Why Americans Should Give A Damn About Kurdistan
We made a promise. We should keep it.
Tucked into the northeastern corner of Iraq is Kurdistan, a region that is home to some of the United States’ most loyal and devoted allies.
It is also a place the U.S. government is allowing to go to hell in a hand basket. This is deeply worrisome, as nothing less than 8 million lives, the worth of American promises to its friends, and the national security of the U.S. are at stake.
Such is the state of affairs when it comes to how the United States is responding to the simmering crisis surrounding last month’s Kurdish referendum for independence. Perhaps a better description is “the lack of a cogent response”: Other than a few choice words from the state department and the indifference of President Trump, the U.S. has no real policy other than essentially saying “We told you so.”
In fact, not even a bombshell seems to move the White House or its listless department of state.
On Sunday, October 29, Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani announced his resignation, effective Wednesday, November 1. Barzani is nothing short of the political father of the independence referendum and a force of nature in Kurdish politics.
Yet as of Sunday evening, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has said nothing. However, the state department did release a canned statement about the 94th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey.
As for the president, he was busy tweeting again about Hillary Clinton, Russia, and the Democratic Party.
If you are an American, despite recent events it is still likely that you know very little about the Kurds. I wish I had a dime for every time I’ve heard the lame retort, “Oh, like curds and whey?” I’d donate the funds to a Kurdish relief agency and solve all of their problems just from that donation alone.
So let’s start with a very brief primer on the Kurds:
They are not Arabs. They definitely don’t consider themselves Iraqis — in fact, the idea of Iraq is just a fragile construct forced on them nearly 100 years ago at the end of World War I by the “Great Powers” such as Britain and France.
Nearly 30 million Kurds live in the mountainous regions straddling the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. They are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, but they have no homeland, no permanent nation.
Aggravating the situation further is that they were promised a nation at the Versailles Conference in 1919. That promise was sacrificed on the altar of geopolitics, oil, and expediency when the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 gave control of the entire Anatolian peninsula to the new nation of Turkey, which had been formed from the post-war ruins of the Ottoman Empire.
Despite earlier promises, the treaty made no provisions for a referendum on Kurdish independence or autonomy. Since then, the Kurds have fought for independence — a fight that has included resistance to all opposition imaginable including a genocidal war waged against them by Saddam Hussein in the 1980s.
From 1992 through 2003, the Kurds were able to carve out an autonomous region in Iraq because of U.S. protection established by the no-fly zones and U.S. influence on the post-Saddam central government in Baghdad.
They governed themselves and began an economic revival that transformed Erbil (the region’s capital city) into a thriving commercial hub. Crude oil flowed into the world petroleum market from the mega-field complex in and around Kirkuk, a city where Kurds had been wiped out under the orders of Saddam.
They also guaranteed exceptionally tolerant political and religious rights to women and religious minorities within their autonomous area, a decision that is nothing short of amazing by Middle Eastern standards.
In 2013, ISIS began its rise to power. ISIS attacked the Kurds, eventually seizing Mosul and waging war against the Kurds (as well as others) in Iraq and in Syria as well.
In response, the peshmerga — literally, “those who face death” — a force comprised of men and women, fought back hard.
Backed with both weapons and training from the United States, the peshmerga fought valiantly against some of the worst barbarians this planet has seen since the Nazis. It is no exaggeration to state that the peshmerga in Iraq and Syria are the chief reason why ISIS’ dream of a caliphate was destroyed.
As far as most Kurds were concerned, the time was right to assert their nationalism once again.
President Barzani announced a non-binding independence referendum. Eventually, the Kurdish parliament approved of the referendum, which was held September 25.
Admittedly, this is where things get sticky. Supporters of the referendum said they wanted a successful “yes” vote as a bargaining chip to use in negotiations with Baghdad.
Was it really that straightforward? Of course not: It’s the Middle East.
Was Barzani trying to feather his own political nest? Probably. Was the timing poor for a vote? Maybe — but a century is a long time to wait for a homeland.
Go ask an Israeli what it is like to wait for your own nation after facing genocide. (A factor that in part explains Israel’s outspoken support for the vote.)
During the months and weeks before the election was held, the U.S. state department waged a relentless campaign against the referendum, predicting that The Apocalypse would break loose if the election was held.
The non-binding “yes” vote passed overwhelmingly. Then, things quickly turned ugly for the Kurds, with the central government in Baghdad led by Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi choosing retribution as his response.
The Iraqi government closed the international airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah; revoked visas issued to travelers by the Kurdistan Regional Government; took control of the border crossing between Kurdistan, Turkey, and Iran; banned international transfers of dollars into Kurdistan; and most recently drove the Kurds out of Kirkuk, the oil-rich city that is the lifeblood of the Kurdish economy.
John Hannah, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former national security advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney during the George W. Bush administration, did a brilliant job of summing up the Eeyore-esque schadenfreude both publicly and secretly expressed by America’s top diplomats. In an article that recently appeared in Foreign Policy, he notes:
Now that many of their concerns are coming to pass, with KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) officials expressing growing alarm that their neighbors might actually proceed to impose a crippling blockade that could bring the region to its knees, American diplomats are clearly thinking ‘I told you so’ — indeed, they’ve said as much to me. More than a few are surely tempted by the opportunity to teach the Kurds a lesson, to show them that there’s a price to be paid for so directly defying the repeated requests of their most important and powerful patron on an issue that was clearly of great significance to U.S. interests.
So, like Eeyore, the only policy the U.S. now has is: “The sky has finally fallen. Always knew it would.”
Of course, one might ask a simple question: If the U.S. foreign policy team was so sure of a disaster, why didn’t they have a plan in place to cope with what happened?
Optimists will point to comments made on October 23 by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. After a meeting in Baghdad with the Abadi government, Tillerson told reporters:
We are concerned and a bit saddened by the recent differences that have emerged between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi central government. We have friends both in Baghdad, and we have friends in Erbil, and we encourage both parties to enter into discussion and dialogue. I think if both parties commit themselves to a unified Iraq, to the Iraqi constitution, I think all differences can be addressed and the rights of all can be respected and Iraq will have a very secure and a prosperous future.
However, that’s hardly a forthright demand for Iraqis and Kurds — who both enjoy their freedom and their future because of U.S. military and economic intervention — to settle their differences. In fact, Tillerson’s comments could even be taken as a slap in the face of the Kurds, who are told repeatedly by Baghdad that the referendum violated the Iraqi constitution.
Yet why should the United States give a damn about another squabble in the Middle East?
There are reasons aplenty:
1) A civil war in Iraq between Iraqis and Kurds could spur another refugee crisis. The KRG cares for more than 200,000 Syrian refugees. An estimated 97 percent of Syrian refugees in Iraq reside in Kurdistan. To care for those refugees, the KRG built seven permanent camps and three transitional camps. It was in the process of constructing another four camps, but the future of those facilities is now very much in doubt. Where will those refugees go if the Kurds no longer can care for them? It’s doubtful that European Union nations will accept more refugees. So far, the Trump administration is no help on this issue. It is another disaster in the waiting.
2) Iran will grow even more powerful in the region. Remember, the Iranians seek regional hegemony. They want to build nuclear weapons. They still consider the United States their #1 enemy. In addition, they would love nothing better than to crush the Kurds in Iraq so the Kurdish population in Iran does not get any ideas about independence. Recently, Iranian-backed militias joined the troops Baghdad sent to Kirkuk, and there are reports that Qassem Suleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, entered Kirkuk to hold talks with Kurdish officials. Secretary Tillerson’s surprise visit to Baghdad was at least in part prompted by Baghdad’s refusal to tell the militias to go home.
3) If the Kurds can’t trust the United States anymore, they might turn to other nations who don’t have American interests at heart. Russia is one possibility. On October 22, hundreds of Kurds in Erbil protested in front of the Russian consulate, calling on Russian President Vladimir Putin and his government for help to stop attacks by Iranian-backed militias and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk. They chanted, “Trump lied to the Kurdish people,” waved Kurdish and Russian flags, and carried portraits of portraits of Putin, Israeli Prime Minister Bejamin Netanyahu, and Barzani. Mustafa Barzani — the late father of Masoud Barzani — spent more than 10 years in Moscow after being exiled from Iraq. In short, the ties between Russia and the Barzani clan are tight. Barzani is walking away from the presidency, but it is a safe bet that he is not walking away from political power in Kurdistan. He will still wield immense influence. In addition, this year Russia made a multi-billion dollar investment through state-owned Rosneft for access to Kurdish oil — an influx of crude that Moscow counted on and will be loathe to lose. A new Kurdish-Russian alliance is not far-fetched.
4) We made a promise to the Kurdish people. Perhaps I am a dewy-eyed dreamer, but I think there are good reasons to keep our word to our allies. It’s the right thing to do. True, we did not promise to support Kurdish independence now. But we became the Kurds’ protector nation, a status the Kurds cherish and respect. My Kurdish friends hold the United States in high regard, considering the U.S. nothing less than a savior from the genocidal depredations of Saddam Hussein and his henchmen. Besides, we betrayed the Kurds once before: In 1972, the Nixon administration agreed to organize a Kurdish insurrection against Saddam at the request of the Shah of Iran. For three years, the CIA backed the Kurds covertly with money and arms through the CIA — until Saddam and the Shah reconciled. Then, the U.S. threw the Kurds under the bus. After the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, tens of thousands of Kurds were murdered, gassed, and killed in warfare. Some of the dead include more than 300 of Masoud Barzani’s family members. Henry Kissinger, then Nixon’s national security advisor, told Congress in response to questions regarding our abandonment of the Kurds, “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.” Perhaps Dr. Kissinger can be forgiven for his cynicism — Lord knows he has a lot more to answer for. But I am not so sure the Kurds can forgive him, and I also don’t know if the Kurds can forgive this nation a second time. If there is a civil war, American-trained and American-armed Iraqis will kill American-trained and American-armed peshmerga, and I am afraid the Kurds will lose. If they lose, that will be the real disaster because the most effective force in the fight against ISIS will be wiped out, and it will be America’s fault.
Christopher Hitchens once wrote:
The Kurds are homeless even at home and stateless abroad. Their ancient woes are locked inside an obscure language. They have powerful, impatient enemies and a few rather easily bored friends. Their traditional society is considered a nuisance at worst and a curiosity at best. For them the act of survival, even identity itself, is a kind of victory.
It would better — far better — if the United States proved it was not among the ranks of Kurdistan’s easily bored friends. We’ve promised them more than a friendship of convenience.
Their dreams are our dreams. Their goals help us reach our goals. They have shed blood for us.
The United States should actively, openly, and immediately seek to mediate the crisis between Erbil and Baghdad, put a stop to what is about to become a civil war, and work to prevent others in the region from taking advantage of the situation for nefarious ends.
That’s better than the U.S. government wagging its finger and simply telling the Kurds, “We told you so” — or giving the Kurds a finger of a different kind.
Paul R. Huard is an award-winning journalist who covers military history and national security issues for daily newspapers and online publications. His work appears in the National Interest, the (Portland, Oregon, USA) Oregonian, Real Clear Defense, Real Clear History, Real Clear Politics, War Is Boring, War On The Rocks — Molotov Cocktail, We Are The Mighty, NRT English, and Arc Digital. Follow him on Twitter at @paul_huard and at his website The Pen and The Sword.
