Abstract

Energy is crucial to both the Russian Federation and the United States, and both countries utilize it in their foreign policy. Despite the wealth of literature arguing that sanctions are ineffective and cause more harm to the implementing economy, the United States chose to implement energy sanctions specifically targeting the Russian Federation. At the time of implementation, both countries were vying for global market dominance as the leading energy producer of both petroleum and natural gas. The study used the investment theory of party competition and the business conflict model as its theoretical base to understand the rationale to the sanction legislation.

The study explored the relationship between the U.S. energy sector and the person-vote behavior of congressional representatives relative to five Russian sanctions. This relationship was identified through the presence of personal financial interests, campaign contributions, or constituency stake in the energy sector. Panel regressions modeled this relationship using the person-vote observation as the dependent variable on a spectrum, weighted independently against both the chamber aggregate and the congressional aggregate.

The results of the study confirmed the qualitative evidence that those with ties to the energy sector are more likely to vote when it concerns the industry and oppose legislation that negatively impacts the industry. Moreover, the study demonstrated that those with ties to the energy sector are more likely to vote in favor of legislation that targets the Russian Federation’s geopolitical position insofar as it does not negatively impact domestic industry. The study represents a new application of the investment theory of party competition and the business conflict model to U.S. sanctions and the energy sector, where there is currently limited literature. The study also presents strong potential for insight into the relationship of business interests and public policy for future policy analysis and development.

Keywords: investment theory of party competition, business conflict model, sanctions, energy, Russia, campaign contributions