John Locke, Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill on Equality and the Redistribution of Wealth, Part II
Part II: How should wealth be redistributed?
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You can read Part I here. This is where we are in the discussion:
Locke, Bentham and Mill all see people as morally equal. Locke’s view is deontological in that he sees people as all being created by God and all having equal capability for reason. Bentham and Mill are utilitarians and see our equality as stemming from our equal capability for experiencing pleasure and pain. I will now place each thinker on a continuum to show how their ideas of philosophical equality relate to their ideas of political and economic quality, by looking at their advocacy for the distribution of wealth.
The Continuum: Locke
Equality is present in every aspect of Locke’s theory of government. Although chapter 5 of the Second Treatise appears ‘patently inegalitarian’ (Waldron, 2002, p. 152) unlike his contemporary, Tyrell (1987, p. 162), Locke was openly critical of institutions such as inheritance and primogeniture (Locke, 1988, p. 210).
Moreover, charity was important for Locke. Charity is concept that is much wider when set out in Lockean terms than when in those purely modern, as it goes beyond private philanthropy to official redistribution of wealth. Introduced in the First Treatise, Locke argues that all property owners must surrender their surplus to alleviate the destitution of the poor, when the poor have no other way of surviving (Waldron, 2002). A person has ‘a title to so much of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no other means to subsist otherwise’ (Locke, 1988, p. 170). Therefore, any permission of inequality contained in the Second Treatise, capitalised on by Macpherson, is premised on and mitigated by the contents of the First Treatise. This is the constraining role that equality plays on human freedom.
Locke viewed political theory as a way of understanding God’s intended place for humans in the world (Kramer, 1997; Waldron, 2002); not examining him through this spiritual prism suppresses a kind of socialism in his ideas. There are two core Judaeo-Christian propositions in play here: first, is the concept of stewardship which entails that people are God’s appointed caretakers of the earth, responsible for nurturing and preserving nature; and second, is the idea that everybody has equal right of access to the world’s natural resources that are so crucial to enabling them to fulfill their place in creation. For God’s creation to be respected and fully realised, natural laws (specifically those pertaining to property rights) play an essential role in mediating the interests of the individual, society and nature (Waldron, 2002).
Given that the purpose of government is to uphold natural law, a Lockean government will have to intervene and redistribute surplus (Waldron, 2002). The primacy of natural law for Locke’s society cannot be overstated, and it is the purpose of government to uphold and execute its dictum. This requires people to relinquish to a government their natural freedom to carry out executive, legislative and judicial functions; which they are happy to do as devolved and fragmented responsibility, as in the State of Nature, is grossly inefficient (Locke, 1988). It follows that any government will have within its competencies the enforcement of the laws of appropriation (Waldron, 2002).
The limitations on private appropriation, coined by Macpherson (1962) as the spoilage and sufficiency limitation, coupled with the doctrine of charity (Waldron, 2002) require frequent governmental intervention; not least because transgressions violate natural rights to life, liberty and possessions but also because a centralized system of property collection and allocation is far more effective and efficient than individual philanthropy (Waldron, 2002).
There is a hint of utilitarianism in this aspect of Locke’s theory. Locke suggests that a government ought to uphold the limits on appropriation on the basis that an economy predicated on liberal equality is the best way to ‘promote the great Design of God and, Increase and Multiply’ (Locke, 1988, p. 170). He argues that societies where the sovereign casts the interests of the labourers and the poor aside, in favour of vested interests, suffer from economic stagnation and points to the cronyism of absolute monarchies (Locke, 1988, p. 170; Waldron, 2002).
Notwithstanding the above, Locke’s political theory should not be confused with being a test-case for socialism. While he intends for a mild level of redistribution to establish a safety net and ensure equality of opportunity to fulfill God’s purpose, he doesn’t intend for government to engineer total economic equality. Although equality pervades all aspects of his theory, political equality remains paramount, he contends that
‘[the legislator] is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator’ (Locke, 1988, p. 458).
This was his project. To refute what he saw and as the tyranny of arbitrary taxation which reflected the stark realities of political inequality he so despised (Dunn, 1969). It follows that though people relinquish the power to execute natural law, any redistribution of wealth must be based on democratic consent. In subjugating economic equality to political equality, Locke takes his place in the centre of the continuum.
The Continuum: Bentham
Utilitarianism is distinct from most ontologies, especially Locke’s, because of what is has to say on the natural-versus-man-made rights dichotomy and for its consequentialism. Deontology judges actions based on whether they conform to rules, whereas utilitarianism focuses solely on their consequences (Keller, 2009). For Bentham, there are four ends that a legislator should work to in order to maximise the greatest happiness of the greatest number: subsistence; abundance; security; and equality. He advocates for government to increase the ‘national stock of the matter of wealth, or to the application of it in the most efficient mode, to any of its three uses, viz. subsistence, security, and enjoyment’ (Bentham, 1843, p. 73).
However, critics argue that this utilitarianism sacrifices the individual whenever there is a chance to increase the aggregate welfare of society and is simply not a practical framework for judging what allocation of resources is fair (Postema, 1998; Shapiro, 2011; Hart, 1996; Parekh, 1970; and Rawls, 1999). For instance, the removal of one of a man’s eyes in order to alleviate the blindness of another man is in accordance with the utility principle as the pain caused to the first man is outweighed by the pleasure brought to the second (Postema, 1998; Shapiro, 2011). This criticism stems from the idea that the principle ‘treats individuals as mere receptacles [of pleasure or happiness] with no intrinsic value for the experiences of pleasure and pain’ (Hart, 1996, p. 91; Parekh, 1970; Rawls, 1999). The lack of moral rights, critics argue, enables Bentham’s legislator to sacrifice individual interests for marginal aggregate gains of happiness (Schofield, 2003).
Despite the persuasiveness of these voices, Bentham’s utilitarianism is opposed to the sacrifice of the individual in the pursuit of the greater happiness of the community. His rejection of moral rights stems from their inherent subjectivity, not that they may get in the way of the utility principle (Rosen, 1983; Schofield, 2003). Only the utility principle, exercised by the legislator can guarantee a sufficiently impartial and rational basis for resolving conflicts of interest (Rosen, 1983). Moreover, Bentham did not intend for the term ‘maximization’ to be interpreted as the advancement of the greatest aggregate happiness. He intended for it to pertain to the widest possible distribution of happiness. His utility principle is therefore ‘distribution-sensitive’, in that it prioritises equal happiness and resists sacrificing individual interests for marginal aggregate gains of happiness (Rosen, 1983; Schofield, 2003).
Bentham’s project acknowledged that poverty required state intervention. To this end, he proposed panopticon workhouses, national hospitals and many other forms of state assistance (Quinn, 2001; Bentham, 1843). He even describes the circumstances under which land may be compulsorily purchased from landowners: to provide work and housing for the poor. However, the responsibility of Bentham’s government goes only as far as facilitating a means for the poor to ‘pay their way’, as it were (Bentham, 1843).
He doubted the efficacy of removing of private property, saying ‘the law of property had an effect on the self that makes redistribution problematic. Law provided security for our expectations [… which] formed part of the structure of one’s agency’ (Bentham, 1840, p. 183). He also argued that the best way to relive the plight of the poor ‘is — not by donations, but by loans. Loans preserve unimpaired the spirit of frugality and industry; donations impair it, by leading them to transfer their dependence from their own exertions to those of others’ (Bentham, 1843, p. 624). He holds the self-liberation principle to be ‘the main pillar of industry and economy’ (Bentham, 1843, p. 624) and donations are inconsistent with this principle. Indeed, he would rather that ‘dissipation is promoted by … the way of loan … [than] by money given without condition of repayment’ (Bentham, 1843, p. 625). He goes on to say, ‘we think much of them in the way of charity, but we think little of them in the way of justice. Justice, however, ranks before charity: and they would need less charity, if they had more justice’ (Bentham, 1843, p. 1041).
Bentham’s advocacy for reform of the poor laws and for the establishment of state welfare programmes stemmed not from a drive for economic equality but to increase the national wealth (the greatest happiness of the greatest number). While higher productivity means a wealthier nation (which he argues leads to better conditions for even the poorest in society), it by no means makes society more equal. In this respect, Bentham is more inclined to the laissez faire policies that epitomised 19th century Britain. He proudly maintains Adam Smith’s proposition that if the economic realm were left alone, it would produce an egalitarian distribution of wealth (Bentham, 1843; Parekh, 1970; Smith, 2010). And given that he holds idleness to be one of only two crimes against the national wealth (Bentham, 1843, p. 286), his programmes appear to be no more than ways to boost productivity and mitigate the inherent inequalities of a capitalist economy. In light of this analysis of Bentham’s strand of utilitarianism, we shall place him to the right of Locke.
The Continuum: Mill
Mill arrives at a wholly different conclusion to Bentham, despite adopting the utility principle. His fear of revolution subsided in his later years and he took his philosophy far beyond the parameters of utilitarianism (Miller, 2003). Indeed, to cast Mill as an advocate for a kind of socialism would not be unduly hyperbolic. He records, in his autobiography, how he became estranged with his prior views on property and the role of government.
‘In the days of my most extreme Benthamism… I had seen little further than the old school of political economists… private property … and inheritance, appeared to me as to them, the dernier mot of legislation’ (Mill J. S., 1981, p. 218). Moreover, he concludes that the ‘ideal of ultimate improvement would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists’ (Mill J. S., 1981, p. 239).
Mill has been portrayed as a bastion for liberalism in the social, political and economic realm. However, his writings outside of On Liberty suggests that he is merely an ‘epigone’ of liberalism (Von Mises, 1985, p. 195). At times, he seems to flirt with communism (Miller, 2003): going further than arguing for an equality-based distribution of wealth to one that is needs-based. For Mill, (1967) individual need was a higher principle of justice than the desert principle or principles of incentivistic socialism (Mill J. S., 1967).
While Mill advances the argument in favour of socialism ‘with loving care’ (Von Mises, 1985, p. 195) and undeniably pushes the boundaries of liberalism, he stops short of encroaching on core libertarian territory (Miller, 2003), citing various problems with socialism and communism. One such problem is that by guaranteeing a subsistence income, people will be discouraged from limiting the number of children they have; high birth rates are, for Mill, a root cause of poverty (Mill J. S., 1965). A further problem pertains to the division of labour. By definition, communistic communities distribute goods and ‘evils’ (meaning labour) according to either equality or need, but for Mill there is no non-arbitrary way to determine ‘how much cotton spinning…or bricklaying, or chimney sweeping, is equivalent to so much ploughing’ (Mill J. S., 1965, p. 211). The communist’s solution of rotating individuals around tasks relinquishes the advantages gained by specialisation and ignores the inherent inequalities regarding ability and preferences (Mill J. S., 1965; Miller, 2003). Irrespective of this concern, the incompatibility of Mill’s liberalism and communism provides the main obstacle to a full commitment to this way of economic organisation.
‘I fear that the yoke of conformity would be made heavier instead of lighter; that people would be compelled to live as it pleased others, not as it pleased themselves; that their lives would be placed under rules, the same for all, prescribed by the majority; and that there would be no escape, no independence of action left to any one’ (Mill J. S., 1986).
For Mill, the acceptance of communism is contingent on its perceived effect upon liberty and individuality; however, he concedes that communism would lead to dissent and to the ultimate destruction of the system itself (Mill J. S., 1965, p. 206; 1967, p. 745). It must be noted that Mill’s socialism is loosely defined. It extends to ‘any system, which requires that the land and instruments of production should be the property, not of individuals, but of communities or associations, or of the government’ (Mill J. S., 1965, p. 203). Furthermore, he respects the parameters of democracy in arguing that the legitimate distribution of wealth among owners of production is dependent on ‘public act, performed according to rules laid down by the community’ (Mill J. S., 1967, p. 738). This broad definition does not require even partial national ownership of the means of production; indeed, judged by this standard, contemporary firms that are wholly owned by their employees qualify as socialistic enterprises (Miller, 2003).
Therefore, Mill’s socialism is more akin to a ‘socialism-under-capitalism’ (Miller, 2003, p. 229) and any socialist enterprise would operate within the framework of capitalism. At no point does he suggest any reforms to property laws that would make it impossible for individuals to own productive property. Similar to the modern-day employee-owned firm, his socialist enterprise may well be public with respect to its members, yet private to everyone else (Miller, 2003). Given this, it is fair to place him to the left of his two counterparts.
Conclusions
I began by exploring each thinker’s philosophy of equality before looking at how their philosophies interacted with their political and economic views. I did this so as to place them onto a continuum; spanning left to right, it shows where each thinker sits in relation to left or right-wing politics and in relation to each other. I place Locke centrally, with Bentham to his right and Mill to his left. It would seem an argument can be made for the redistribution of wealth regardless of whether the thinker understands rights to be of natural or artificial origin.
By analysing each of their positions regarding property rights and the role of government in respecting such rights, I have established that Bentham is sceptical of the efficacy of the removal by the state of property from private hands; whereas we see in Locke a more compassionate view that limits appropriation and permits the redistribution of property. And in Mill we see the endorsement of a ‘socialism under capitalism’ that seeks to promote egalitarian policies within a utilitarian, liberal and capitalist framework.
This is not a philosophical exercise but an academic one. It has drawn attention to the varying degree to which equality in abstraction interacts with equality in practice (so far as political thought can be practical) within the British liberal tradition. As we have seen, all cases entail minimal encroachment on libertarian territory and all respect the primacy of the capitalist’s right to property.
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