American Democracy’s James Harden Problem
Is American Democracy suffering from a James Harden problem?
In 2020, we’ve decided to try a new approach to this blog. Instead of writing 800–3,000 word essays back and forth. We’re going to try co-authoring posts together. In most cases, these are edited versions of conversations we have had in person.
For our first attempt, we will try to capture a conversation we’ve been circling around for a while: why is compromise and coalition building so hard in our present day democracy? Jay, helpfully described it as “Democracy’s ‘James Harden’ Problem.”
Samarth: Jay, why don’t you briefly describe what you mean by the ‘James Harden’ Problem.
Jay: “The James Harden problem” is a reference to NBA player James Harden’s play-style: not so much basketball as an analytics-inspired performance during a basketball game that helps his team win, but which doesn’t also produce good basketball. He plays less against his opponents than against the rules of the game. We see the same type of thing politically in the US. Rather than playing the core game within the rules, it has become standard political practice to play against the rules.
Samarth: Even when you initially called it the “James Harden problem,” I knew exactly what you were referring to. And I couldn’t agree more. In fact, I saw Harden play recently in Houston and my overwhelming take-away was that he is an incredibly talented basketball player but a complete bore to watch. Watching him play the referees and try to find advantages at the margins was not satisfying because it didn’t feel like basketball. It felt like cheating. Harden’s game is less defined by taking good shots, more by trying to get the referees to call a foul. So he can go to the foul line. He seems less interested in being the best basketball player on the floor, rather than the best foul receiver on the floor.
In politics, I had some of the same feelings while watching the impeachment proceedings unfold over the last couple of months. The outcomes felt decided before the trial even started. Much of the conflict was about the mechanics of trial, witnesses and procedure. A focus on the substance of the case felt, at best, secondary. There were only a couple of moments in the months-long saga, as it unfolded, that felt truly up for grabs.
Jay: Right. The Democrats started an impeachment proceeding that was very unlikely to be successful and then — like Harden leaning into his defender to draw a foul while taking a “shot” that has no chance to go in — didn’t even attempt to make a real persuasive argument about removal. The House managers in the Senate trial called Trump a “dictator” and warned that he would give Alaska to Russia: it wasn’t a serious approach designed to convince reluctant Republicans to remove Trump. And there are potentially serious ways to argue for Trump’s removal, which might have convinced some Republican senators. Democrats could have made any concessions at all — about President Obama’s past-impeachable conduct, or about how they would treat future Republican presidents as long as they were sufficiently un-Trumplike. They might have even made a legislative deal. But instead they insisted on a strategy that ostensibly had no ability to achieve their goal of removal. And they did that because they were playing a different game.
Samarth: And complaints about Republicans lacking any interest in running a fair trial were easy to find, too. To me, this brings up the question of incentives. Why do we live in James Harden’s world? One element of this dynamic is how electoral politics and campaigns work. We have a highly efficient campaigning system. Maybe too efficient. Just as Amazon has become highly efficient at selling you the exact product you should buy, elections have become highly targeted and efficient at getting votes from the exact voter. In fact, many campaign operatives go back and forth from the worlds of marketing and analytics (including me!). This, in turn, diminishes their interest in building wider coalitions, appealing to any other voter than their own, or aiming toward compromise rather than ideologically “pure” positions. No politician, in an extremely sorted political market, is incentivized to behave in surprising ways.
Jay: And a sorted political market affects the product being sold, too. The market for voters ends up so finely-targeted that it is conducted through individual-based appeals that turn the market for votes into a consumer market — a search for the best consumer good instead of participation in the common good. So just as the analytics revolution in basketball has made the sport more efficient to the point that it loses its central focus, voter analytics has made the traditional contest into something else by turning the focus of politics into selecting the right combination of voter-appeals rather than making general appeals to the common good. Just as NBA players now attempt shots solely for the purpose of being fouled, U.S. politicians conduct their business with no real intention of living up to their rhetoric. And we get a Green New Deal that doesn’t even get votes from its own sponsors in the Senate, or an impeachment pursued despite no chance of success.
Samarth: We should clarify, though, that analytics or highly efficient markets don’t necessarily cause this outcome. But that analytics are working to amplify an environment that is already highly sorted. You and I grew up in a small town but left for New York City, thinking we might be surrounded by more people like us. Now we mostly interact with people like us.
In the cities we live in, the schools our kids attend, the churches we do or don’t go to, we hardly have heterogenous political interactions anymore. If you and I weren’t friends growing up, the likelihood that we would become friends — with our divergent politics — would be very low. The great American sort has created bubbles and pockets everywhere that analytics has gotten great at targeting.
Jay: The point is that more efficient sorting, at a lot of different levels, has created a consumer market for politics that didn’t really exist until the last twenty or so years. And just like the rest of our consumer economy, it is really efficient and really elaborated. The possibilities for digging into a consumer identity are endless and deep, to the point that common ground can be hard to find. I’ve noticed this in New York, where I sometimes have a hard time talking to people even about NFL football, since my Chicago loyalties mean that I watch different games than New Yorkers watch. Even as a football fan, talking about the same conference in the same league, there can be a vast gulf that hinders communication and connection. But while the consequences of not connecting over football are innocuous, politics actually requires a common understanding, which won’t happen without incentives to compromise.
Samarth: Even in the last few years, I’ve felt a pull toward the poles in this environment. Not only are we building two parties that don’t criss-cross with each other but each party has politicians who are moving to their maximalist positions. On the right, if you’re a pro-choice Republican, the cards are stacked against you. On the left, if you believe in the problem of racism but think it can’t explain every social ill, you’re going to have a tough time politically.
The polarized, hyper-targeted, hyper-efficient political market seems to reward maximalists who have no interest in compromise.
Jay: And political loyalty as a consumer good has an insidious effect on the practice of politics. When you buy something for yourself, there’s no reason to compromise — the product exists for you to enjoy. But compromise is essential in democracy because millions of people each have their own views but can only join together for one majoritarian program. So a consumer relationship to politics is significantly responsible for the emergence of many more maximalist political positions, which are much more satisfying as a consumer good. And it might seem strange that an elaborated individual consumer market for politics leads to groupthink, but the point isn’t necessarily that an individual-targeted consumer politics leads to a certain type of individual voter, but instead that politics as a consumer product takes a certain form. We shouldn’t be too surprised that there is a mass market for certain political-consumption products, given the mass market appeal of lots of other products.
And since we have a two-party electoral system that automatically generates a bi-polar arena for political contests, our consumer choices need to relate to those poles. But if it only comes down to a consumer choice, it will always be more satisfying to be closer to the pole. When your candidate wins, you can be heart-and-soul involved with that win, rather than moderately satisfied at a broad ideological level, or ambivalent. So, if the political choice is a consumer choice, and a consumer choice is made for personal satisfaction, every voter/consumer has a strong incentive to identify with one of the poles.
Samarth: I do think we should, in a subsequent discussion, talk about the role of money in politics. But that is a huge area with lots of moving parts that deserve their own consideration.
Similarly, our evolving media environment (the degradation of local journalism, the ascendance of the internet, targeting communication, etc), I think, plays a huge role in this dynamic. But it deserves its own discussion.
But to be specific about the maximalist discussion. What do you think are some examples of this on both the right and the left? And what do you think are some of the outcomes of living in a maximalist political world?
I’m reminded of a recent piece in the Atlantic by Caitlin Flannigan, who wrote about abortion. Her thesis, summarized, was basically that we’re not going to move forward with any of society’s most difficult issues if we don’t recognize that people who disagree with us have a legitimate and thought-through position. If pro-choice voters believe all pro-life voters are characters in the Handmaid’s Tale and all pro-life voters characterize their opposition as baby murderers, we’re not going anywhere. Not only do maximalist positions exist on both sides but the violation or transgression is assumed to have a maximally bad outcome.
Jay: Yeah, that’s why every threat to abortion rights is taking us literally back to the Dark Ages, while anyone who opposes some popular, but ineffective, forms of gun control has “blood on their hands,” or is responsible for murders committed by other people. There’s no reason to moderate the perceived dangers posed by your political opponents when you’re really just expressing loyalty to your consumer identity. I think that we can only return to a healthier style of politics if significant portions of our political community start seeing politics as a practice, rather than an identity.
Samarth: That reminds me of another recent, very good, Atlantic piece by Eitan Hersh, arguing political hobbyists are ruining politics.
James Harden’s style of play is maybe not a perfect analogy for our political environment, but there is something seriously amiss when our politicians — with all sorts of incentives and tools — are no longer aiming for any sort of middle ground. They are only interested in finding loopholes and inefficiencies to win on maximalist grounds.
Knowing all this as a voter, especially in an election year, I’m personally motivated to reward politicians who show capacity for and interest in compromise. It’s not a behavior that exists in spades, right now. But as a citizen with a single vote, a drop in the ocean of maximalism, it feels like the only choice I have.
