How the Lakers Built the NBA’s Best Defense: Their Championship Secret
“Showtime” might be back in Los Angeles with LeBron James and Anthony Davis, but the heart of their championship contention is their defense
AS UNCERTAINTY REIGNED in L.A. following a year of uncertainty, the team quietly looked for a replacement the departed Luke Walton. The team, which had been as high as fourth in the Western Conference, was now out of the playoffs, with a dilemma: they had a 34 year-old LeBron James who showed his age on defense throughout the season, and they had a collection of young, talented prospects.
Things were made only more complicated by the Lakers’ failed attempt to trade for Anthony Davis at the 2019 Trade Deadline, which alienated many players on the roster and only added to the uncertainty on the team.
James was quiet at this time — though reports cited his desire to reunite with former coach Ty Lue or a former star he admired in Jason Kidd. So when Frank Vogel, a defensive guru who had been ousted after an underwhelming stretch with the Orlando Magic, there was significant skepticism in whether or not this new Lakers team would succeed.
Yet, by the end of 2019–2020, Frank Vogel would prove to be the mastermind of a team whose defense propelled themselves to an NBA championship, all while Vogel maximized the skillsets of each player on his roster.
Key Concepts of the Lakers’ Defense
1. “Up to Touch” Pick and Roll Coverage
Defending the pick and roll is among the biggest priorities for every NBA team, the Lakers included. Vogel, in a modernized version of the scheme he ran with Roy Hibbert and the Indiana Pacers, ran “up to touch” coverage throughout the year, to great success.
“Up to touch” references the fact that, in a pick and roll, Vogel wants his back-line defenders (often a center or power forward) to be close enough to the opponent’s screener to touch them.
This is a modified version of “Drop Coverage,” which is a coverage where centers hover around the paint on pick and rolls. Unlike a drop coverage, this “up to touch” coverage doesn’t concede nearly as many open jump-shots to scoring guards.
With mobile big men like Anthony Davis, JaVale McGee, Dwight Howard, and, more recently, Montrezl Harrell and Andre Drummond, the Lakers have been able to contain scoring guards and defend the rim at an elite level for most of the past two seasons — though they were notably better at this in 2019–2020 than in 2020–2021.
Other teams have taken a liking to this strategy. The Philadelphia 76ers, for instance, switched from an extremely conservative drop coverage to a more aggressive up to touch coverage this season, helping them go from a merely good defense to the #2 defense in the NBA this season.
2. Pressure Opposing Ball-Handlers at All Opportunities
Vogel is one of the few coaches who actively chooses to have his guards pressure opposing ball-handlers past half-court throughout the course of a game. Whether it be Alex Caruso, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, Dennis Schröder, or the departed Avery Bradley, the Lakers are among the leaders in applying full court pressure on defense.
This strategy has multiple benefits: it leads to the Lakers’ deadly transition offense by forcing turnovers, and it also fatigues opposing guards, which can be crucial late in playoff series. In fact, in Game 6 of the Finals, the Lakers’ full-court pressure was key to burning out an already exhausted Jimmy Butler, leading to a Lakers’ blowout victory.
Of course, there are trade-offs, with guards who defend full-court being more susceptible to on-ball screens or simply being blown by. Yet, this strategy has had great success for Vogel, so don’t expect it to change for L.A.
3. “Scram” Switching
The Lakers are not a switching defense by definition. But, like every other team, they tend to switch in late-game situations and at times when switching is advantageous or forced.
Building on a strategy made popular by Brad Stevens of the Celtics and Steve Kerr of the Warriors, the Lakers are among the leading teams who “scram” players out of mismatches when they switch on defense — “scram” comes from the quick switch on defense to prevent a mismatch from occurring.
Find a compilation of “scram” switching below.
The primary drawback of a switch-all scheme is that it can be easily manipulated to create mismatches. However, L.A.’s eagerness and decisiveness to re-switch their defenders out of mismatches means that their defense, when they switch, is not highly susceptible to being picked apart in isolation.
4. Help the Helper
The Lakers have some of the most aggressive help defenders in the NBA. LeBron James and Anthony Davis, their two defensive leaders, gain a significant share of their defensive value from this off-ball defense.
But such aggressive help defense comes at a price: it forces defenders to enter a flurry of close-outs and rotations.
Thankfully for L.A., their eagerness to pressure ball-handlers transfers to help defense. Their guards, particularly players like Alex Caruso and the departed Danny Green, are strong help defenders at the rim — whether it be by helping protect the rim or taking charges.
Overall, L.A.’s team defense has consistently been among the NBA’s best because of their commitment to help defense.
5. Skillset Maximization
Probably the most important facet of the Lakers defense is that Frank Vogel maximizes his players’ defensive potential by playing to each of his players’ strengths.
There are innumerable examples of this effect, like Vogel using LeBron James’ IQ to his advantage by making him a weak-side defender that can call out sets, or Vogel using Kentavious Caldwell-Pope’s speed to “lock and trail” against the best three-point shooters in the NBA.
This point may seem overly intuitive (part of the definition of coaching is to get the best out of players), but there are more than a few examples of a coach’s rigid scheming leading to worse defensive performance.
A notable and familiar example is the 2019–2020 L.A. Clippers, who, despite having Patrick Beverley, Kawhi Leonard, and Paul George, as well as mobile big men like Ivica Zubac and Montrezl Harrell, always stuck to a conservative drop coverage instead of an aggressive trapping scheme that could force turnovers.
Before the NBA Playoffs began, the Lakers were dealt an unlucky hand when Avery Bradley opted not to join the team in the Disney World Bubble. Bradley, under Vogel’s scheme, had become the team’s top option for guarding star guards, and his lateral quickness and on-ball defense were invaluable traits.
Los Angeles would also be tested in the postseason; that much was clear after they struggled through the seeding games and were upset in Game 1 of the postseason by the Portland Trail Blazers.
But, by the end of their championship run, the Lakers were clearly the best team in the NBA, and their defining trait was their defensive mastery. They shifted schemes, changed rotations, and adapted to drastically different opponents from a game-to-game basis, and ultimately, that is what should define their championship run.
Western Conference First Round: Portland Trail Blazers
In the first round, the Lakers had the challenge of guarding Damian Lillard and C.J. McCollum, two guards whose shooting and driving ability can cripple defenses.
Lillard, in particular, is probably the best player in the league at breaking down drop coverages because his athleticism driving to the basket and extended range is nearly impossible to cover.
That was the formula for the Blazers’ Game 1 upset over L.A., when Lillard got loose for 34 points against the Lakers’ modified drop coverage.
Vogel was quick to adjust, however, and his team began trapping ball-handlers on pick and rolls. The plan worked: Jusuf Nurkic and Hassan Whiteside struggled in short-roll situations, and Lillard never was able to attack L.A. in pick and roll as effectively as he had in Game 1.
Check out the clip below (timestamp 0:38), where Kentavious Caldwell-Pope and JaVale McGee’s trap leaves Lillard with no option but to force a pass to a rolling Whiteside. Even if the pass had gotten through, Davis was pre-rotated and ready to meet Whiteside at the rim, while James was ready to help out on Nurkic, who had been Davis’ man.
This was a great example of Vogel’s ability to adjust his scheme to stop his opponent, all while maintaining his core defensive principles of helping the helper and pressuring ball-handlers.
Of course, Portland was in the play-in range leading up to the NBA Playoffs. The Lakers’ next opponent, however, was a team that many seriously considered as a threat to knock them out of the postseason entirely.
Western Conference Semifinals: Houston Rockets
The Rockets, when they went to ultra small-ball and played P.J. Tucker at center, created a fascinating antithesis to the Lakers’ lengthy, paint-patrolling lineup.
Like the first game of the previous series, L.A.’s propensity to treat Game 1 as a “feel out” game backfired, as James Harden and Russell Westbrook got loose for 60 combined points. Changes were needed, as it was clear Harden’s isolation scoring ability may have been enough to single-handedly knock off L.A.
One game later, L.A. found their solution, as they played smaller lineups with players like Markieff Morris at center, pressured Harden full court, and placed Anthony Davis on Westbrook so he could help in the paint.
The one downside of trapping Harden incessantly was that it constantly makes L.A. go into “scramble mode,” where they would have to close out to Houston’s three-point shooters.
But, their defensive rotations were fantastic, and players like Markieff Morris, LeBron James, and Danny Green made a huge defensive impact just by rotating well on defense. Meanwhile, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, Alex Caruso, and Rajon Rondo all had their moments of great individual defense as they wore down Harden by pressuring him full court.
Below is a great example of this ultra-aggressive trapping scheme (time stamp 4:47), as L.A. trapped Harden twice in one possession but were still able to rotate fast enough to force a contested three by Jeff Green — a win for the Lakers’ defense.
Notice how, in that clip, the backside defenders were just as important as the on-ball defenders. Without Markieff Morris, Anthony Davis, and Danny Green being able to guard the weak side, L.A.’s trap of Harden would have been for naught.
Ultimately, though there were many factors that led to L.A.’s lopsided win over Houston, the biggest key would have to be this: Vogel was able to devise a game-plan that, at its peak, had lineups that were better at “small-ball” than the Rockets were.
Western Conference Finals: Denver Nuggets
L.A. made it clear they would not underestimate the Nuggets after they came back from 3–1 deficits in consecutive series.
Of course, Denver’s success begins and ends with the Jamal Murray and Nikola Jokic combination, so stopping that combination was key to L.A. winning the series.
The Jazz were unable to contain Murray off-the-dribble in the first round, and Jokic’s shooting was strong enough to mitigate Rudy Gobert’s rim protection abilities. The Clippers, meanwhile, failed to contain the Murray-Jokic pick and roll with their drop coverage, and their decision to double-team Jokic (one of the greatest passers ever) in the post in Game 7 was a poor choice.
After Game 1, L.A. mostly gave up on running an up-to-touch drop coverage against Jokic, mostly because he was too skilled to be contained by lumbering big men like JaVale McGee and Dwight Howard.
They often turned to switching, which was effective only because of how great their help defense was, and how quickly they “scrammed” players out of mismatches on switches.
Probably the most creative defensive sequence of the series came in Game 3, when, facing a large deficit in the fourth quarter, Vogel turned to a 2–3 zone.
Rajon Rondo, who emerged as L.A.’s best on-ball defender against guards in the postseason, racked up steals in the zone, as he no longer needed to worry about help defense responsibilities or being beat off the dribble. Davis and James, meanwhile, were a great tandem in covering the backside of L.A.’s defense.
Vogel never showed the zone for an extended period of time against Denver, a wise move considering that Michael Malone had time to game-plan against the zone after Game 3. The only notable change he made during the rest of the season was putting LeBron James on Jamal Murray in the fourth quarter of a tight Game 4.
But more importantly, it was Vogel’s willingness to try new strategies in the most important stages of the playoffs that would prove crucial later on.
NBA Finals: Miami Heat
Miami presented an interesting challenge for opposing teams. Though their two star players, Jimmy Butler and Bam Adebayo, severely lacked shooting ability outside of mid-range jumpshots, they were two of the best finishers and attackers in the NBA. Combine that with a plethora of three-point shooting and scoring guards, and perhaps the Heat’s NBA Finals run should not have been so surprising after all.
Their offense was Warriors-esque, featuring players like Duncan Robinson and Tyler Herro running off of hand-offs and pin-downs repeatedly. Adebayo and Butler were effectively able to capitalize off of the advantage created by Miami’s shooting to force mismatches in isolation or clear attempts at the rim throughout the postseason.
But give Frank Vogel credit. His team was the most effective at containing Herro and Robinson in the Playoffs, mostly because he had his fastest guards (Caldwell-Pope and Caruso) stay attached to Robinson at all costs, while he had his strong on-ball defenders (Rondo and Green) harass Tyler Herro.
After Butler dominated Game 3 of the Finals, primarily by making smaller guards defend him in isolation, Vogel had a brilliant response: he put Anthony Davis on Jimmy Butler.
Butler was a perplexing player to guard: he was too physically imposing for guards like Caruso and Caldwell-Pope, too savvy at drawing fouls for undersized wings like Kuzma and Green, and too indefatigable for a 35-year-old LeBron James.
Enter Anthony Davis.
Davis was the one player whose length could bother Butler at the rim, while also having the lateral quickness to help protect the rim or help out on Miami’s elite three-point shooters.
The plan worked nearly to perfection. Butler’s scoring total dropped exponentially, his free-throw attempts were cut in half, and he resorted to shooting jumpers against Davis for much of the game.
Look at the clip below (timestamp 7:51). Davis is able to give a cushion because of Butler’s struggle to make three-point shots, though Davis stays close enough to potentially help out on a dribble handoff to Tyler Herro.
This game was a defensive masterpiece from Davis, and his ability to deter Butler at the rim was crucial to L.A.’s Game 4 victory.
In Game 5, Butler countered his matchup with Davis mostly by forcing mismatches in isolation and partly by taking advantage of a hobbled AD. After a 35–12–11 triple-double, it was time for another change.
The Lakers solution (which was credited to Rajon Rondo) was decidedly old-school: L.A. applied full-court pressure on Butler for the entirety of Game 6, wearing out an already exhausted Butler.
LeBron drew the assignment of Butler for most of the first half, but even players like Rajon Rondo were allowed to guard Butler because of their ability to pressure the ball. Once again, Vogel was maximizing his team’s skillsets.
Perhaps equally important was Vogel’s decision to start Alex Caruso in place of Dwight Howard, whose lack of lateral quickness relative to Bam Adebayo had become an issue. The lineup change moved Davis to center, and he wrecked havoc in Game 6 because he is one of the few big men who can defend the rim and play passing lanes.
When James said the Lakers deserved their “damn respect” after the Game 6 victory, giving L.A. their 17th championship in franchise history, he wasn’t lying: L.A. was the most versatile and effective defense all season, yet their “Hollywood” status often overshadows the grit, determination, and wisdom that they showed as a team throughout 2020.
WHEN LeBRON JAMES and Anthony Davis went down with debilitating injuries in the middle of this season, with a high ankle sprain and Achilles tendinosis/calf strain respectively, these Lakers were supposed to bottom out.
Scenarios of the team falling to the play-in range, having to face the Clippers in the first round, or even potentially missing the playoffs were all discussed. And while some of these scenarios are still possible, L.A. has held its own without two of the best players in the NBA.
There are no secrets about how L.A. is grinding out these wins (roughly a .500 record without James or Davis) — their winning formula, as always, is their defense.
Despite L.A.’s offense being a disaster at times, they have also held their opponents under 100 points multiple times.
In April alone (as of April 16th), L.A. has maintained its defense without James (who went down on March 20th), as they have only given up 104.4 points per game to their opponents. Their defensive rating on the season, at 106.0, remains as first in the NBA.
Familiar faces like Alex Caruso, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, and Markieff Morris have all held their own this season, posting positive defensive box plus/minus ratings, while new additions like Dennis Schröder and Andre Drummond have been solid as well.
L.A.’s success is made even more impressive given the fact that they don’t practice: between COVID-19 testing and a grueling schedule, the Lakers cannot afford to force their veteran-laden team to practice on off days. The fact that the #1 ranked defensive team in the NBA only relies on film is nothing short of remarkable.
Drummond, in particular, has impressed with his mobility and pick and roll defense, even if his vertical rim protection and offensive game leaves much to be desired.
If the Lakers win the championship, this stretch of games will be lost in history. But it shouldn’t be, given the rarity of a team holding its own without two bona-fide superstar players — and L.A.’s success during this stretch is all because of their defense.
“We just want our respect. Rob wants his respect. Coach Vogel wants his respect. Organization want their respect. Lakers Nation wants their respect. And I want my damn respect too.”
— LeBron James after winning the 2020 NBA Finals
IF THE LAKERS are going to win a championship this season, their defense is going to have to be their hallmark once again. There are other contenders with more superstar power, more creative offensives, and more depth.
But L.A. can mitigate almost all of its warts come playoff time with their defense.
Their consistent commitment to smothering ball-handlers, playing help defense, and trying new strategies in playoff series is one of the reasons why they should still, in all likelihood, be considered the favorites to win it all again.
No other team has shown the same fluidity and versatility in the NBA, and that ability to play multiple styles is a key trait to have in the postseason.
Of course, L.A. has a tough test ahead. The Clippers are a sleeping giant who are quietly posting remarkable offensive production with two lower tier MVP candidates, even if they still haven’t harnessed their defensive potential, the Bucks have started varying their strategies in an effort to be more versatile, and the Brooklyn Nets have the greatest collection of scoring talent ever seen.
If all goes right for Frank Vogel and the Lakers though, with health being the biggest question about their team, then once again, as the old adage says, defense will win the championship.
