U.S.-Europe relations in the wake of Trump
In Brussels in December 2018 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo addressed an assembled crowd of European diplomats, officials and press. In a short speech — euphemistically entitled “Reforming the Rules-Based International Order” — Pompeo disparaged a range of multilateral institutions, from UN bodies on climate change and human rights to the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund. Amid attacking the institutional pillars of the post-World War II order that the U.S. did so much to create and that previous administrations held so dear, Pompeo questioned whether the EU was simply a vehicle for the interests of bureaucrats. His speech drew several audible rebukes from people in the room.
Brussels crowds are not known for their interjections, and the light smattering of applause at the end showed just how the talk was received. For many watching, Pompeo’s speech epitomised their concerns about the Trump administration; the following year and a half has done nothing to assuage those fears. Support for multilateral institutions has been almost abandoned by the White House, while relations with erstwhile allies have seriously frayed.
It did not escape the attention of many in the room that Pompeo’s Brussels speech happened in the same venue as one by his predecessor John Kerry two years earlier. An all-round more positive and well-received affair, the two speeches (and their respective receptions) highlight both the hopes and fears many Europeans hold ahead of the 2020 elections: hopes that a Democrat administration is installed and the ties that bind Washington and Europe are restored; fears of another four years of the Trump administration and further degradation of the Transatlantic alliance.
The European desire to see the White House turn blue in November is based primarily on the stances of the respective potential administrations to the global order. The Trump presidency has shifted America’s international involvement, preferring bilateral engagement to the multilateralism of previous Presidents. It is precisely this multilateralism, while messy, that has kept large parts of Europe safe, stable and prosperous for 50 years. It is also the foundational principle of the EU; though much aligned, the body is still thought of as the vehicle to best protect its member nations interests and to have a positive influence on the outside world.
The Trump presidency — based unashamedly on the idea of “America First” — has sat uneasily with many on the other side of the Atlantic. Trump has a transactional vision of the world, where much is measured by the financial value of relationships. His preference is for bilateral deals where the balance of power is firmly in Washington’s hands. This has clashed against a Europe for which the idea that “might makes right” is — for historical, practical and geopolitical reasons — anathema. It is only through the messy multilateralism that the collection of small states that Europe encompasses can have a global voice.
Alongside an aversion to a multi-polar international order, America’s foreign policy decisions across the world has shaken much of Europe, forcing leaders on the continent to recalibrate their preferred path in response to U.S. actions. Snap decisions taken on a whim, such as in North East Syria, combine with long anticipated moves, such as the abandonment of the Iran deal. Traditional allies and partners have been left angered and scrabbling for adequate responses. As a result, the U.S. has alienated itself, prompting previous stalwart supporters to reassess their relationships and distance themselves from Washington.
This list of instances of where the White House has fractured the Transatlantic relationship is long: Washington has shown little interest in the concern in parts of Europe with Russian President Putin’s expansionist policy in the wake of the annexation of Crimea in 2014; Trump has undermined regional security structures, questioning whether it was worth defending “tiny country” and NATO-ally Montenegro were it to be invaded; he has embraced nationalist, authoritarian, Euro-sceptical leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán; and the White House has used the threat of financial weapons to impose policy on security issues — hardly the most collaborative way to treat partners.
All this boils down to an antagonistic attitude the US has taken towards Europe. Under Trump, America has positioned the EU as not a partner, but as a strategic competitor. In July 2018, Trump described the EU as a “foe on trade”, drawing a swift rebuke from the body. But the labelling of a vital international ally as a “foe” perfectly illustrated the crux of Donald Trump’s global world view; every actor is motivated by pure self-interest, and international relations is a zero-sum game where if one nation “wins”, the others must surely “lose”.
It is not that the EU-U.S. relationship before Trump faced no difficulties. In 2003 for example, there were considerable contentions over the coalition invasion of Iraq. But problems and differences arose within a framework and a basic understanding that underlined that Europe’s and the U.S.’ overall strategic interests were aligned and compatible, not mutually exclusive. Even if Pompeo’s trip to Brussels in September 2019 aimed at “resetting” the relationship illustrated that some in the White House are at least aware of the difficulties, Trump’s tweet the very same day complaining of EU trade practices showed that no reset will be possible while the very top of the administration sees enemies where others saw friends.
Although a Democrat administration voted in this November would heal some of the divide, the U.S. is unlikely to be received as before. With Trump, something fundamental has changed in the trans-Atlantic relationship, at least for the near future. European governments and citizens acknowledge they can no longer rely on the U.S. as they used to believe was possible; leaders on the continent including Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron have said as much. This could be starkest in the realm of security. A much-debated future step is the possibility of greater European integration on defence, which could side-line NATO. Of course, Washington has for many years hoped Europe would take a greater security burden. However, with the relationship as it currently stands, any belief that a future European defence body would align closely with the U.S. is starkly misplaced.
The post-Cold War consensus has fractured in many ways, but perhaps none as significant as Europe’s questioning of its partnership with the U.S.. Despite this, the election of a Democrat president — or, to borrow from a now dominant refrain, anyone but Trump — would go some way to thawing what is now an icy Atlantic.
Europeans will be pleased that the most likely alternative to Trump is Joe Biden, the presumptive Democrat nominee. Reports from before the Democrat primaries suggested some European leaders had urged Biden to run, citing the former Vice-President’s long-time commitment to the Transatlantic partnership. Biden is evidently comfortable in multilateral settings. Well versed in the ideas of international relations, Biden is highly regarded in the capital of Europe, having spoken to the European Parliament in 2010, where he remarked that the U.S.-Europe relationships was “as strong and as important” as it had ever been. European officials also believe the wider Democrat administration would be more conducive to cooperation and have similar rhetoric, policymaking style and stances on issues such as climate change and multilateralism. There will of course be points of departure — perhaps notably over trade and China — but the crucial aspect will be the understanding that compromises can be made and that neither side is inherently inimical to the other.
The list of who may take Pompeo’s place should a Democrat administration be installed also inspires a sense of reversal of the Trump years. If much of Trump’s political mission was to undo the work of President Obama, the advertising of Obama-era officials for the position of Secretary of State offers a promise to heal some of the wounds and will soothe European tensions. John Kerry stands out on the list of Pompeo’s potential successors, as does former Ambassador to the UN and National Security Advisor Susan Rice. Outside of such big names, options such as Connecticut Senator Chris Murphy have been touted.
However the name of the office holder will not matter much to those in Europe’s governing halls. If the future U.S. government does not appear as hostile to their worldview as the current one does, or as dismissive of the ideas of international cooperation, they will be welcomed. Perhaps there will be no heckles the next time a Secretary of State has a speech in Brussels.
