms and conditions. The action of clicking accept is not forced upon us, and the corporations behind websites cannot force anyone into giving anything away. What can be argued, though, is that platforms such as social media has created a consensus for how to stay connected to friends and family and sometimes people are to an extent left with the choice of giving away sensitive information or stay disconnected. Arguably, the possible benefits and abilities from joining a site like Facebook is experienced as more important than the safety of personal information. With the example of Facebook, exactly what happens to the information we give away is rarely disclosed completely. When creating a Facebook account, the user consents to Facebook allowing researchers to gather information for academic purposes, what was also what they allegedly thought was happening in terms of the Cambridge Analytica scandal. However, in that particular case, only just under 300 000 individuals had accepted having their data harvested through a survey, yet Cambridge Analytica gained access to over 50 million raw accounts (Granville, 2018).

One of Facebook’s biggest motivations for opening access to their users’ information was profit. As the industrial revolution took hold of Europe between the mid-1700s to the mid-1800s, human labour that was previously strictly tied to our person become possible to buy and sell, along with land and money. The way personal data is being treated by companies such as Facebook, one might argue that personal data can also be added to Karl Polanyi’s list of fictitious commodities, a result of what he called The Great Transformation, which was society’s turn to the free market in the 1800’s and society’s reaction to the market-dominating the economy (Hann & Hart, 2011, p. 14). Ivan Manokha argues in his article for personal data’s place in a capitalist world economy. He points out further that just like Polanyi maintained the idea that the labour and land threatened the existence of society and the environment, the increasing commodification of personal data has implications for different kinds of individual rights and the existing democratic politics (2018, p.895). Ownership over labour, land and money after the industrial revolution placed one in a position of power. That can be likened to ownership over personal data today is a mean for surveillance and profit-making which again can grant power.

Surveillance in Real Life As mentioned above, surveillance over entire populations is not simply a bleak picture of the future that only exist in science-fiction. As the possibility to buy and own personal data belonging to a country’s inhabitants has presented itself, several countries have chosen to do just that, branding and marketing the move as one for safety measures more than a measure of issuing control. It does not only concern the personal data one gives up by signing onto a web site such as birthdates and current locations, but even faces is gathered and saved, which can be used for facial recognition without consent or control.

In April of 2019 the city of Buenos Aires in Argentina announced that the cameras used in their subway system would be connected to facial recognition software for the sake of capturing wanted criminals in their national fugitive database and was praised by politicians for being a way of making their city safer. The invasion of citizens privacy and security not considered, the system showed it’s other flaws soon enough. Innocent Argentinian citizens were arrested and prosecuted for crimes they had not committed and even had alibis for because there happened to exist wanted criminals who had something as ordinary as the same name (Gershgon, 2020). The right to privacy and the ability to move around freely without suspicion was put on the back burner in favour of safety and the greater good, even though one can easily ask the question if it is not just a desire for almost absolute control of what a population is up as well.

Similar cases can also be found in Russia, mostly targeted at Moscow, where the Russian government has been installing security cameras using facial recognition software for the past few years and is considered by human rights organisations to be close to countries like China in term of surveillance of its population. The use of the system happens by the government unchecked and is suspected of being used as a tool to keep watch over opposition politicians. Additionally, during the months of the corona pandemic, the technology can be used as a way of monitoring the people who move around the city outside of their homes, their medical condition and whether or not they are an essential worker, which gives the Russian government a useful, albeit ethically questionable tool, in the work of stopping the pandemic. Especially because the system is advanced enough to recognise faces even while wearing facemasks (Kruse, 2020)

The end result in both cases is the state making a significant breach into people’s privacy, and what before might’ve been considered the freedom of moving around in public space becomes a way a state can have systematic control over its population, almost as an extreme extension of surnames, social security numbers and passports as is mentioned in James Scott’s “Seeing like a state”. While the surveillance and gathering of personal data by sites like Facebook is a “choice” and can be monitored by a governing body, the surveillance from a state comes from the governing body itself and can to a greater extent happen unchecked and hidden, even if organisations such as Amnesty speaks up against it. Had facial recognition technology been less sophisticated or introduced at a slower pace one might wonder if there would’ve been time for an ethical debate on the use of it and a creation for how it is best used to benefit the masses.

The article’s from both Argentina and Russia both imply that the population of the countries in question do not have much choice in the matter of surveillance to this extent. The same concerns and reactions are also visible in Norway when the app for tracking people’s movements in an attempt at stalling the virus COVID-19 was launched in April. The most notable difference is of course that while the app would track locations, movements and which one came into contact with, it does not deal with facial recognition (Skille, 2020) The arguments used to promote the app was among other things that apps such as Facebook or Google already are tracking movements, search history, screen time and personal data, the only difference would be that the application for monitoring COVID-19 was simply for tracking movements without being a web browser or social medium. On the flip side, the voices arguing and warning against the app has pointed at the low level of transparency in the development and the use of a central database for collecting all data, while experts points to that local collecting would be better for security reasons (Gundersen, 2020)

While the COVID-19 app was developed by the Norwegian FHI and Simula Research Laboratory, a non-profit research organisation, the digital technology that enables cities such as Buenos Aires and Moscow to view to keep surveillance over their populations are developed from commercial corporations. Corporations who would make a profit out of their new systems being used and sold. This dilemma raises the question surrounding the true ethics and desires behind creating systems that can take surveillance to this level. If a state’s desire for control and commercial actors need for profit is greater than the concern for privacy, then one can look back at Scott’s book where he questions what is best for a state, and what is best for the individuals in a population, Most of the world’s economy is based on capitalism and neoliberalism, where the ultimate goal is seemingly to maximise profit. At the same time as Facebook sells personal data to third parties, and states are willing to pay for the ability to see their citizens every movement, one might argue that personal data is being commodified as Manokha argues for in his article (Manokha, 2018), and it can be added to the list of fictitious commodities.

The rights and wrongs surrounding the possibility that personal data can be turned into commodities for sale and profit-making can be debated. On the one hand, it can be argued for being a natural progression of capitalism in which what previously undoubtedly belonged to our self is now created for buy and sale, just like what happened to labour and land during the industrial revolution. On the flip side however, the argument could be that personal details, from social security numbers to our faces and fingerprints, is meant to stay personal. Such things being commodified when they perhaps should not be shows how technological development moves faster than legislatures and the ordinary user can comprehend exactly what they are giving up, and what consequences that might have.

Where does this leave us?

This essay began with a failed prediction of the future of the internet, a future where it was predicted to crash. Instead, it has become a key part of society and today plays a vital part in battling a pandemic, ensuring education, keeping parts of the workforce active, issuing information quickly and perhaps the most important of all, keeping humans connected in a time where physical, social interactions are heavily advised against. In a situation such as the one with COVID-19, we can be grateful that Robert Metcafle’s predictions proved wrong.

As it has been highlighted especially in the past two months, digital advances such as the internet in the past 25 years has brought convenience, connections and a smaller world, but along with there has also appeared problems, some perhaps unforeseen and some not.

The potential change in perception of personhood, and exactly which road personhood will take in the coming years is one of them and remains a debate between developers, experts, academics and legislatures There are these debates, and the outcomes of them, supplied with the idea that Handler presents in that culture is ever-changing, that made me wonder whether or not there will come a time where the answer to problems such as “Are AI people?” and “Does digital advancement benefit the developers or the masses more?” are found out and agreed on. Because if there can exist several perceptions of personhood in different cultures, then could it arguably one day be a culture where robots acquired personhood on the same level as a natural human being.

The question remains whether or not we are able to keep up the same pace as technological development, and if the pace we are experiencing now will escalate further relative to the way it has escalated since 1995, can we still keep up even then. Of course, the issues brought up in this essay is by no means decided to be solved in either good or bad ways. There is the possibility that while surveillance by the likes seen in Buenos Aries is unfavourable for the public’s privacy, it’s is efficient as a safety measure, which leads back to square one where privacy is weighed against safety and the technology humans knew how to create does not necessarily correspond to technology humans know the best way to use.

Answering whether or not we are able to follow technological advancements is perhaps just as difficult as making predictions as to how the digital climate will look in another 25 years, considering all the factors that play into it. This essay has only touched briefly upon a few of them. What is almost certain is that there will be a change anyway. Both as a consequence of the current pandemic and as a consequence of, should we believe Handler in the introduction, culture constantly being reinvented . Then one can hope that humans as autonomous person will make sure the change is good.

References

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Guro Langøigjelten
Antropress

Written by Guro Langøigjelten

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Student of anthropology | Norway

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