Hubris in the White House: How President Wilson’s Ego Ruined the Treaty of Versailles
May 9, 2001 — History 25 — Dartmouth College
After more than a century of isolation from European affairs, the United States of America was reluctantly thrust into the politics of Europe. As The Great War raged on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, American’s did their best to follow the suggestions of President George Washington and alliances. Even President Thomas Woodrow Wilson publicly called for Americans to remain unbiased not only in action, but also in thought. Wilson, however, was a man full of contradictions and by the end of the War he called for America to take an active role in European politics. The Senate, however rejected The Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations that it created.
If Wilson had been a Shakespearean tragic hero, literature critics would blame the treaty’s failure in the Senate on hubris. I do not venture far from this explanation. Americans and their senators were not willing to embrace the Treaty of Versailles for two major reasons. First the treaty’s conditions were too great a departure from traditional American foreign policy. Second, Wilson was ineffective as a statesman when he returned to the US. Both conditions were byproducts of his personality; his ego made him feel individually responsible for the contents of the agreement and then for its ultimate success.
Wilsonianism — which his policies became know as — called for a new kind of international system based on Wilson’s personal values of justice and morality. Wilsonianism was simply too radical a form of international relations for most Americans. The public and especially the Senate were not willing to subject the nation to The Treaty of Versailles’s because the peace accord and the League of Nations were seen as threats to American independence. American’s were willing to follow Wilson to the trenches of the western front — after all, German U-boats had killed Americans and destroyed American cargo — but Americans were not willing to join him in his quest for a new world over after the war.
At Versailles, the president used his influence to frame an accord along Wilsonian lines. This was a testament to his profound personal conviction that, if human morality and Christian Law could be transferred to the international system, conflicts could be resolved by peaceful means before leading to war. An expert on Wilson, Arthur S. Link, describes him as a “Christian Idealist”.[1] Such an optimistic view of the international system was not only too radical and controversial for Americans, but it was not even evident throughout the treaty. For instance, the accord did not fully reflect the tenements of self-determination. In reality, the treaty did not strictly adhere to Wilson’s Fourteen Points that had guided America during the war and had ultimately brought Germany to the peace table. The treaty’s contradictions were easily used by radicals as examples of the treaty’s weaknesses.
His ego allowed him to overlook that it would be hard to convince the Senate to ratify a treaty that made the US a crucial player in European affairs. It was as if he had forgotten that he had publicly called for the American public to avoid taking sides in World War I earlier in his presidency. In February 1917, Colonel Edward M House noted in his diary even after the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare that the president did not want the US to enter the European conflict.[2]
Because Wilson saw himself as an important and impartial player at the conference he deeply involved himself in negations. A result of his insistence to travel to Europe and personally take a seat at the peace table was that the treaty in many ways became his document, but not necessarily Wilsonian. As historian Henry Kissinger comments, his presence at Versailles was a mistake because
It is almost always a mistake for heads of state to undertake the details of negotiation. They are then obliged to master specifics [and]…Since no one without a well-developed ego reaches the highest office, compromise is difficult and deadlocks are dangerous…With every passing month, [Wilson] was drawn more deeply into haggling over details which had never concerned him before. The longer he stayed, the more the sense of urgency to bring matters to a conclusion overrode the desire to create an entirely new international order. [3]
Wilson immersed himself into the negotiations so much that he got distracted by details and failed to maintain his overall goal; of a new peace based on his Fourteen Points. As he grew tired of negotiating, he was forced to make compromises that deteriorated the strength of his Fourteen Points. Historian Akira Iriye believes that the Peace Treaty was not a direct departure from the Fourteen Points, but a “modification” of them.[4] Akira’s seems to down play the importance of these modifications, but the modifications were complete contradictions of the Fourteen Points. Wilson lost legitimacy back home because he had acquiesced to other powers and thus opened the door for opponents in the Senate to try to further bend Wilson’s resolve in the name of his treaty.
He was so determined to create a new world order based on his own convictions that he was not willing stay in Washington and let confidants such as Edward M House speak for him at the conference. Not only did his travels create a sense that the treaty was going to be strictly formed along Wilsonian lines, but they also lost him support in Congress. Kissinger claims that his insistence on traveling to Europe went against the wishes of his advisors and decreased Wilson’s influence on the Hill. The trip to Europe, the first by a sitting American president, was an unmistakable signal to Americans and the Senate that he was bringing the United States into European Affairs; thereby, strengthening the resolve of irreconcilables.
Although he succeeded in forming a peace that both allies and enemies were willing to sign, his experiences in Versailles were demonstrations of his hubris. His arrogance made him cross the ocean and therefore loose touch with American public opinion. Pride lead to intimate involvement with very detailed aspects of the treaty. He was proud of himself when he returned to the United States. On July 10, 1918 he told reporters (perhaps only in jest) that he could not bring home the original copy of the Treaty. [5] For him to suggest that a European document ought to be housed in the United States shows how he felt like a proud parent. The comment also hints at the fact that he thought the treaty would be ratified by the Senate because it would have been embarrassing for him to have actually brought the original copy to the United States if the treaty might not pass through the Senate. After all, at the end of the press conference he went on to say, “I do not think hypothetical questions should concern us. The Senate is going to ratify the treaty.”[6] The trip left him out of touch with America and engrossed in self-achievement. Further making ratification more difficult because the treaty he wrote was not in line with American public opinion.
Any humility that had allowed for compromise in Versailles was gone. Pride would keep him from compromise on US soil. Even after discussions and votes regarding numerous amendments and reservations, the chief stumbling block of the treaty’s ratification was clearly Article 10. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Henry Cabot Lodge’s second reservation was designed to allow for Congress to have the final say regarding US responsibilities in the League particularly with regard to Article 10. In the July 10, 1919 press conference (before the Lodge reservations existed) he was willing to concede that the Congress would have the final say regarding US action.[7] He was, however, unwilling to allow democrats to the vote for a later version of treaty that included a revised preamble and Lodge’s second reservation which he seemed to agree with in principle during that July 1919 press conference.
President Wilson was a great visionary for the future international relations, but he allowed his pride to overtake his policy objectives. The League of Nations lost all legitimacy when the sponsoring country failed to ratify the League. Wilson could have avoided this loss of legitimacy for the League had he been willing to give up executive power of the president in the United States that didn’t even exist in the Constitution. Article 10 was as much of a domestic policy item as it was an international one. Lodge’s reservation number two was an attempt by the Senate to reign in growing presidential powers. Wilson feared the League’s legitimacy would be lost if the Congress had too much, but that was against the Constitution. This was the ultimate act of hubris because he was willing to risk the Constitution of the United States in the name of his vision of international relations. For a President to defy Constitutional law in such a way can on be explained in egotistical terms.
[1] Arthur S. Link, “Wilson’s Higher Realism,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (5th ed. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 1: 510.
[2] Colonel Edward M House’s diary entry on a White House visit [1 February 1917], The Crises in US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael H. Hunt, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 48.
[3] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon Schuster, 1994), 230.
[4] Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913–1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 60.
[5] Woodrow Wilson Press Conference [10 July 1919], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed Arthur S. Link, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 50, 786.
[6] Woodrow Wilson Press Conference [10 July 1919], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed Arthur S. Link, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 50, 793.
[7] Woodrow Wilson Press Conference [10 July 1919], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed Arthur S. Link, et al. (Princeton University Press, 1985) 50, 791.
Notes:
[1] Arthur S. Link, “Wilson’s Higher Realism,” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (5th ed. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 1: 510.
[2] Colonel Edward M House’s diary entry on a White House visit [1 February 1917], The Crises in US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael H. Hunt, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 48.
[3] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon Schuster, 1994), 230.
[4] Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913–1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 60.
[5] Woodrow Wilson Press Conference [10 July 1919], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed Arthur S. Link, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 50, 786.
[6] Woodrow Wilson Press Conference [10 July 1919], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed Arthur S. Link, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 50, 793.
[7] Woodrow Wilson Press Conference [10 July 1919], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed Arthur S. Link, et al. (Princeton University Press, 1985) 50, 791.
Works Cited
Hunt, Michael H. The Crises in US Foreign Policy: An International Reader. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996.
Iriye, Akira. The Globalizing of America, 1913–1948. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon Schuster, 1994.
Link, Arthur S. “Wilson’s Higher Realism.” in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 1: To 1920, eds. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson. 5th ed. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Edited Arthur S. Link, et al. Vol. 50. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
