South Korea vs Poland 3/27

In the last match of the March international break, South Korea faced #6 ranked Poland. Led by the Bayern Munich striker Robert Lewandoski, Poland took a 2–0 lead in the first half. The second half brought forth a dramatic finish as two South Korea goals by substitutes Lee Chang Min and Hwang Hee Chang in what seemed to be an epic comeback, was ultimately stymied by a last minute finish by Piotr Zielinski resulting in a 3–2 defeat.

Starting Lineup: Kim Sung Gyu (1), Kim Min Jae (20), Jang Hyung Soo (5), Hong Jeong Ho (19), Lee Yong (2), Park Joo Ho (12), Ki Sung Yueng (4C), Jung Woo Young (13), Kwon Chang Hoon (22), Son Heung Min (11), Lee Jae Sung (8).

Formation: 3–4–3

1st Half

For the match against Poland, coach Shin Tae Yong used a 3–4–3 formation (although tactically the formation looked more like a 5–2–3/5–4–1) instead of the usual 4–4–2. Against a stronger attacking team, Shin chose to absorb Poland’s attacking pressure while relying on his front three (Lee, Son, and Kwon) to attack with the counter. However, both offensively and defensively, this formation proved ineffective with Korea producing only three shots and conceding two goals in the first half.

Defensively Korea used a 5–4–1 formation.

Defending in a 5–4–1, Korea chose to absorb pressure on their own half rather than applying pressure onto Poland’s back line. This allowed Poland to transition up the field smoothly, giving full backs the time and space to find their midfield players further up Korea’s side of the field. The main probelm with Korea’s defensive tactic was the failure to maintain an organized back line when Poland received possession in wide areas. It comes down to positioning and shifting. In theory, when Poland receives the ball in a wide area the back line should shift appropriately: The wing back checks to the ball, fullbacks shift to cover one another, and the opposite wing back tucks in to continue to provide width while also covering the flanking space. However, when Poland received possession wide on the field, the wing back would check to ball, but the full backs failed to shift appropriately leaving too big of a gap between wing back and full back. The back three were far too condensed and far too occupied with covering Robert Lewandowski. As a result, dangerous spaces were left open between and behind our back line. And situations where Korea lost possession in the midfield led to goals.

Defensive shape: How Korea looked defensively vs how they should be positioned.

Offensively, due to Poland’s high pressure, Korea found themselves unable to find their rhythm and unable to maintain possession. We were poor in transition and our wing backs failed to get forward. In a 3–4–3, the wing backs are the players responsible for providing the team’s width. This allows the two side forwards (Lee and Kwon) to occupy more central spaces thus allowing the central striker (Son) more support once on the ball. The idea is that because there is always three in the back, wing backs can and must attack as a box to box player. Because Korea defended in a 5–4–1 formation it is essential that they transition quickly in order to have numbers going forward. However, because Poland applied high pressure and closed spaces quickly, Korea found it difficult to string a combination of passes beyond the half line and thus ineffective in transition. Wing backs often received the ball too low on the pitch forcing the forwards to come down to our half of the field to receive the ball and in turn, forcing the striker to receive the ball far too in front of the oppositions full backs. In other words, our attacking players were getting the ball in unideal spaces.

On both occasions, forward Son Heung Min receives the ball in difficult spaces and is quickly closed down by the Polish defense.

In one of the few situations where Korea transitioned well — wing backs got forward, midfielders pressed up, and forwards positioned directly up against the opposition’s defensive line — forward Lee Jae Sung was able to make a more central run behind the fullbacks and was met with a dangerous ball that split the defenders and led directly to a shot on goal.

But too often wing backs failed to provide the width needed for the forwards to receive the ball in advantageous spaces. The majority of Korea’s possession was within our own half and both our midfielders and defenders had difficulty finding our forwards in open spaces going forward. This resulted in the use of ineffective long lofted passes to try and play Son Heung Min into spaces behind Poland’s back line.

2nd Half

The match began to change for Korea toward the end of the first half. Hwang Hee Chan came onto to the pitch and Shin switched the formation to the familiar 4–4–2. The two big differences that came with the change were pressure and shape. From the get go Hwang applied immense pressure onto the opposing back line which resulted in Polish turnovers. With the newly added pressing, Polish defenders found it difficult to build from the back. In the second half, the Korea applied pressure together as a team and Poland’s midfielders struggled to find their rhythm while Korea transitioned more effectively. The second half saw Korea take 13 shots (compared to just three in the first half) two of which resulted in goals.

Match Takeaways

1. Korea’s formation for the World Cup should be a 4–4–2 and only a 4–4–2.
2. The most appropriate striker for the current team is Hwang Hee Chan.
3. Individually our full backs are not the most technically gifted, but we should not concede due to issues with shape and positioning.