Sino-Japanese Reactions to Western Threats and Their Impact on Modernization

May 28, 2002 — History 77 — Dartmouth College

During the 19th and early 20th centuries, East Asian Imperialism dropped the largest Asian nation to its knees. Western military might destroyed the ancient Celestial Kingdom of China; but Japan, an isolationist state at mid-century, was on its way to greatness by 1900. Japan was relatively weak when European eyes fell on her, yet she was able to capitalize on western encroachment to become an imperialist nation in her own right. The Chinese, unwilling to recognize their military inferiority, fought a loosing battle against western powers in an attempt to hold onto what remained of their culture; meanwhile, the Japanese reluctantly acquiesced to western , developed western military technologies, and embraced western culture. These failures by the Chinese and relative successes by Japan, however, were not entirely the fault of Chinese. The Western aims for China and Japan were different and therefore the Japanese had more room to maneuver than Chinese. That said, the impact of a Sino-centric world cannot be ignored. Chinese leaders were generally naïve and stubborn when deciding policies regarding the west and modernization, while the Japanese were rational, flexible and imaginative when dealing with the western military threat.For the Chinese their problems began during the Opium wars where they were unwilling to recognize their military inferiority. They over estimated their own power and vastly underestimated the power of the British. They simply were not prepared for the wrath of western military might. Chinese generals relied on superstitions in battle and it did not occur to the Chinese that they should be cautious of western technology.

For the Chinese their problems began during the Opium wars where they were unwilling to recognize their military inferiority. They over estimated their own power and vastly underestimated the power of the British. They simply were not prepared for the wrath of western military might. Chinese generals relied on superstitions in battle and it did not occur to the Chinese that they should be cautious of western technology.

Both opium wars have many examples of naïve military tactics by the Chinese. In the First Opium War (1841–1842), historian Fredric Wakeman explains an incident where a general “consulted the oracles for an auspicious time to attack, which happened to be at the height of the rainy season” and in the same battle troops did not get the correct commands and marched against British cannon with just knives.[1] Robert B. Egderton’s Warriors of the Rising Sun notes a misjudgment by Chinese military commanders who believed that they could defeat western gunboats by throwing firecracker-laden monkeys onto cruisers to ignite their hulls.[2]

Furthermore, in the Second Opium War(1856–1860) it was clear that the Chinese still did not fear the western military even though they had unquestionably lost the First Opium War. “Chinese soldiers,” in a 1860 battle for Sinho, fought British and French regulars with “bows and arrows, some ancient matchlocks, nine-foot-long gingals that spewed sparks and smoke but were otherwise inoffensive, and some obsolete brass muzzle loading cannon.”[3] It was certainly brave of the Chinese to fight, considering their low odds, but these hopeless battles not only cost lives but also reduced imperial authority for the long-term. The Japanese were willing to accept temporary unequal treaties, and adapt to a changing reality rather than cling to a lost past.

While the emperor was facing external threats, his internal challengers were mounting and the Opium Wars did not help. He moved his military to the coasts to fight the British and this disrupted the traditional balance of power in rural China. Historian Philip A. Kuhn notes a contemporary view of the deteriorating situation. In Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, he explains that “the problem went beyond incompetence: at fault was the practice whereby garrisons of the interior provinces were transferred on an ad hoc basis to meet threats along the coast…[and they] had the mission of bolstering state authority….The internal garrison system was no longer capable of being mobilized as an expeditionary force, because rural society was now too unstable.”[4] China was loosing centralized authority as a result of western encroachment, but Japan was becoming more centralized as nationalism allowed for the restoration of the emperor a decade and a half after the Perry’s expeditions.

Clearly, military inferiority was a major contributing factor to China’s declining position, but equally as dangerous was the centuries-old Sino-centric worldview that had produced a culture not interested in outsiders. Chinese policy was hampered by ridiculous “truths” and superstitions about westerners. Edgerton explains a series of such unreasonable claims by the Manchu Imperial Commissioner Lin Tse-hsü. He believed that the British “had deformed legs, could not see at night…[,] were fatality vulnerable to any attach on their feet” and were so dependent on rhubarb that “with out it [they] would die of constipation.”[5]

At the end of the Opium Wars, some Chinese leaders wanted to modernize, but those attempts were largely made at the provincial level, since the emperor had lost much of his centralized power. After the bloody battles at the mouth of the Pei-ho, the taking of Tientsin, the march on Peking, the sacking of the emperor’s Summer Place in 1860, and the concessions that were a result of these western victories, some Chinese correctly predicted that they needed to modernize or risk becoming prey, not just to the Europeans, but their Japanese neighbors. Edgerton contends,

China’s shocking defeat of 1860 convinced some influential Chinese that they could no longer ignore Western military superiority. Noting that the Japanese had already begun to acquire Western weaponry, provincial leaders sought out European help in constructing arsenals and dockyards. Leading this drive toward Westernizing China’s military was Li Hungchang, a six-foot-four scholar, soldier, and diplomat who was to become one of the most powerful men in China and was already a man of great wealth and importance. Li warned everyone who would listen — and most still would not — that China must arm or Japan would join the west in destroying her.[6]

The military mistakes and erroneous beliefs by Chinese leaders were not the only barricades to military modernization in China. Another reason for China’s inability to modernize was that they failed to allow their culture to be mixed with the west’s. Instead of keeping foreign culture in the ports, Japanese citizens everywhere became infatuated with western customs. While the Chinese were trying to protect their culture from that of the west, the Japanese were trying their best to modernize and westernize. While the Chinese saw themselves as superior to the west, the Japanese were striving to be equals with the west in western terms. They understood that their culture needed to change if they were to be political, economic, and social equals of the Imperialist powers.

In terms of military modernization Japan reorganized its ranks based on task and leadership abilities like that of the imperial powers, but the Chinese could not complete these changes because their culture did not fit well into western military structure. Mary Clabuagh Wright, explains in The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874 that the “The military reorganization was successful up to the point at which it conflicted with the essential requirements of the traditional society…The reorganization program produced indoctrinated scholar-generals who were technically competent…[but]…it proved impossible to fit a modern army into the Confucian order. True military modernization proved to require greater changes…in the class structure, the system of values, the tax system and the principles of organization of the Empire’s administrative hierarchy.”[7]

In his introduction, Wakeman contends that China was, “ a nation so proud of is culture that its inheritors were seemingly incapable of recognizing the need for rapid adaptation to the European challenge.”[8] The lack of respect that the Chinese had for the “red faced barbarians” is quite different from that of the Japanese who, for instance, had known significant facts about America even before Commodore Mathew C. Perry landed.

Traditionally the Japanese, not being part of the sino-centric worldview, were willing to borrow and learn from other cultures. The Chinese, however, had no interest in barbarian affairs. Chinese knew next to nothing accurate about the British, yet the Japanese knew and cared about global events before mid-century. In the 1860s, the Celestial Kingdom was still very isolated and Sino-centric. Even though the “barbarians” had defeated them in the early 1840s, it does not seem that the Chinese made an effort to learn about their new adversaries.

After the Second Opium war, according to Edgerton, the emperor’s brother did not know that Britain controlled India and “believed Britain to be so small that more than half of its people had to live aboard ships.”[9] In contrast, when Perry landed in 1853, the Japanese knew what they were up against and when he returned the next year they used the visit to learn about America.

Edgerton explains that the Japanese were “well aware of their military disadvantage, [and] tried everything in their extensive bag of negotiating tricks to send Perry away during his first expedition. The discussions, held in Dutch, quickly revealed that Dutch traders in Nagasaki harbor had kept the Japanese abreast of world events. Japanese negotiators were well versed in geography and were even aware that the United States had recently fought a war was Mexico and was building a transcontinental railroad.”[10]

But in 1854, the Japanese demonstrated that they wanted to learn from, rather than hopelessly attempt to thwart, the Americans with force. For these rounds of talks the Japanese had an English interpreter and quickly learned American songs sung by American sailors. Although the Americans came seeking serious concessions, the Japanese — for whom the ultimate goal was to be on an equal footing with west — tried to focus on the exchange of customs and ideas. They watched with studious eyes as Perry’s men demonstrated the telegraph and steam engine. For example, a young man was able to build his own steam engine within a year after inspecting the American machine.[11]

The Chinese reacted to the influx of westerners and western culture very differently than the Japanese. They were not interested in western culture and tried to keep westerners from participating in Chinese life. Westerners, says Edgerton “were subject to stringent restrictions. They could not, for example, buy Chinese books, learn the Chinese language, bring foreign women on shore or hire Chinese women for any purpose…[Furthermore, they]…professed no desire for Western goods — ’We possess all things,’ the emperor told King George III…”[12]

Japan, however, did want something from the West — they wanted military education. The early Dutch on Nagasaki brought systems of ranks and organization. British soldiers, although not authorized to teach tactics, provided Japanese soldiers with rifle instruction.[13] The French, were officially training Japanese soldiers as early as 1867, and Ernst L. Presseisen, in Before Aggression, says that the Japanese unitized the help fully. “The [French] mission’s influence was much enhanced by the desire of the Japanese to learn. Its officers were treated with deference and listened to with care. The leaders of the Shogunate seemed to trust [the lead instructor] as a military adviser and allowed him to participate in secret discussio on military affairs.” The French were equally involved in the relationship and they brought engineers to help the Japanese although it was not part of the original agreement. [14]

Although both powers bought ships from foreign powers and both wanted to be able to support their own navies, the Japanese navy was stronger due to better discipline and training. The Chinese navy was ranked higher on a world scale than the Japanese navy in the mid-1890s because China had more ships, but the Chinese navy was not as strong as it seemed. According to Wakeman, the navy was divided into two fleets that didn’t even use the same kinds of munitions and discipline was difficult in such a navy. Wakeman contends, that managing discipline was difficult for the Chinese as demonstrated by China’s naval losses in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895:

“The naval issue was rapidly and humiliatingly decided in Japan’s favor. On September 17 [1894], each country’s fleet of 12 modern warships egaged in a major battle off the mouth of the Yalu River. Teh Chinese squadron was commanded by the [navy chief’s] protégé, Admiral Ting Ju-ch’ang. His performance was lamentabl. Battle orders were countermanded by one of his captains, his ships wasted their ammunition before the enemy was even in range, and the concussion from teh flagships major salvo demolished Ting’s own flying bridge. Mintues after the Japanese fleet began raking the Ch’ing battleships and cruiser with deadly accurate fire, two Chinese vessls were on fire, two others had sun, two refused to engage, and two more were steaming hastily away from the battle. Of the 12 warships that began the battle on th echinese side, only 4 had acquitted themselves well and manged to survive.[15]

China’s military was plagued with such inconsistencies and its commanders often made tactical mistakes. The Chinese beat themselves — running out of ammunition before an enemy’s ships are even in range is an inexcusable military blunder.

China’s failures and Japan’s success were not just due to better decisions by Japanese leaders, but also do to circumstance and luck. Certainly, China was hurt by bad decision making and Japan was helped by good decision making. The history of China and geographic location of Japan may be more important than each instance of success by Japan and failure by China. The west wanted to trade with China and eyed its vast resources and markets. Japan, however, was seen by western powers as a smaller market, with few resources. The Americans only became interested in Japan when it was seen as a possible coaling station for pan-pacific shipping from the United State to China. It was also easier for Japan to accept the threat of gunboats because they were an island nation. China had never been threatened by a sea power, so it is understandable that they were not as concerned with sea going barbarians — perhaps if the British had arrived overland the Chinese would have seen them the dangerous foe that they were and things may have worked out better for the Chinese as a result.

Notes

[1] Frederic Wakeman, Jr., The Fall of Imperial China (New York: The Free Press, 1975 ), 136

[2] Robert B. Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun: A History of the Japanese Military (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997), 28.

[3] Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 33

[4] Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 53

[5] Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 29

[6] Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 38

[7] Mary Clabuagh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (First Printed 1957; Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), 196

[8] Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, 1

[9] Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 31–32

[10] Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 40

[11] Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 41–42

[12] Edgerton, Warriors of the Rising Sun, 27

[13] Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1965), 2–3.

[14] Presseisen, Before Aggression, 11.

[15] Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, 191–2

Bibliography

Edgerton, Robert B. Warriors of the Rising Sun: A History of the Japanese Military. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997.

Kuhn, Philip A. . Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864. . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Presseisen, Ernst. Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army. Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1965.

Wakeman, Frederic , Jr. The Fall of Imperial China. New York: The Free Press, 1975 .

Wright, Mary Clabuagh. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874. First Printed 1957. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967.