Not only that.

The second paragraph on page 2 goes like this:

Now what I want to highlight here is the idea that “Being is the most universal and emptiest of concepts” and also that the ancients philosophers found it “continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden” while today it is take to be obvious to everyone.

Now is a good time to say something that I continually harp on which is that “Being” is a uniquely Indo-European concept and that as far as is known it does not exist in any other language group beyond the Indo-Europeans. So even though it is obvious to us, it is not obvious how such a concept ever arose as a linguistic anomaly, and it is in the attempt to appreciate this anomaly what we can share the amazement of its obscurity and hidden nature with the ancient philosophers. But the fact that it is taken to be a Universal is in conflict with the fact that it is instead an anomaly, a singular as Kant would say. But also it is very insightful, and Heidegger makes much of this in other works, that it is in fact empty, or No Thing. The difference between the ontic and ontology is that in Ontology “Being” what ever it is, is not a thing, and is in fact empty of thinghood. And so the emptiness of Being is part of its mystery. Hegel points this out in his Logic where his first two categories are Being and Nothing, and in which he identifies Nothing with what the Buddhists call Emptiness. It is for this reason that I believe Nietzsche has no excuse for following Schopenhauer in misinterpreting Buddhism as being nihilistic. Buddhism by its own account is precisely the avoidance of the extremes of SAT and ASAT, of Being and Nothing as Non-Being. Heidegger on the other hand interprets No Thing of Being as thinglessness, not emptiness in the Buddhist sense. However, some like Parkes thinks that there are Asian roots for his innovations in Philosophy.

Amazon.com: Heidegger and Asian Thought (National Foreign Language Center Technical Reports) (9780824813123): Graham Parkes: Books