Don’t Be Fooled: We Are Getting Tougher With China
“One China” is a distraction. The real story is increased U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea.
Much is being made of President Donald Trump’s Thursday phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping when Trump promised to honor the “One China” policy.
It’s been portrayed as a major reversal by Trump.
Perhaps — or maybe it was just a phone call that lowered tensions and re-affirmed a decades-old U.S. foreign policy that never had any chance of disappearing.
If anything, the media is missing the real story — how the Trump administration sent a forceful message to the People’s Republic of China through Secretary of Defense James Mattis during his Feb. 8 stop in Japan.
As reported in Nikkei Asian Review, Mattis delivered public comments about the PRC that were similar in tone to what the Obama administration had said in the past about Beijing’s quest for control over the South China Sea.
However, in private multiple sources told the paper Mattis said the U.S pledged
to take an active role in protecting freedom of navigation, suggesting a more aggressive stance than the previous administration in an effort to restrain military buildup. Specifically, the U.S. is set to increase the frequency of patrols within 12 nautical miles of man-made islands China has constructed in the sea.
In other words, Trump’s “One China” comments might just be a carrot while the new administration promises the big stick of U.S. naval power in a way far more active than what President Barack Obama originally set forth.
It’s possible the administration is pursuing a strategy of making bold statements first only to walk them back later to de-escalate any possible confrontation. Ultimately, the U.S.’ goal is broker an arrangement that results in a less-aggressive China in the contested waters.
In fact, there might not be many new policies from the Trump administration toward China — after all, Obama ordered the “freedom of navigation operations” in October 2015. However, there were far fewer patrols than originally offered.
But there could be more action now, said James R. Holmes, professor of strategy at the Naval War College. Sending Mattis as the messenger made a difference as well.
“I imagine the policies and strategies will remain largely the same,” Holmes said in an interview.
The main differences will be in how the Trump folks execute it, and in their willingness to take risks in the service of freedom of the sea, support for allies, and on and on. It’s become clear that China pockets what it can when opposed by a diffident America. We need to impose costs and risks on Beijing for a change, in hopes of deterring Beijing and restoring an acceptable diplomatic and equilibrium in the region.
During the Obama administration, China was not shy about expressing its perceived superiority. For example, during a 2010 meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations the Chinese foreign minister reportedly told Singapore’s foreign minister, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”
That tart comment came on the heels of a statement by then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton that essentially rejected the PRC’s claim to maritime control of the South China Sea and called for creation of a code of conduct in the region. Clinton also stated that freedom of navigation on the sea is in the national interest of the United States.
But freedom of navigation is just one part of the equation. Both in the past and recently, Beijing also objected to underwater surveys, surveillance flights, and other lawful activities in the waters that it claims.
If the U.S. under the Trump administration increases surface navigation, surveillance flights, and subsurface exploration it will underscore a forceful message to the Chinese: That the United States rejects China’s claims to jurisdiction outside its territory and territorial seas that attempts to ban any legitimate use of international waters.
That would not only send a powerful deterrent signal to China but reassure our allies in the region as well.
However, there are also distinct risks involved.
First of all, any U.S. patrols will be denied use of an old American naval asset: the Philippines. Gone are the days when the U.S. maintained a sizeable naval force at Subic Bay and regional airpower at Clark Air Force Base — both were closed in early 1990s after waves of anti-American protest.
Last October, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte turned his back on the United States while negotiating a $13 billion commercial alliance with the PRC in Beijing and rejecting recently improved military ties with Washington.
In 2014, President Barack Obama signed an agreement with then-President Benigno Aquino III allowing the U.S. military increased and regular access to bases in the Philippines as well as opportunities for training and mutual exercises between the two nations.
Duterte’s decision to separate from the United States led foreign policy analyst Max Boot to state that the 2014 pact “looks increasingly like a dead letter” despite the Philippine military’s desire to continue a close relationship with American forces.
That means the U.S. will need to deploy and support any increased naval patrols from Guam, Japan, or even Australia instead of the Philippines — and deal with the logistical headaches that will come with the added distance. It won’t be impossible for the U.S. Navy to cope, but the burden will be real.
There is also the potential for escalation between two nuclear powers. More U.S. vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea mean more chances for confrontation between the two countries.
During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union played a game of cat-and-mouse between the respective nation’s naval and air forces. But the United States and the Soviet Union were never major trade partners — as are the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
That means economic repercussions would be inevitable. Even a low-intensity scuffle between the two nations would break new military and foreign policy ground for the United States.
In fact, the Chinese may already be thinking about what it would take to put the U.S. out of action if faced with a more forceful military presence in the South China Sea.
Writing in War on the Rocks, Thomas Shugart said that a close look at satellite imagery comparing China’s rocket testing grounds in the Gobi Desert and American military bases in the region reveals that recent missile tests could be a dress rehearsal for a pre-emptive attack to destroy U.S. naval bases, airfields, and other bases in East Asia.
In fact, the Chinese mocked up the targets on different test ranges to bear a very close resemblance to Kadena and Misawa air bases in Japan, as well as targets that resemble moored ships like destroyers and carriers found at Yokosuka, Japan.
Shugart writes:
While most Sinologists discount the idea of a true bolt-from-the-blue attack in a crisis without first giving an adversary a chance to back down, preemptive missile strikes to initiate active hostilities could be consistent with China’s claimed overall military strategy of ‘active defense.’
He also notes that much of China’s precision-strike rocket force is conventionally armed rather than carrying nuclear warheads, meaning that Beijing might be more inclined to use the weapons.
