Braver’s critique and the possibility of philosophical antropology

Braver in A Thing of This World mounts a critique of Heidegger which is interesting which is that although he attempts to avoid the essentialism of Kant with regard to the Categories he fails to do so with respect to Dasein, and thus he presents an essentialist account of the nature of dasein that appears more or less out of nowhere just like Kant does for objects.

However, I found a sentence toward the end of time that I think answers this criticism which says:

In terms of the possible ways in which primordial time can temporalize itself, we have provided ‘grounds’ for thos structurs which were pointed out in our earlier treatment [i.e. existentials]. Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of Desein’s Being remains only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general.

I take this to mean that the structure of Dasein is not essentialist but is in fact provisional as Heidegger keeps saying throughout the book.

This has implications for any anthropology. Foucault in the Order of Things talks about getting beyond Man as an idea. And I found a passage in B&T which suggests something similar.

Anthropology without Man as a central idea would be very different from the kind of anthropology we have now, even philosophical anthropologies. Part of the reason for using the term Dasein is in order to stop saying Man. Man as an idea carries a lot of baggage. It more or less assumes an answer to the question of Who we are. Heidegger seeks to displace us by asking about the meaning of Being and then saying that who ever we are we know the most about Being in an essential way, what ever Being might be.

I think Heidegger would say that our Anthropologies close off possibilities of who we might be before hand, and that is what he would like to avoid.