Where Do the San Antonio Spurs Go From Here?
The NBA’s most successful team over the past two decades now looks as vulnerable as ever
F OR DECADES NOW, the San Antonio Spurs have prided themselves on one thing: culture.
Culture is a beautiful word to describe them, as it explains all of their incredibly prolonged success.
Culture is how the Spurs transitioned from Davis Robinson to Tim Duncan while adding Tony Parker and Manu Ginóbili, and then passing the torch to Kawhi Leonard and LaMarcus Aldridge. It was a system, analysts said, a system that fostered individual greatness with the higher purpose of team success.
But entering a new decade, the Spurs’ smooth ability to transfer between stars and enter a new era has been halted to a stop.
Dejounte Murray was supposed to take over after Tony Parker, DeMar DeRozan was meant to fill the void left by Leonard, and LaMarcus Aldridge was supposed to man the forward/center spot previously held by Duncan.
San Antonio had a culture that was supposed to make them contenders even after Popovich retired. There were always supposed to be light years ahead: getting steals in the draft, reviving the careers of older players, scouting extensively overseas, and transitioning from one home-grown star to another.
It is this optimism that made Murray a popular player in his short stint in the league and earned him a hefty contract extension, and it was this optimism in the Spurs’ culture that made general manager R.C. Buford want to trade for DeRozan instead of young players and future draft assets.
Yet, more than ever, it seems that the success of the Spurs was built on great individuals who were selfless — and decidedly not on a culture that has been consistently praised for getting the best out of players.
WHAT MAKES THE Spurs struggles so inexplicable is their success last season.
Their offense finished below average last season, but for large parts of the season, their offense was good to even great, relying on the mid-range dominance of their stars, DeRozan and Aldridge. As a team, they shot well from three and on two-pointers, while also limiting turnovers.
But it was a telling sign that the Spurs finished 18th in offense, despite strong seasons from their stars and role players alike.
In actuality, the Spurs defense was better than their offense, placing 12th overall. They didn’t have strong players overall on defense — glancing at their roster, their players often lack elite athleticism — but it was a testament to Popovich’s coaching and the players’ discipline that the Spurs were an above-average defense.
And this was meant to be a transition season, with Murray out for the season after injuring his knee in preseason. So it was extremely welcoming to see the Spurs nearly win 50 games again, finishing 7th in the West while having other players like Bryn Forbes and Derrick White get the opportunity to develop. They finished at 48–34, a strong record overall.
In the first round, they nearly toppled the upstart Denver Nuggets, losing in 7 games. They used their experience to halt the Nuggets’ young stars, though ultimately their lack of overall talent cost them as they lost Game 7 by 4 points.
But this season was supposed to be clarifying, it was supposed to serve as evidence that the Spurs identity and culture was well alive, and when they acquired new pieces, they would be even better in 2019–2020.
THE ROOTS OF the Spurs’ problems began in July, with the beginning of one of the most hectic free agency periods ever.
To bolster their front-court — an area of need ever since Aldridge moved to center — the Spurs pursued Marcus Morris, who was coming off a terrific season with the Boston Celtics the season prior. Verbally agreeing to two-year, $20 million deal, the Spurs had him.
But there was a catch.
First, the Spurs traded Davis Bertans, a promising sharpshooter whom they had found from overseas. Secondly, Morris had a falling out with his agent Rich Paul of Klutch Sports — a move which preceded his back-stabbing of the Spurs.
So when Morris signed a one-year, $15 million deal with the Knicks, now the Spurs had to backtrack, eventually signing Trey Lyles, who had fallen out of the rotation in Denver.
But having either Bertans or Morris, both of whom are decidedly better than the aging Rudy Gay and the un-athletic Lyles, would provide a huge contribution to this Spurs team.
Outside of the draft, the Spurs’ second acquisition was DeMarre Caroll, whom they signed to a 3 year, $20.65 million contract. Caroll was revitalized in Brooklyn, showing the 3&D abilities that made him so coveted from his days in Atlanta.
Yet inexplicably, Popovich has refused to play him — even though Caroll’s skillset of guarding wings and shooting threes is very simple — and now Caroll sits on the bench every game. It has been mentioned that Caroll needs to learn the system in San Antonio, but with the Spurs’ horrific record this far, citing a system as a reason why a player can’t play is inexcusable.
But none of this would matter if Popovich had a true superstar. His supposed stars in DeRozan and Aldridge, however, have not lived up to their billing.
DeRozan is having a conflicting season. He is shooting mid-range shots, the primary offensive tool he relies upon, at the best percentage of his career. Yet, his refusal to shoot three-pointers and his decline in playmaking has hampered the Spurs. And with DeRozan being a limited scorer in Popovich’s egalitarian system of ball movement and cutting, it seems at times that he harms the Spurs as much as he helps them.
DeRozan’s defense has been passable at best, horrific at worst. And Popovich’s decision to move DeRozan to small forward has only compounded his issues. In fact, Popovich moving DeRozan and LaMarcus Aldridge down positions, to forward and center respectively, seems like an attempt to appease to analytic-forward crowd by making the Spurs a small-ball team.
But benching a player of DeRozan’s stature seems unthinkable — especially when considering that he was the centerpiece of the Kawhi Leonard trade for the Spurs.
So fans and analysts alike share a common solution: trade DeRozan.
But who will take on DeRozan? And more importantly, if the Spurs move on from the former All-Star, will they finally acknowledge that they need to acquire young talent, or will they continue to seek veteran players?
Also, history tells that the Spurs will not make a mid-season trade, as they have only done so 6 times ver the past 22 years.
On the surface, Aldridge is having another good season, especially given that he has finally accepted taking threes — and making them at a 43.8% clip. But his athleticism, which has been waning, is at an all-time low. This issue is compounded by him having to play at center.
Defensively, Aldridge had a revitalization in his earlier years with the Spurs as a rim protector, but those days are gone, and teams are feasting on the small size and lack of athleticism in the Spurs’ lineups.
And when Aldridge lines up at power forward, his natural position, it becomes nearly impossible to score with Jakob Poetl, DeRozan, Murray, and even Aldridge refusing to shoot threes.
Strangely, both DeRozan and Murray refuse to shoot threes, à la Ben Simmons. Murray’s offensive struggles lead to him being benched, and also Bryn Forbes being started as an undersized shooting guard simply because he can shoot.
In fact, San Antonio’s starting five — Murray, Forbes, DeRozan, Lyles, and Aldridge — are horrible defensively, and feature two players in Forbes and Lyles who aren’t starting-caliber players, but are on the floor for spacing.
Most disappointingly, the backcourt of Derrick White, who broke out in the playoffs, and Murray haven’t played many minutes together, as Popovich sought out combinations with better perimeter shooting.
“We’ve got to realize we are s — — defensively,” said DeRozan after another loss. “Plain and simple. We’re terrible. We have to take more pride in it.”
“It’s embarrassing. It’s embarrassing to lose this many games,” he added. “We’ve got to take pride in it, whatever that may be.”
THE SPURS MAY still have a bright future — though that is reliant on moving away from their veterans.
For as strong of a scouting department as they have, with the team consistently outperforming expectations (until this season), they have had to find lots of talent with sub-20 first-round picks and second-round picks. While they found some gems — Murray and White in particular — they need a true superstar to move on.
Because though Murray was heralded as the heir apparent to Tony Parker, that claim was as much a glorification of the “Spurs culture” and their player development program as it was a factual statement.
Murray is not talented enough to lead this team forward as a primary scoring option, and if Popovich can’t find time for him to play with White in the backcourt, then the Spurs will continue to cripple their future while racking up losses in the present.
The upcoming draft has some hit-or-miss prospects. Unless they bottom out by making mid-season trades, the Spurs likely will have a pick high enough to look at selecting Anthony Edwards, James Wiseman, or LaMelo Ball.
The Spurs will likely still get a good prospect, but watch out if that prospect is a backcourt player. With White, Murray, and the developing Lonnie Walker IV, the Spurs backcourt and their likely 6th-man of the future is set.
This season was meant to be competitive for the Spurs, a season that built on the upstart success of their previous squad. But instead, this season has proved, even more so than last season, to be a transition year — a year where they can decide how they want to shape their future.
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