The Failed Blockade of Qatar
How the attempt to isolate and undermine the kingdom has backfired on every level
On June 5, 2017, the 2.3 million residents of Qatar suddenly found themselves the subject of a blockade. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt cut off all trade and transportation with Qatar and expelled Qatari nationals. Students studying in Qatar were summoned home to Cairo, Dubai, and Riyadh. Two years later, little progress has been made to end the blockade, but one thing is quite clear — the strategy has failed.
It failed to topple the Qatari emir. It failed to force the closure of the Turkish military base in Qatar. It failed to force the closure of Al Jazeera, the popular satellite television network. And it failed to isolate Qatar economically or politically. Not only has this blockade failed to achieve a single one of its objectives — it has backfired spectacularly. It led to a more independent, globally engaged, and (relatively) open Qatar. Conversely, the architect of the blockade, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has developed a reputation for a unique mixture of failure, incompetence, and brutality.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have close religious and tribal connections, but their political differences date back decades. They are both members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) a regional organization formed in the wake of Iran’s Islamic revolution to foster unity among the six Gulf Arab monarchies. However, Qatar has a history of developing cordial relationships with everyone from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Taliban to Hamas to Iran to Israel and the United States. It is willing to criticize the other GCC countries, and has granted citizenship to opposition figures from around the region.
Saudi Arabia has a history of meddling in Qatar’s affairs — and by “meddling” I mean “attempting to overthrow its government.” This particular attempt was timed to the ascendance of two new royals — Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, and President Donald J. Trump.
The blockade began soon after Trump’s May 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia, a visit notable for its (unconsummated) arms deals and the “mysterious glowing orb.” Trump’s immediate response to the blockade was concisely conveyed in fewer than 280 characters. Trump tweeted that the leaders with whom he met in Riyadh pointed to Qatar as “fund[ers] of Radical Ideology” and “perhaps [the blockade] will be the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism.” And while the New York Times pointed out that the orb “did not appear to have any magical powers,” touching it did seemingly cause Trump to forget that just 18 months earlier he told Chuck Todd that the Saudis are “the world’s biggest funders of terrorism.”
Trump walked back his comments, perhaps after learning from his secretaries of state and defense that Qatar is home to Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American base in the Middle East. 11,000 Americans serve at Al Udeid, and its Combined Air Operations Center controls US military air operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the entire Persian Gulf region.
Saudi Arabia had hoped to invade Qatar, overthrow Amir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, and replace him with a distant relative with close ties to Riyadh. It has been widely reported that then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson moved to prevent the invasion — and may even have lost his job over this.
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates presented Qatar with a list of thirteen demands. Qatar rejected all of them, and for two years its fortunes have improved, the Saudi geopolitical position has weakened, and the “GCC Crisis” is in a stalemate.
Saudi Arabia demanded that Qatar close a Turkish military base. That base has since expanded — a necessary tripwire to prevent a Saudi invasion in the event that Trump decides to abandon Qatar. Another demand was for Qatar to “scale down” its relationship with Iran; but Qatar and Iran share a liquid natural gas field, and good relations between the two are vital for Doha.
During the blockade’s opening weeks, Iran airlifted food and other necessities into Qatar, which shows how the Saudi strategy backfired. Instead of convincing Qatar to break ties with Iran, the blockade gave Iran an opportunity to get closer to Qatar.
A Player, Not a Pawn
Qatar is a spectacularly wealthy country. Its GDP per capita is over $124,000, more than twice that of Saudi Arabia (or the United States). And its sovereign wealth fund is valued at more than $300 billion — more than $1 million per citizen. This wealth allowed the country to develop domestic industries and absorb the economic cost of the blockade while establishing new supply chains. It has also allowed the country to pursue a sophisticated, broad-spectrum public relations campaign in the United States.
Of course, the Saudis have money too — what they do not have is good leadership.
Qatar is fortunate to have a highly competent royal family and a politically incompetent adversary. Saudi Arabia has never been popular with the American public, its support is limited to Trump, Jared Kushner, and the fantasists who believe Saudi Arabia will be a good friend to Israel. If Americans know anything about Saudi Arabia it’s that 15 of 19 September 11 hijackers were Saudi; that MBS had a Washington Post columnist murdered; that he has imprisoned and tortured the women’s rights activists behind the (ironically successful) campaign to give women the right to drive; and that he has waged a brutal war in Yemen.
A compelling case can be made that Qatar’s support for the Arab Spring and Muslim Brotherhood — particularly as expressed on Al Jazeera and in other Qatari media — is the real cause for the blockade.
But the main reason is that Qatar has little to fear from popular uprisings while Saudi Arabia is terrified of them. Qatar’s independence is an inherent threat not to the existence of Saudi Arabia or the legitimacy of the house of Saud — after all, Qatar is also an absolute monarchy — but to the legitimacy of the royal family’s domestic political, economic, and religious decisions.
Qatar shows by example that Wahhabism — the state religion of both Saudi Arabia and Qatar — does not necessarily lead to repression or violent extremism, resource wealth does not necessarily lead to indolence, and modernization need not lead to secularization.
The United States has long been close with both countries, making it uniquely situated to negotiate an end to the crisis. The solution is simple — Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledge, formally backed by the United States, to lift the blockade and “respect Qatar’s sovereignty.” In exchange, they get a carefully worded Qatari pledge not to “support terrorism or extremism.” This would, in essence, be a face-saving return to the status quo ante.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to negotiate in good faith when the American president can undermine his negotiators with a single tweet. Or when his son-in-law and MBS are texting buddies.
Economic pressure is unlikely to lead to abject capitulation. Qatar has been under blockade for over two years now, and shows no sign of giving in to the Saudi-led countries’ absolutist demands.
That’s something the United States should keep in mind as it tries to use economic pressure against North Korea and Iran.
