Post Iran nuclear deal

The post-JCPOA environment in the Middle East and its geopolitical repercussions: an Arab Gulf perspective

By Dr. Abdulaziz Sager
Chairman, Gulf Research Center

  • This article was originally published as part of the 2018 edition of Bled Strategic Times, the official gazzette of the Bled Strategic Forum (BSF) international conference. You can access the full version of this and other BSF publications by visiting our official website.

For the states that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), the decision of the U.S. Trump Administration to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Iran nuclear deal, as it is more commonly known, did not come as a surprise. For one, President Trump voiced his displeasure with the accord even during the presidential campaign, and kept up the pressure for significant improvement to the deal after assuming office. In addition, the GCC states voiced similar concerns over the terms of the nuclear agreement and found themselves largely in agreement with the new administration in Washington. While not urging President Trump to completely withdraw from the JCPOA, they nevertheless argued that significant improvements and adjustments to the accord where required if the long-term security of the region was to be assured. As it stood, the general feeling in the U.S. and the Arab Gulf was that the JCPOA contributed to greater insecurity in the Middle East rather than promoting its stability.

At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that despite not being included in the official negotiations, the GCC member states were supportive of the nuclear negotiations process. This is reflected in statements such as those of the GCC Foreign Ministers who officially pronounced on August 3, 2015 that “once fully implemented, the JCPA will contribute to the region’s long-term security, including by preventing Iran from developing or acquiring a military nuclear capability.” GCC Secretary-General Abdul Latif Al-Zayani also let it be known that: “We, in the GCC, support the legitimate right of states, including Iran, to have nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But, at the same time, we are opposed to other options that could affect regional security and stability.”

There is a deep conviction among the Arab Gulf states that a political and diplomatic solution to the issue of nuclear proliferation is clearly preferable to further escalation of the crisis. For the GCC, war has never been an option for resolving Iran’s nuclear case. This is because there exists a complete understanding what havoc and destruction another conflict would create in the region. At the same time, the decision by the U.S. to ultimately withdraw from the nuclear deal was grounded in many of the same fundamental reservations that the GCC states held about the deal itself. These included:

  1. A strong conviction that it was sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table and that with the pressure now off, Iran would soon prove intransigent once again, when it came to the resolution of other regional issues. This could be clearly demonstrated by the case of Syria, where Iran had not contributed to finding a peaceful solution in the past 3 years.
  2. There is a strong belief that Iran continues to be intent on pursuing military nuclear capabilities and that Iran will use the time of the agreement, in particular the so called ‘sunset clauses’ to enhance its capabilities and pursue its research activities. A key question remains what would happen after the agreement expires. The Obama administration’s point and hope that the deal would bring about a change in Iranian behavior was largely seen as being naïve — after all, the Iranian revolution has been around for almost 40 years. There was also a concern about what would happen in ten years when a new generation of Iranian leaders — i.e. those coming out of the Iran-Iraq War who tend to be more hard-line, take over power in Tehran. No one in the GCC states wants a return to the Ahmadinejad years.
  3. Finally, there was the conviction that the sanctions relief associated with the nuclear deal would be used by Iran to bolster its interventionist policy in the region, including through further support of proxy groups that promote a sectarian agenda. In particular, this includes the continued mobilization of Hizbullah in support of the Syrian government of Bashar Al-Assad; the support for hundreds of Shia militias in Iraq that have prevented the process of reconciliation and unification in Iraq from proceeding forward; and the assistance provided to the Houthi militia in Yemen, in particular, the supply of ballistic missile material that has been used to attack targets inside Saudi Arabia and the use of which has been threatened against other GCC states.

Taken together, Iran’s interventionist policies throughout the region are seen in the GCC states not as something temporary, but rather as a “fixed” policy that is aimed directly at undermining the stability of neighboring countries. In this context, the continuation of the JCPOA in its current form would have simply extended an umbrella for Iran to continue with its activities without any consequences.

The key problem here has been that the signatories of the agreement have failed to use the period since the deal was signed in 2015 to continue negotiations towards a more comprehensive accord with Iran that addresses regional security priorities and deals with other concerns outside the nuclear domain. Instead of using the JCPOA as a stepping stone to draw Iran into further discussions about a regional security process, the focus remained on the nuclear issue only. This, in turn, ultimately undermined the agreement as a whole, and left the region in a volatile and unstable situation, given the uncertainty over what comes next.

To be sure, the regional security environment in the post-JCPOA era is only one of the many political challenges with which the Middle East finds itself confronted. Other items include the need to bring the many current war and conflict situations to peaceful resolutions the most obvious being Syria, Libya and Yemen. There is also the continued challenge of state decay and failure alongside the rise of violent non-state actors as a component contributing to the “failed state phenomenon.” Yemen is a clear example of this, where the Houthis have been allowed to uproot a legitimate government. Thus, an effort must be made to bring the state back and to support the strengthening of state institutions as a way to re-establish domes-tic security and stability. Finally, the issue of external involvement in Middle Eastern affairs needs to be addressed, given the fact that external actors always come with their own agendas, which most often do not correspond with the needs and requirements of local communities. This includes the current Russian role in Syria, but also concerns the United States as it develops a strategy vis-à-vis Iran. To counterbalance such policies, the European Union would be strongly advised to engage all actors in the region in a comprehensive dialogue that takes the local security interests seriously. In the end, security can come from the outside, but can only be guaranteed by the forces on the inside.

Where Europe can be consequential is in defining what the post-JCPOA environment must look like if a further downward spiral into violence and instability is to be avoided in the region. As far as Iran is concerned, four scenarios are possible at this moment: acceptance of the new conditions imposed on it and readiness to strike a new deal; rising domestic pressure caused by the inability to reform the Iranian domestic economy, resulting in increased repression by the state and an overall heightened sense of insecurity; intervention by Russia and China to offer themselves as alternatives to the U.S. policy, resulting in increased great power competition, including a disregard for regional security needs; and finally, sudden military escalation due to an unforeseen event or unexpected confrontation that could spiral out of control, given undefined rules of engagement and the limited conflict management capabilities in place. Given that the first scenario is unlikely, the other three would add additional pressure on top of the already tense situation. The key question at this stage involves the readiness of Europe to get involved and offer an alternative path. Given the fact that Europe is directly impacted by the stability of the Middle East, it would appear to be a question of not if but when.


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Bled Strategic Forum

The official Medium publication of Bled Strategic Forum (BSF) — a platform for high-level strategic dialogue among leaders from private & public sector. Organised by the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Centre for European Perspective (CEP).

Bled Strategic Forum

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A platform for high-level strategic dialogue among leaders from private & public sector. Organised by Slovenian MFA & Centre for European Perspective (CEP).

Bled Strategic Forum

The official Medium publication of Bled Strategic Forum (BSF) — a platform for high-level strategic dialogue among leaders from private & public sector. Organised by the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Centre for European Perspective (CEP).

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