The UN’s role during Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971
Notes from then UN Secretary General, U Thant’s Autobiography
2021 is a landmark year for Bangladesh as it marks 50 years of independence after the glorious Liberation War of 1971. Hence, it is also an occasion to revisit Bangladesh’s history, specifically the year 1971. While I was interning at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York City, I had access to the vast archives of the UN library. I was curious to know more about UN’s role during Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971. Hence, I started reading and researching the archived meeting notes, internal briefings and books written by authors who were part of UN’s leadership in 1971. I came across the former UN secretary general, U Thant’s autobiography, who was the Secretary General (SG) of the UN from 1961 till 1971, including the period of Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971.
On 17 September 1974, Bangladesh became a full member of the United Nations (UN). Since then, Bangladesh has become an important member of the UN, being one of the largest troops contributing countries to the UN peacekeeping missions. It has already been elected to the security council once and the human rights council four times. But what role did the UN play during the liberation struggle of Bangladesh in 1971?
Perhaps surprisingly, not much has been written about this topic so far and Bangladeshi people are largely unaware of the history of the 1971 liberation war, from the UN’s perspective. The United Nations (UN) is the centre of global diplomacy. Hence, there is no better place to look into other than the UN, if we want to know about the history of international diplomacy concerning Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971.
Mr. U Thant was the Secretary General (SG) during the period of Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971. In his book “View from the UN”, he details his decade of experience in the “cockpit of world tensions”, according to his introduction to the book. In the book he also intended to reveal key features of his private actions and conversations with heads of states and governments, and other important actors. Hence, his book can provide important insights into UN deliberations regarding the 1971 war, from the SG’s viewpoint. In particular, Mr. Thant dedicates an entire chapter (specifically chapter XX) to this episode of history, named “The Birth of Bangla Desh” in his memoir. The history and opinion described below is entirely from the view point and interpretation of Mr. Thant.
The Trigger and the Deeper Cause
First, Mr. Thant states the existence of turmoil and tensions between the Indian and Pakistani governments since the partition. He notes the February 1971 incidence of hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight from Srinagar (Kashmir) to Lahore (West Pakistan). The aircraft was ultimately blown up in Lahore and the Indian government banned all flights of Pakistani civilian aircraft over India. Pakistan accused India of having engineered the hijacking of the plane to provide the grounds (or excuse) for overflight ban that would further increase difficulties between the two wings of Pakistan. Five years after the Tashkent declaration which ended the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the two rivals were dangerously close to an all-out conflict again.
Mr. Thant was informed on March 26th, 1971 that a news dispatch from Calcutta stated that “Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, President of the Awami League, proclaimed this Friday the independence of East Pakistan, which becomes the Popular Republic of Bangla Desh.” In the next few days, there were reports of “massive massacres” of Bengalis committed by the Pakistani army. According to Mr. Thant, the immediate cause of the conflict was the December 1970 election which was won by the leader of the more populous East Pakistan’s secessionist party Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. However, the deeper cause was the split between “the Punjabis of West Pakistan and the Bengalis of the more populous East Pakistan.” The votes reflected this difference as all seats allocated to East Pakistan in the unicameral national assembly was won by the Awami League and all seats in West Pakistan was won by Pakistan People’s Party (headed by Mr. Bhutto, then foreign minister of Pakistan).
Soon after the election, there was a constitutional crisis as the two major parties had disagreements regarding some central issues of the new constitution to be drafted. According to Mr. Thant, President Yahya Khan postponed the Assembly scheduled to meet in March to draft the constitution and arrange the transfer of power to the national assembly, to give the major parties time to reach an agreement. However, the Awami League strongly protested such a move and demanded full autonomy for East Pakistan, which the West Pakistani leaders were not prepared to accept. This sparked massive protests in East Pakistan and Mr. Thant notes “there was no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the people of East Pakistan were for complete independence”.
Given the situation, according to Mr. Thant, then Pakistan President Yahya Khan was convinced that what Awami League wanted was not autonomy, but secession. He ordered the Pakistan army to “maintain law and order” and banned all political activities and issued martial law regulations. From then on, due to press censorship, it was difficult to get authoritative news out of East Pakistan, but Mr. Thant soon came to know about ruthless killing of unarmed civilians by the Pakistani army. By the end of March, hundreds of thousands of people were fleeing East Pakistan to India, imposing a tremendous burden on the Indian government. But the Indian government kept its door open. On the other hand, Pakistan accused India of inciting the Bengalis to rise up against Pakistan and alleged that the Bengali ‘freedom fighters’ were receiving military training on the Indian soil.
“Extraordinary Apathy of the Security Council”
Despite the growing concern of the SG and the worsening situation in the South Asian subcontinent, Mr. Thant notes that there was “extraordinary apathy of the security council”, the body of the UN with the primary responsibility of preserving international peace and security. The apathy was due to two reasons: firstly, India and Pakistan did not want any action by the United Nations and Pakistan claimed that the situation in East Pakistan was an “internal affair” outside the purview of the UN. Secondly, the permanent members of the Security council concurred that the conflict was an internal affair and hence did not support call for a meeting. As situation deteriorated over time and the UN was standing helplessly on the side, Security Council meetings were still out of the question, especially given the strong opposition of the Soviet Union. This apathy existed despite the revelation by the Pakistani army in late October that they were engaged in heavy fighting in East Pakistan, against “Indians and Indian agents.”
Mr. Thant considered invoking Article 99 of the UN charter, under which the SG can bring any matter to the attention of the council, if it is considered a threat to world peace. However, he decided against doing so because the council members most likely would not have even held a meeting, and even if they did, no agenda could have been adopted, given Pakistan’s insistence that the conflict was an internal matter and hence, international peace was not involved. Mr. Thant believed that he would have been accused of invoking Article 99 on a “false” premise, which would have jeopardized his utility as a mediator in the future. Despite the context, he not only remained in touch with both India and Pakistan, but also tried to discuss the situation with council members individually, most of whom refused to even do so.
Eventually after four months, on July 20th 1971, the SG distributed a confidential memorandum to the council members regarding the conflict in East Pakistan and the warning that it can ensue a bigger conflict encompassing the entire subcontinent, which will jeopardize world peace. Hence, by this rare implied invocation of Article 99, the SG urged the Security Council (SC) to take action. Despite this warning, the SC met more than four months after the warning to discuss the issue, on 4 December 1971, and even then, was unable to reach any consensus over the basic facts of the conflict.
The “unusual and secret” step by the UN Secretary General
Outside the formal deliberations of the UN, the SG took “unusual and secret” steps to bring about a political solution to the conflict by mediating between President Khan and the Awami league. In April, Mr. Thant had written a secret letter to Mr. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia and a man who had immense political prestige in the Islamic world. The SG believed that Mr. Rahman would be the most qualified negotiator in the conflict, as he was a friend of the late Jawaharlal Nehru, as well as President Yahya Khan, and at that time, he was also the secretary general of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. On the request of the SG, Mr. Rahman replied on May 3rd and accepted the responsibility to secretly work to bring about a political solution in East Pakistan. Mr. Thant and Mr. Rahman also agreed that their correspondence should remain secret, even from the leaders of India and Pakistan.
On July 17, Mr. Rahman succeeded in contacting President Khan and was proceeding to East Pakistan to make an on-the-spot study of the situation. On July 23rd, the SG received another letter from Mr. Rahman, where he outlined his plans to get the two leaders- President Khan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi together. However, ultimately this effort did not succeed. On September 7th, the SG received a secret report from Mr. Rahman, which said, in part, “We are unable to visit West Bengal in India because of India’s objection to the inclusion of the representatives of the Islamic conference.” It concluded, “I have also sent an appeal to President Yahya Khan to exercise clemency if Mujibur Rahman is found guilty of the offence for which he is charged.”
The Importance of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Fate for a Political Solution
The leader of Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was reportedly captured in Dhaka by the Pakistani military in March, during the barbaric military crackdown. However, nobody knew about his fate, whether he was dead or alive, and if alive, where he was detained. President Yahya Khan reacted furiously whenever he was asked by foreign diplomats (including friendly diplomats) and journalists, publicly and privately, about the fate of Sheikh Mujib. Mr. Thant notes that he and other representatives at the UN thought it was absolutely imperative to have Sheikh Mujib alive, because without his cooperation, a political solution to the conflict in East Pakistan was deemed impossible. Hence, he states “His fate was therefore a matter of extraordinary interest among the representatives at the UN.” Therefore, Mr. Thant sent a confidential letter under his personal seal to the President in August, making a personal request to keep Sheikh Mujib unharmed. However, President Khan never responded to the SG or to the various other appeals made by several governments privately.
Mr. Thant notes that he later learned that Sheikh Mujib was alive and his trial began on August 11, but the location and proceedings were secret. On August 20, it was published in the news that he was charged with “waging war against Pakistan.” After that, nothing more was heard about the trial.
The Beginning of the End: India — Pakistan All-out War
On November 23, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan declared a national emergency and alerted the whole country for an all-out war. At that time, Mr. Thant was in the hospital with a recurrence of a stomach ulcer. Right after he was discharged, on November 29, Indian ambassador Samar Sen met with him at his residence and informed him that the fighting in border areas have intensified. On November 30, Mr. Thant was also visited by the Soviet Union ambassador Yakob Malik, who told him that the basic problem in South Asia, from their perspective, was the implementation of self-determination of East Pakistan and the transfer of power to the Awami League. By December 2nd, the Indians were reported to have deployed seven military divisions around East Pakistan, while Pakistan had assembled a force of about 10,000 irregular troops in Jammu and Kashmir.
On December 3rd, the all-out war between India and Pakistan broke out with air battles. Pakistani planes carried out repeated raids on eleven Indian air bases and two other military targets, while Indian bombers attacked targets in Karachi. Air raid sirens wailed in Rawalpindi and other West Pakistani cities. The same day at 5 pm, the Security Council finally met in an emergency session. However, over the next few days, no resolution could be passed because of the disagreement between the big powers. As a result, most of the resolutions were vetoed. There was bitter clash between the Soviet Union and China, each taking the side of India and Pakistan respectively. Soviet Union asked to invite representatives of Bangladesh to address the council, which was strongly opposed by China. Meanwhile, there were also acrimonious exchanges between Indian and Pakistani ambassadors, with India charging Pakistan with “genocide” and Pakistan charging India with the aggressive attempt to break-up Pakistan. It was clear from the beginning that India would not agree to a cease-fire and withdrawal.
On December 6, India recognized “The People’s Republic of Bangladesh”. On that day, when the Security Council met for the third consecutive day, it finally acknowledged its incapacity to deal with the conflict, given the conflict among the Big Powers. As a result, Ambassador A.A. Farah of Somalia, under the “Uniting for peace” resolution, moved that the question of Bangladesh be referred to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. That resolution was adopted in 1950 in regard to the Korean question (break up of Korea to North and South Korea), which states that if the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain international peace, the General Assembly should consider the matter immediately. This resolution was previously used in several instances such as the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. To pass this resolution, nine of the fifteen Council members or the majority of the members of the UN have to vote affirmative, and no Security Council veto is permitted. When the vote was taken in the Council at about 11 pm, eleven voted in favor and four abstained. The main reason of abstentions was that the General Assembly has no power of enforcement under the UN charter, unlike the Security Council. Hence, simply passing this issue to the Assembly would not result in an enforceable solution to the conflict.
On December 7, the General Assembly approved a resolution urging India and Pakistan to a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. The vote was 104 in favor, 11 against, and 10 abstentions. India, the Soviet Union and other East European countries were the ones voting against it. Thus, according to Mr. Thant, this resolution clearly signalled a “political and diplomatic defeat for India” and emphasized the isolation of India and the Soviet Union. However, a General Assembly Resolution does not imply the same consequences and Indian officials did not feel bound by it.
Due to the war conditions forced the suspension of the UN food shipments to East Pakistani refugees in India. The International Committee of the Red Cross informed Paul-Marc Henry, who was the Secretary General’s representative in Dhaka, that the intensity of fighting and widespread killings impeded the humanitarian efforts. Mr. Thant informed the General Assembly before the voting took place, about the worsening developments in East Pakistan, and urged all parties to the conflict to take every possible measure to protect the lives of innocent civilians.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, on the same day (December 7) President Yahya Khan called on the Bengali politician Nurul Amin to become Pakistan’s first Prime Minister since 1958 (Mr. Amin was against the secession of East Pakistan) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the deputy prime minister and Foreign Minister. On December 9, Pakistan announced that it decided to accept the General Assembly’s call for a cease-fire. But Pakistan did not mention what it plans to do with the ten million refugees who had fled East Pakistan into India. Nothing was also said about the state of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of Awami League and the people of East Pakistan.
Mr. Thant received reports that the Indian troops were closing in on Dhaka and the Pakistani soldiers were retreating. Given the dangerous situation in Dhaka, Mr. Thant proposed to both India and Pakistan the establishment of neutral enclaves in Dhaka, for the safety of the foreigners. Arrangements were made for their evacuation. However, in West Pakistan, the Pakistani government continued to insist that its troops were holding fast in East Pakistan. On December 10, a Pakistani military spokesman finally conceded that Indian troops outnumbered Pakistani troops by six to one and the Indian troops were heading toward Dhaka, after successfully crossing the Meghna river. At this time, Mr. Thant came across multiple reports that Pakistani troops were killing Bengali civilians as they retreated and also specifically targeted Bengali intellectuals residing in Dhaka.
The Birth of Bangladesh
On December 12, the United States (US) requested the immediate convening of the Security Council based on the news that Indian troops had reached a small town within twenty-two miles from Dhaka and the capture of Dhaka was imminent. The Council met at 4 pm that day and the US ambassador George Bush (who later became the President of the US) tabled a draft resolution calling upon India to immediately accept a cease-fire and mutual withdrawal of forces. He criticized India for militarily intervening in East Pakistan and putting in jeopardy “the territorial integrity and political independence of its neighbor, Pakistan.” However, when the resolution was put to vote the next day, December 13, the Soviet Union vetoed it. The Soviet Union ambassador Mr. Malik explained that it had to veto the resolution because it did not include a call for a political settlement.
On December 14, the next meeting, the Council was visibly shifting its focus on a political settlement, as news reached to the UN that the civilian regional government in Dhaka, formed by the Pakistani military authorities, had resigned, dissociating itself from the central administration of President Yahya Khan. That day, a new draft resolution by the United Kingdom and France called for power to be handed over to the elected local representatives in East Pakistan. On December 15, several more draft resolutions were proposed and as the fall of Dhaka and defeat of the Pakistani military seemed imminent, the Council agreed with the Soviet Union ambassador Yakob Malik that simultaneously with cease-fire, the power must be handed over to the elected representatives in East Pakistan. No vote was taken that day on any of the resolutions.
On December 16, when the Council meeting resumed at 10:30 am, India’s foreign minister Swaran Singh made the dramatic announcement that Indian forces has captured Dhaka and as a result, India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has ordered a cease-fire. Mr. Singh quoted this statement by his Prime Minister: “Now as the Pakistani armed forces have surrendered in Bangla Desh and Bangla Desh is free, it is pointless in our view to continue the present conflict.” The next day, on December 17, President Yahya Khan also ordered a cease-fire in the West.
The last meeting of the Security Council on the conflict took place on December 21. Given the end of the conflict, a compromised resolution was promptly passed. The resolution took account of the realities of the prevailing situation, called for a durable cease-fire and cessation of hostilities in all areas of conflict, and called for international assistance in the relief of the suffering of the refugees. It also called for the safe and dignified return of refugees to their homes. Meanwhile, the same day (December 21), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the President of Pakistan and formed a new government. He also announced that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will be released immediately.
The Impact of 1971 Conflict on the United Nations
Mr. Thant argued that the 1971 conflict and Bangladesh’s birth posed some fundamental questions for the UN. First, he acknowledges that there is “absolutely no doubt about the brutal character of Pakistan’s military suppression of the Bengalis from March 25, 1971, onward — the savagery of the atrocities committed have few parallels in history.” However, given the then universally accepted doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of another state, India’s role in this grim episode was clearly a breach of international law. Thus, it raises fundamental questions about the responsibility of the international community in coping with man-made disasters, often by governments within their own country. If India is held guilty under the international law for its intervention, what should have it done, given that it had to bear the burden of 10 million refugees from its poor neighbouring state. Can non-interference be justified given the extent of human suffering? On the other hand, another school of thought argued that India’s interference made the East Pakistan disaster worse, and if India did not help the Bengali insurgents, a political settlement might have been achieved after the initial military suppression. Giving credit to India for having genuine sympathy for the suppressed Muslims in East Bengal/ Pakistan is contradictory to how India feels towards the Hindu Bengalis in West Bengal, and the reciprocal resentment of Hindu Bengalis against Delhi.
Regardless of the motivations of India or Pakistan, Mr. Thant writes that “a major victim of the war was the United Nations and the principle of international co-operation that it embodies.” This was because of the inaction of the UN despite the worsening situation in East Pakistan and the inability of the Security Council to act, despite public and private warnings by the Secretary General. The UN was severely criticized in public media during and after the conflict. The paralysis of the UN Security Council in matters of international security because of conflict between Big Powers and the dilemmas regarding the doctrine of non-intervention in cases of human suffering were brought into the forefront of the issues, the UN had to tackle.
Dealing with the issue of Bangladesh was the last responsibility of Mr. Thant as the Secretary General of the UN, as he retired soon after and his successor Mr. Kurt Waldheim of Austria was recommended by the Security Council to replace Mr. Thant, on December 21.
