Free Press to Economic Prosperity: A Timeline for Russian Development in the Next Decade
August 23, 2000 — Government 4
Last week, the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk became disabled and sunk off Russia’s northern coast. The backward reaction of Russian statesmen in regard to this crisis highlights the fact that traditional soviet doctrines are still strong in Russian politics. During the Soviet era, state policies were generally reactionary — communist governments guided their resources towards the immediate security needs of the State and Party (both domestically and abroad) while focusing little on the long-term goals. The current crisis demonstrates that the western freedoms necessary for the kind of economic development wanted by President Vladimir Putin cannot co-exist with the traditional methods that Soviet and Russian statesmen have used to maintain domestic security; therefore the key to creating economic and political development in Russia is the building of a legitimate democracy in Russia.
In order to build at legitimate democracy in regard to the Russian model two major functions of government must be created and then maintained. First, political accountability and property rights must be solidified. A freer press that works along with government during periods of reform to make bureaucrats accountable for their daily actions will avoid the replacement of current corrupt institutions with similarly corrupt new ones. Into order to preserve property rights (the second stronghold of a legitimate democracy) the Russain court system must predictably protect the property of individuals.
A legitimate democracy where the state is accountable to it citizens cannot have a president who vacations thousands of miles from a disaster area in order to avoid even tertiary responsibility. During one of his press conferences last week in regard to the Kursk sinking, Putin said the reason that he did not cancel his vacation in order to visit the families of the victims in the Kursk’s homeport was because he felt that his bureaucratic presence would hamper rescue efforts, but clearly this evidence of the Russian military’s disrepair would question his leadership so he avoided the event — hoping that if he stayed away he would not have to admit the short-comings of the post-communist Russian Navy. [1] That uncompassionate and ridiculous excuse contrasts actions taken by the leaders of established democracies where state accountability to citizens is solidified by leaders showing compassion towards the people during times of hardship. Putin’s mannerisms during the press conference blatantly display his lack of respect for a free press. He looked annoyed about the fact that he had to answer the questions of the media. The heretofore-untouched resource of the media in Russia could jump-start the political accountability necessary to strengthen democracy.
Although Russia may have the technological infrastructure for a free press, its leaders (stuck in the Soviet rut of short-term policies) need to learn how to avoid reasons for the media to be critical rather than the actual printing of such criticism. In order for leaders to make this shift in ideals they must be willing to endure criticism over the short term in return for long-term gain. With the first successful peaceful transfer of power since the fall of communism complete, the Russian democracy is strong enoughfor statesmen such as Putin to handle its critics not in a Soviet style way, but instead use citizen input through the press’ praise and criticism to guide policy — a Russianized version of what American presidential candidates would call a “listening tour.” [2] Although such machiavellian raids were undoubtedly considered prudent during his KGB career , the ex-spy turned president should have offered an interview instead of storming the offices of NTV.
Democracies, especially emerging democracies need leaders with whom the people respect and trust as demonstrated by the post-independence period in India. Patrick Tyler of The New York Times quotes Putin’s deputy chief of staff Vladislav Y. Surkov as claiming that Putin is a real democrat, but that “elementary order” is needed for him to consolidate power. Surkov’s assertion is right on with regard for the need to have that “elementary order”; however, Putin sees “consolidation of power” as a product of “elementary order” instead of a product of low transaction cost between citizenry and state due to respect and trust toward the state. It may have been the case during the Soviet era that order created power, but in a free society (such as the one that is needed to order for Russia to reap the economic benefits of its enourmous economic potential) elementary order cannot be created by decree — it must be earned[3]. Both “elementary order” and the consolidation of power are the products of low transaction costs between citizenry and state.
Those low transaction costs are earned through the accountability of state institutions. Today, Russia’s state institutions are plagued by corruption, undoubtedly similar to the corruption that hurts third world state-building in Africa. Through Surkov, Tyler claims that Putin says that he can not initiate “ a full-fledged anti-corruption campaign…since it would be interpreted as a political purge and evoke images of 1937 and Stalin’s terror” and that “reforming the functions of government [is] the only way to fight corruption for now.” With Putin’s current views how to create order those two assertions may be true, but if a free press is allowed to emerge — and with it the freedom and quality of information available to it citizens is increased — institutions will naturally become accountable to the people. The increase in information will have a two-fold effect. First, the corrupted bureaucrats can be removed so that Putin is seen as the hero instead of the villain during the “full-fledged anti-corruption campaign” and second Putin will be able to maintain that image only if he replaces those institutions with incorruptible ones. Putin will therefore create such institutions in order to maintain his own power and consequently allow his economic hopes will fall into place.
Most importantly, the rejuvenation of institutional accountability would create a court system that is just and predictable. With the rights of individuals insured and property rights maintained, Putin will have the ammunition to create economic growth in the form of domestic investment by educated urban Russians. With 77% (Kesselman 426) of Russians living in urban areas and the information age bursting globally, services will undoubtedly grow in Russia and may turn many of those city dwellers into a middle class Russians wanting to invest at home. Unlike third world nations of Africa that were hampered in economic growth due to their lacking of an educated middle-class, Russia touts a literacy rate higher than the United States (Kesselman 288, 426). Its land mass is greater than any other nation on earth increasing the likelihood that its natural resources will give it power in the future as other nations’ supplies diminish.
Although I am asserting that free speech leads to accountability and accountability creates just courts and predictable courts maintain property rights and property rights protect investors and investment creates economic prosperity, my timeline is flawed because of the fact that it is a timeline that has no clear starting point — All the parts are needed to create the linkage between an open media and growing economy, but an open media cannot create accountability on its own. Instead, it could easily backlash. By exposing corruption Putin could put his power in jeopardy. Once the timeline starts it will likely run its course to fruition because is better suited for economic growth due to its former status as a world power and has the physical infrastructure and resources to allow for such growth. It is not a mono-economy that relies on one resource, and unlike a colonial legacy, the communist legacy with all its faults has left an educated and proud citizenry — although there is the need for a new national myth. The strengths that separate it from other nations struggling with democracy will make the speed of its growth fast once the timeline does end. Its geography makes China look infinitesimal — surely its natural resources of dense forests will become a commodity has the rainforests continue to be depleted for instance.
As the British democratic example illustrates, the most important variable in state building is time. The longer governments, formal institutions and informal institutions stay in power the likelihood that they will succeed increases. Yeltsin, already proved to Russians that shock-therapy does not work and that economic success cannot be “decreed” (Annual 38). Putin himself may not be successful, but his successor may be. He must open his government up to scrutiny in order make the state as a whole accountable for its actions. Since he is creating a top-down democracy he must make himself personally responsible to his citizens in order to get the unstoppable timeline started. He lost his chance last weekend, but the deaths of the sailors aboard the submarine may not have been in vain — for they have created a situation that tests Putin early in his term as president giving him an opportunity realize that if he opens up to his people he may truly become the democrat that he claims to be.
[1][1] Sometime late last week I was watching Russian television on C-SPAN and there was an informal press conference forced upon the President by reporters. Unfortunately I had not seen the connection between the disaster and what I was going to write about for this paper until days later so I am unable to better cite his statement. Also, my assertions as to the real reasons why he stayed on vacation are my own interpretations as to what his real motivation for staying on vacation may be.
[2] With regard to the strength of Russian Democracy Russians “have a strong instinct for gravitating toward the existing power” anyway. (according to Patrick Tyler’s “Russians Wonder if Putin Accepts Limits to Power” in The New York Times)
[3] Artice 38 reminds the reader that Yeltsin failed at economic development based on his desire to have it. He could not simple decree it.
