The New Battlefield: Russia’s Strategic Use of Information Warfare
Introduction
Russian power is usually defined by its vast nuclear arsenal and its formidable conventional forces. However, contemporary Russian power has become increasingly tied to its growing influence in the information domain. As a matter of fact, Western categorization of Russian information operations as “innovative” symbolizes the leading role that Russia has taken in this area of warfare. The ascendency of information warfare in strategic culture and Russian meddling in recent American and European elections has placed it at the forefront of this new, but destabilizing source of war.
Russian information warfare aims are primarily to create discord and confusion in the adversary country in favor of Russian actions through a wide array of tools such as Russian state-run media, controlled posts on social media platforms, and direct cyber attacks on infrastructure. This essay will analyze Russian information warfare aims, their components, and their consequences on the international system.
What is Information Warfare?
To understand Russian information war aims and components, it is important to understand what constitutes information warfare. Information warfare can best be described as a relatively new domain of warfare where the information space is used as a theater of conflict by adversarial actors to achieve their strategic aims. Information warfare can take many forms, such as through manipulation of mass media and through kinetic cyber attacks on infrastructure. It can be both offensive and defensive and target mass populations as well as the elite of the adversary state. Information warfare is still an evolving domain of warfare and will continue to develop as states experiment with its usage and application.
It is important to note what information warfare is not. Information warfare is not the unintentional spread of disinformation or accidental breach of another state’s informational infrastructure. Information warfare must be deliberate and done with the strategic aim of coercing the adversary closer to one’s political objectives. Furthermore, informational warfare is carried out by states or major non-state actors such as ISIS. An average Russian citizen with no ties to the Russian government posting pro-Trump tweets on Twitter does not count as an actor of information warfare. This is obvious, of course, but important to note. For the purposes of this essay, only actions perpetrated by the Russian state or from actors that were directly (or indirectly) endorsed by the Kremlin will be analyzed.
The Russian Notion of Information Warfare
Russia has its own specific understanding of what information warfare is. Dmitry Adamsky gives an especially insightful summary of what he deems as Russia’s view of “informational struggle,” which can be taken to mean informational warfare:
The Russian interpretation of informational struggle comprises both digital-technological and cognitive-psychological components. It is designed to misinform and manipulate the adversary’s picture of reality, to interfere with the decision-making process of individuals, organisations, governments and societies and to influence it in order to produce favourable conditions for promoting strategic goals.
From the Russian perspective, information warfare is a broad domain of information that comprises different, but interrelated components (i.e. technological, psychological) that cohesively contribute to the furthering or attainment of Russian strategic aims. Moreover, the Russian understanding of information warfare differs from that of the West. Russian information operations (and Russian notions of warfare more broadly) are uninterrupted and extend into peacetime. As a consequence, Russian information operations can blur the line between war and peace, making it hard for the adversary state to determine what actions count as war.
In 2011, the Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov wrote an infamous article outlining what came to be known as the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” Regime changes in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, particularly the overthrow and death of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, led Gerasimov to argue that Western disinformation campaigns could lead to a similar fate for the Russian Federation. The article was incorrectly taken to mean that Russia would need to engage in offensive information operations, however, Gerasimov was instead arguing that Russia needed to defend herself from Western disinformation campaigns. Since that time, Russia has placed a lot of importance on information warfare and that trend will likely continue as the information space grows in importance as an essential place for the dissemination of information to the masses.
For the Russians, information warfare is one part of a larger triad of warfare domains. Modern Russian strategic thinking has evolved into what Adamsky terms “cross-domain coercion.” Cross-domain coercion consists of the nuclear domain, the conventional domain, and the information domain. These three domains are all interconnected and interact with one another in a comprehensive and continuous cycle. In today’s strategic climate, each domain needs the others to be truly effective. However, within this triad, the informational component serves as the “master of ceremonies” that guides both the conventional and nuclear domains. It gives the other two room to maneuver and can enhance their potency by limiting the decision-making ability of the adversary.
Russian Information Warfare Aims
The principal aim of Russian information warfare is to negatively affect the adversary’s ability to make decisions that run counter to Russian strategic interests. By limiting their decision-making abilities, Russia can get what it wants from rival states without ever having to reach any sort of kinetic conflict with them. This, of course, is something that Russia needs as its economic strength continues to falter in comparison to that of the US and China. The aims that Russia seeks to gain through information warfare are numerous and varied. The following section will explore those aims and how Russia can acquire them by using effective information warfare strategies.
Changing the adversary’s perception in favor of Russia is a central aim for the Russians. How a state views Russia and its actions is crucial for determining how that state might react to future Russian operations. If, for example, a state generally has a positive perception of Russia, then it is more likely to react positively (or neutrally) when Russia does something that might be considered controversial internationally. Of course, if a state generally views Russia negatively, then it will likely react negatively to any potentially controversial Russian actions. So, it is important for Russia to manage how it is perceived by other states. Perception control, or “reflexive control”, is the tool by which Russia can effectively alter how other states view Russia and its operations. Establishing positive perceptions through controlled means makes it easier for Russia to operate as it would like in the international system.
Subversion of the adversary’s government is another essential aim of Russian information warfare. Through persuasive information warfare operations, Russia can create distrust and confusion in a population toward its own government. This distrust and confusion can lead to a variety of different outcomes for the rival state such as the potential overthrow of that state’s government or its ability to act decisively against Russian actions. As noted before, Valery Gerasimov believes that the West applied these subversive measures against Gaddafi in 2011.
The subversion of another state’s government can be greatly beneficial for Russia. Time and resources that are used to solve domestic issues means less time and resources that are being spent on Russia. Taking the US as an example, effective Russian information warfare campaigns could establish an environment where the American government is unable to act decisively against Russia because of a hostile or indifferent American populace. Consequently, limiting the US’s ability to forcibly counter any potential Russian plans. Subversion of the adversary’s political leaders can be a powerful way to advance Russian interests.
Information warfare affords Russia continued existence as a great power. Russia is aware that it is a declining power relative to other countries in the world. This deficit in relative power is especially pronounced when compared to transnational alliances like NATO. In a conventional military confrontation with NATO, Russia would surely lose. This is something that Putin himself has publicly stated. So, to maintain Russia relevancy in a world that is becoming increasingly harder for it to influence through sheer brute force, Russia has come up with more creative ways to impose its will. One of these creative ways has been the application of information warfare. In Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, Keir Giles posits how power imbalances have resulted in new Russian thinking:
Recently published Russian military theory gives information warfare an increasingly prominent role. Recognition that Russia cannot compete directly in conventional terms with NATO has led to persistent emphasis in public statements on finding asymmetric responses. Information warfare is presented as one of these responses, and specifically as a means of assuring victory in armed conflict by predetermining the outcome.
Since Russia knows that it cannot directly challenge the West in a conventional conflict, it must look for other ways to compete strategically. Information warfare then, provides Russia with a different avenue of victory by “predetermining the outcome” against stronger adversaries. One of the loftier goals that the Russians seek to achieve through information warfare is to divide or even destroy the opponent internally. The recognition that Russia cannot win against more powerful states means that it must look to asymmetrical or hybrid warfare to realize some of its goals.
It is assumed that if Russian information warfare operations are potent enough, then the adversarial state could be broken up internally to the point that it no longer presents a serious challenge to Russia. Previously mentioned aims like subversion or perception control can give Russia the ability to prevent and resolve conflicts without ever reaching the kinetic. If the opponent defeats themselves, then there is no need to fight them militarily. Some Russian military officials have even argued that territorial acquisition, the overthrow of an unfriendly government, and the direct military defeat of an adversary can all occur through the sole use of information warfare.
Russia understands the destructive power of information warfare and is aware that it must protect itself from offensive information warfare operations. The “Gerasimov Doctrine” was initially created based on this defensive posture. Russia understands that it must undertake defensive measures that protect its regime and the stability of the Russian state. So, in addition to offensive campaigns, a key Russian aim in the information space is its defense.
Russia must ensure that its people are not subject to disinformation or even actual information that could discredit the Kremlin. Since Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000, the Russian information space has become increasingly controlled, censored, and monitored. Mass media, the internet, and textbooks are all becoming tightly controlled by the Russian state to avoid any potential risks to the Putin regime. This has increased further since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and will likely worsen as the Kremlin comes under more pressure from liberal democratic countries in the West and Asia.
Russian Information Components and Tools
Russian information warfare activities consist of different components and include several tools that are used separately and in conjunction to promote Russian interests. Of these, Russia focuses its efforts on technological and psychological operations to destabilize its adversaries. Technological and psychological warfare provide the foundation for how Russia conducts its broader information warfare operations. Russia can use a multitude of different means and approaches to weaken the adversary’s ability to make informed decisions. The following section will analyze the major components of Russian information warfare and how they are used to advance Russian strategic aims.
One of the most discussed components of Russian information warfare strategies is control of mass media, both abroad and domestically. Russia has several major state-run news outlets that help propagate the Kremlin’s official position on a variety of issues. Some of the most obvious examples include RT and Sputnik. Consuming information from these networks can bring an international audience closer to the type of news that Russian citizens receive at home. However, these news outlets do not represent the entirety of Russian disinformation campaigns through mass media. Russia also uses fake media sources that seem reputable and legitimate (but or not) to disseminate the Russian perspective to an international audience. Major Russian propaganda outlets and fake media sources assist in spreading various forms of disinformation such as fake news, fabrications, exaggerations, and half-truths to unaware viewers.
Cyber attacks represent another key component of Russian information warfare. Unlike other domains of information warfare, cyber attacks can pose a kinetic threat and can have a very real effect on the receiving state. Cyber attacks can target an adversary’s communication systems, governmental facilities and buildings, and other important state infrastructure. A recent example of this is the Russian group DarkSide’s cyber attack on the Colonial Pipeline in the United States. However, cyber attacks only make up a small portion of Russian information warfare and they can often be troublesome in comparison to other components. Importantly though, in the event of a major conflict, Russian authorities are likely to use cyber attacks, alongside conventional weapons, to inflict physical damage on the opposing state.
Online trolls and bots have become a useful component of Russian information warfare. Pro-Russian trolls and bots are ubiquitous throughout the internet now, particularly in the comments section of major Western platforms like YouTube. Trolls and bots serve a wide variety of purposes, as Giles points out:
These false accounts can pose as authoritative information sources, redistributing disinformation from sock puppet media outlets. But in addition to this use of trolling as a direct injection method, the effect can also on occasion be subtle and indirect, and contribute to the aim described above of establishing a permissive environment. This can be achieved by diverting or suppressing any debate that runs counter to the Russian version of events, and thus creating an atmosphere and an impression of consensus, rather than pushing specific disinformation or narratives. In addition, on occasion the intent of online trolling can be indistinguishable from the original (internet) meaning of the word — simply provoking argument and confusion.
Russian trolls and bots are an easy way to influence public opinion abroad. Creating an online environment where most respondents agree with the Russian narrative only serves to reinforce that same narrative to uninformed audiences in other countries. Moreover, as Giles mentioned, trolls and bots also serve to simply generate doubt and discord in the populations of adversarial states.
The final two components of Russian information warfare campaigns include plausibility and explicit Russian threats. The plausibility factor is two-fold. First, one of the benefits of information warfare is that it provides sufficient cover for plausible deniability. For example, the DarkSide cyber attack, as currently reported, was not directly sanctioned by the Russian government. However, the possibility of some sort of Russian state involvement remains.
Secondly, Russian media and authorities often claim “facts” and events that are far from being true and instead contribute to undermining genuine facts. Consistent lies from Russia make it difficult to come to an actual position on any issue. The threat of the use of force is another tactic used by the Russians. Although not new, Russian threats of war or even of the use of nuclear weapons is an important facet of information warfare. Directly stating the possibility of violent conflict is consistent with the “psychological intimidation” feature of information warfare.
Conclusion
This essay explained and analyzed Russian information warfare aims and its various components. The information domain of warfare is still relatively new and will continue to develop as actors in the international system pursue strategies in the information space. The aims and components mentioned here could change over time, not only for Russia, but for all actors engaging in information warfare.
For better or worse, Russia remains an influential country on the global stage and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. However, Russia’s dominance and power is waning relative to other countries. With an economy roughly the size of Texas, Russia cannot compete with the US, China, India, and the EU over the long-term. To hold on to that power, Russia must find other means to remain relevant and strong. Russia seems to have found that answer in information warfare.
This essay was initially written for a master’s course at King’s College London and reworked for publication on Medium.
