What’s next for peacebuilding in Mindanao
Insurgency in the southern region of the Philippines, Mindanao, has existed for the past five decades, and has since claimed tens of thousands of deaths. Various peace deals have been presented during that time, however none of them have been implemented. While the recognition of an autonomous Bangsamoro region in Mindanao has many political and economic challenges, it also has the promise of diminishing radicalization and ensuring stable development. While the current administration might feel like it has all the time in the world to return to peace talks — it’s time to act now.
The peace deals
Several peace negotiations have been led in the past, most notably since the 1990s. In 1996, a peace deal was signed with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The basis of the agreement was to consider Mindanao’s Muslim-majority provinces, currently named as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), as a semi-autonomous administrative area. The peace deals led to the splintering of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from the MNLF. The MILF rejected the peace deal, as they demanded full autonomy, and have been engaging in separate negotiations with the government since 1997.
A major revival of peace talks was conducted under the previous Aquino administration, who re-launched talks with the MILF. In 2012, the government and the MILF signed the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro, which proposed the declaration of a fully autonomous Bangsamoro. Bangsamoro would replace the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), with a new agreement on the administration of these areas. The Agreement proposed a framework for power-sharing and normalization of relations, in a way that would allow for the maximum amount of autonomy possible under the restrictions of the Constitution. The peace process also envisaged the creation of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission.
While the Framework Agreement was never implemented, a new proposal was tabled in March 2014. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which formed the basis of this proposal, was then signed by the government and the MILF. Under the agreement, the MILF was bound to decommission its forces, and the document involved strategies for the reintegration of the MILF’s Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces. The agreement further proposed plans for livelihoods support to communities ravaged by conflict, police reform, transitional justice processes as well as provisional security arrangements. A key part of the peace deal was the adoption of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) into national law. While the agreement was signed, the law was never validated by Congress.
The peace processes has been progressive in many aspects: they have made a commitment to include women, minorities and the civil society. They have also allowed contribution by international partners, such as the EU and Malaysia, and presented solutions for the sharing of power and wealth.
While the current government shows no signs of reviving peace talks in Mindanao, granting a degree of autonomy in Mindanao’s provinces is vital to building peace in the region. Autonomy in Bangsamoro is often viewed negatively due to years of anti-Muslim propaganda. It is however important for the government to consider the long-term benefits of a lasting peace in Mindanao.
The risks
The failures of previous peace negotiations risk disenchantment and distrust, particularly among young people, in the ability of the central government to bring lasting peace. As ISIS calls for a pure state with justice, equality and prosperity as its hallmarks, such a calling can be particularly attractive to the local people due to the growing distrust in the central and regional government.
A protracted crisis can hence not only fuel criminalization, but it can also spur further radicalization. The risk of young people radicalizing is particularly acute for students at universities, who are tapping into extremist networks online. Radicalisation is not an issue concerning solely the poor, as the profiles of young extremists increasingly include people from prominent Maranao families. Some Marawi children also perceive the region’s Islamic leaders, such as the Maute group, as heroes, while only sensing neglect from the government.
The people of Mindanao have already watched several peace agreements to bear not fruits. The failure to reach a lasting agreement contributes to the distrust in the ability of the government to negotiate one. If the government wants to achieve stability in the region, as well as prevent criminality and further radicalization, it is essential that implements the legislation quickly, granting Bangsamoro a degree of autonomy.
In the meantime, much can also be done by the civil society and support of the administration. Attention should be paid to Mindanao’s “shadow” economies and informal trade, which is driving economic instability. Bangsamoro, as a fragile state, has the highest share of informal economy in the Philippines. Shadow economies, such as weapons and drugs trade and informal money lending are an important source of wealth and power. As such, they can undermine the development of stable governance structures, and their contribution to conflict and stability of the region should be closely monitored. On the other hand, the informal economies of a cross-border trade with Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei has the potential of contributing to economic development. Strategies for formalizing such income through taxation should be set in place.
Besides, the growth in activities contributing to sustainable livelihoods should be at the heart of Bangsamoro’s plans. Boosting the local economy through investments and a focus on job creation has the potential to contribute to a greater stability, as well as to reduce the appeal of radicalization. The provision of health care and education is also at stake when making Bangsamoro a desirable area for living. If local people, particularly the youth, enjoy living in Bangsamoro, the appeal of a utopia state as promoted by ISIS might in turn seem less of a pull factor.
An autonomous Bangsamoro comes with many political as well as economic challenges, yet the return to peace talks is vital. On the one side, it is important to underscore the power of the power-brokers when considering how Bangsamoro’s governance will look like. On the other hand, it is key to return to the political efforts, renew peace negotiations and ratify the Bangsamoro law in Congress. While the government might be reluctant to do so, there are very few avenues to ensure peace as well as economic stability in the region. While the drive might be low, the next best alternative is a rise in insurgency efforts, radicalization, as well as missed economic opportunities. Time to finally sign a deal — and stick to it.
Sources:
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Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations (2016) “Security Council Open Debate: ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture.’” Feb 23, 2016. Available from: https://www.un.int/philippines/statements_speeches/security-council-open-debate%E2%80%9Cpost-conflict-peacebuilding-review-peacebuilding (accessed Oct 18, 2017).
