Protecting Americans from Themselves: Constitutional Defenses Against American Expansion in the Postbellum Period
April 9, 2001 — History 25 — Dartmouth College
The Constitution of the United States leaves foreign relations primarily in the hands of the executive branch, yet ties those same hands with a legislative rope. To claim that U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1896 was characterized by deliberate expansionist action is a mistake. Certain well-known policymakers set lofty goals, but actual events do not reflect successful attempts at empire. Anti-expansionists in Congress thwarted the dreams of overly ambitious presidents and secretaries of state for the three decades following the American Civil War. Constitutional checks and balances made expansion extremely difficult and therefore a more accurate analysis of the postbellum period should assert that American policy was “haphazard and disjointed” rather than representative of “a continuous drive toward empire.”
Historians who claim that American foreign policy was expansionist often use the policies of two key secretaries of state and several presidents as evidence of a greater movement towards expansion. Ironically, however, it is foreign policy failures of post-war administrations that create an overall isolationist policy that was far from imperial. Even though the dreams of certain expansionists may called for military or economic conquest, actual policy did not reflect the oppression of native populations required for imperialism. The intentions of a few men (although powerful) cannot represent the true direction of American foreign policy.
Factions in Congress kept the US from attaining popular imperial ambitions. Presidents Ulysses S. Grant, and Benjamin Harrison; and Secretaries of State William H. Seward and James G. Blaine attempted to expand US territory but failed because of Congress. Some historians such as Walter LaFeber and Eward P. Crapol interpret such failures as the roots of expansion or building blocks of an American Empire. LaFeber (an ardent Seward and expansionist supporter) recognizes that “Congress usually maintained its domination over the executive,” but erroneously suggests that “Lincoln’s use of power…could not be undone.”[i] His error lies in the fact he does not recognize some Congressional Constitutional powers that could not be undone either. The Senate failed to approve numerous treaties that were championed by presidential administrations while the House of Representatives made the appropriation of funds to purchase land difficult. Despite the best efforts of expansionists holding powerful offices, Alaska and Midway were the only territories approved for annexation by Congress during the years 1865–1896.
The successful annexations of Alaskan and Midway occurred during Seward’s time as Secretary of State. He wanted to peacefully extend US power by purchasing new territory. Still economically recovering from the Civil War, some legislators were concerned that such a policy would dangerously run-up national debt. Nevertheless, Seward negotiated treaties to buy Alaska from the Russians and two of the Virgin Islands from the Dutch. The Senate only narrowly approved of the Alaska deal because it was so good, allowed the Midway addition because it didn’t cost anything, and didn’t support Seward’s bid to purchase St. John and St. Thomas from the Dutch because it cost too much.[ii] The failed Virgin Island procurement demonstrates how Congress kept the US from reaching popular imperial ambitions.
Seward also called for economic expansion in Asia and territorial expansion to included areas of Canada, Cuba, Fuji, Mexico, Greenland, even Iceland and others. Historian David M. Pletcher’s More Rhetoric than Results: Halfhearted Economic Expansion” explains the importance of separating intended from actual results. With regard to Seward’s tenure as Secretary of State, we must recognize that actual American policy was not reflective of the policies he originally intended. He dreamt of a vast American empire but could not bring it to fruition; therefore one cannot rightfully suggest American policy reflected Seward’s ambitions. In the US system, one man’s statements — even the secretary of state’s — may not accurately reflect overall the overall American position.
Men outside of administrations had power rivaling that of President and Secretary of State which further fragmented the true direction of American international relations. The Chairman’s of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could easily effect policy. For instance, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner supported Canadian annexation, but twice stopped attempts by Grant to annex the Dominican Republic. Sumner’s reluctance to allow for Dominican annexation ultimately makes American position one of isolation — not expansion.
In 1872, The pacific island nation of Samoa approached the US with dreams of annexation. Although expansionists saw Samoa as a possible place to expand, US involvement cannot here be considered imperial because the native population invited US presence. In fact, reluctance on the part of US to make Samoa a protectorate displays anti-expansionist forces at work. What kept the US from ignoring the Samoan plea for protection was compasion towards people who were trying to avoid European imperailism. The US entered into the controvers over the islands with the British and Germans inorder to maintain a people with a culture of self-determination — not to impose US domination.
While a US Senator and later as Secretary of State, Blaine saw the key to America’s future in economic expansion. Presidential ambition and his own conflicting policies, however, did not translate his foreign policy goals into an overall American policy of expansion. His calls for empire as Secretary of State did not necessarily mirror his early goals. Pletcher suggests that Blaine’s policies of expansion were politically motivated:
“After briefly occupying the State Department under President James A. Garfield, Blaine published a statement insisting that the Garfield administration had intended a systematic policy of trade expansion. There is little evidence of this policy…and [there is] some reason to believe that the statement was actually an early gun in Blaine’s campaign for the presidency.”[iii]
In his biography of Blaine, Crapol also reminds the reader that House Speaker Blaine did not agree with Grant on the Dominican Republic.[iv] To assert that US foreign policy during the Blaine era was marked by expansion and that he was the father of American Empire is a stretch because his motivations were political. If he did not support empire until he saw it as a springboard the presidency, it is hard to say that his policies made the US expansionary.
The deep US involvement in Hawaii during the postbellum years and Harrison’s attempts at annexation are the closest examples of US imperialism before1896. American policy toward Hawaii came close to crossing the threshold of imperialism, but official annexation did not occur before 1896. Actual American policy never fully recognized it as a territory even after Americans facilitated the Hawaiian revolution. Constitutional rules kept in from achieving territorial status. On his way out of office, Harrison gave the Senate the Hawaii Annexation treaty, but President Grover Cleveland removed the treaty before the Senate could ratify it. Anti-imperialist Cleveland thwarted Hawaiian annexation and the start of imperialism was only narrowly avoided.
In the case of Hawaii, forces for expansion were extremely strong, so the isolationist policy succeeded partly due to chance. The timing of events brought the question of empire to national attention during a presidential election. It was a few years too early, so the isolationists prevailed. There is little question, however, that the years that followed were transitional. In fact, some historians such as Paul Kennedy mistake American policies in regard to international events after 1896 as examples that the US had been preparing for Empire before 1896.[v]
The many failures of ambitious powerful expansionists are testaments to the strength of the constitution. It protects Americans from themselves. Madison feared the tyranny of the majority and in case of expansion, the Constitution kept the “popular passion” of manifest destiny from translating into imperialism before the US was ready.
End Notes
[i] Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913.(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7.
[ii] I used both class notes and Historian Walter LaFeber’s work in order to make those assertions about Seward’s purchases. It is important to note that LaFeber sees Seward as a key actor in the cause for US expansion. In the first chapter of his book he outlines Sewards policies with regard to Alaska, the Virgin Islands, Midway Island and other areas. Important to the anti-expansionist argument is that the Senate feared spending money for the Virgin Islands (p. 15) and that the Midway acquisition was only approved “because it cost nothing” (p. 17). See Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913.(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7–20. I used both class notes and LaFeber
[iii] David M. Pletcher, “More Rhetoric Than Results: Halfhearted Economic Expansion” in Major Problems, 1: 338.
[iv] Eward P. Crapol. James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 35.
[v] Paul Kennedy, “The United States’s Rise Among the Living and Dying Powers” in Major Problems, 1: 322.
Bibliography
Crapol, Eward P. James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 2000.
Kennedy, Paul “The United States’s Rise Among the Living and Dying Powers” in Major Problems, 1.
Pletcher, David M. “More Rhetoric Than Results: Halfhearted Economic Expansion” in Major Problems, 1.
LaFeber, Walter The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913.New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
