Hubris and Patriotism: The Downfall of Fredinand Marcos and the Filipino Revolution
December 6, 2000 — SOCY7 — Parsa
Shakespeare could not have written a better tragedy than the one that Dictator Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines made for himself. Two decades of faulty economic policies, selfish ambition, ignorance, and official corruption finally caught up the regime in February of 1986. On the night of the 25th Marcos’ army defected to the side of the middle-class opposition; thereby, freeing the Filipino revolution of a civil war. The alliance of the army and the middle class makes the Filipino revolution a direct reversal of the Nicaraguan model. Although both revolutions targeted an autocratic dictatorship, the middle class emerged as a legitimate power in the Philippines because supporting them were the officers of the army who had been directly responsible for sparing the nation of bloody civil war.
Ambition, arrogance, and ignorance blurred the regime’s priorities resulting in the poor leadership that led to Marcos’ downfall. This hubris allowed him to never truly understand the needs of his people and therefore never provide for them. Dictatorships are successful when dictators adequately provide for their people; therefore the people are less likely to demand a place in the decision making process. Marcos, however, was more worried about world opinion than he was about the goals of most Filipinos. His ultimate goal was for the Philippines to project an image abroad. He wanted the world to think that the Philippines was developed and that he had taken it there.
Instead of providing his people with what they needed, he wasted resources, money, and time on misguided projects in hopes of building a modern image for the Philippines. Such projects failed to substantially contribute to national growth. The inefficiency of these projects led to huge international debts.
As the years past and debts increased, the number of influential Filipinos that benefited from his rule declined. Rigoberto D. Tiglao contends that the Filipino elite supported the dictatorship at its onset because “the world market created the basic condition for the elite’s support of the dictatorship” (30). The referenda of 1973, 1977 and 1978 that Marcos used to legitimize his rule “were undertaken during a period of relative economic prosperity which made the upper and middle classes apathetic to the attack on democratic rights” (29). Marcos’ poor economic policies led to discord among the ranks of the middle class as the economy slowed because the routes to economic success were limited to Marcos and his inner circle. Emmanuel S. De Dios describes how a percentage of international loans were directly allotted to “the rescue or ‘bail-out’ of firms with close connections to the dictatorship” (86).
Still, Marcos continued to borrow. De Dios asserts that Marcos failed to “revamp the protective structure and shift to an export-oriented” economy because “there was no particular urgency” to do so (119). Instead the “import-dependent nature of most industries was preserved” (119). The Philippines continued to import more than it exported and therefore had a hard time paying back its loans. De Dios claims that there “was perhaps no coincidence that the years of easy foreign money were also the years during which the dictatorship was able to consolidate its rule: on the contrary, the end of that period was associated with its weakening” (119). As loans became harder to secure, the internal economy continued to loose money because it was importing more than it exported.
Official martial law, violent persecution, and rigged elections thwarted those that objected to the regime. Even the pre-martial law days of 1970 and 1971 saw examples repression of the opposition. According to Petronilo Bn. Daroy, “the party headquarters and offices of labor and youth organization were often bugged. In the campaign for the congressional elections, the headquarters of opposition candidates, upon routine inspection, were found to have bugging devices installed within and in the premises” (22). The most important pillar of democracy is the freedom of speech. Without free speech, elections and campaigns cannot be considered free because any control of the media by the party in power disrupts democratic debate. Tiglao described how Marcos could manipulate the media in order to present the image of widespread support: “In open meetings Filipinos would be asked to indicate by a show of hands if they wanted [Marcos] to stay in office; he would inevitably receive unanimous support although reports on TV footage showing people raising their hands supposedly in approval were actually of people being asked who wanted a regular ration of rice” (28). Tiglao use of this example defends his assertion that the control of mass media was martial law’s most important early goal. Media that is not free, clouds reality. The absence of regular, free and fare elections negated any possibility of true democracy.
As years of Martial law passed, anti-dictatorship fervor left its traditional resting place at the coffee-tables of middle class and the jungle campfires of dug in leftist rebels only to exploded into widespread existence after the assassination of Sen. Benigno S. “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. Ma. Serena I. Diokno describes this event as the one that “moved countless Filipinos…to awaken and jointly fight the reality of dictatorship” (132). For two years, the opposition grew in strength and Marcos decided to call an election in order to shut the opposition down corrupt electoral defeat. Presidential candidate Cory Aquino, the widowed middle-class homemaker, defeated not only Marcos in the popular vote, but also his corrupt election system.
Despite the flood of anti-Marcos sentiment after the election and Aquino’s successful calls for the boycott of Marcos’ interests, the middle class did not have the revolution fully in their grasp until the Army defected and joined the cause against Marcos. When the army joined the middle class it ended the possibility of civil-war because it demonstrated reconciliation. Gemma Nemenzo Almendral reminds the reader that the opposition held an “innate distrust” for Marcos’ former defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile who masterminded the military’s separation from Marcos (216). Reconciliation created a situation where ordinary Filipinos where willing to join against Marcos regardless of the past — if Aquino and Enrile could be allies so could any other Filipinos.
The Filipino Revolution had a middle-class that was supported by the credible threat of violence. The Nicaraguan coffee and cotton growers simply lacked an armed force to defend themselves with. The army had sided with Somoza; therefore forcing the middle class to choose sides or be destroyed, so the anti-Somoza middle-class choose the left. Despite that crucial role in the Nicaraguan Revolution, the growers couldn’t reap the rewards of Revolution because they had supported a Leninist/Marxist revolution and the rebels controlled all the military power that existed in the country. Once the military sided with the Filipino middle class, the people felt victorious because Marcos was gone. The absence of bloodshed during Marcos’ departure made the prospect of the armed-resistance that had been championed by the Marxist/Leninists without any soldiers willing to rise up — Marcos was gone, there was no more reason to fight.
