Delimitations and Limitations
Delimitations
For the purposes of the present study, legislation in question relating to the Russian Federation was delimited to the sample period 2012–2018 and consisted solely of the final votes for sanctions-specific bills that passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate. This delimitation was chosen due to the present study’s time constraints, since these votes were believed to be the most impactful. Non-binding resolutions were not examined because they express an opinion of the congressional body but do not bear permanent influence on U.S. public policy. Thus, the pieces of legislation examined were delimited to the following, including parallel legislation in either chamber:
● Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal Act of 2012 (H.R.6156 or Magnitsky Act), final vote as recorded on December 14, 2012;
● Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (S.2124, H.R.4152 or SSIDES), final vote as recorded on April 6, 2014;
● Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (S.2828, H.R.5859 or Ukraine Freedom Support Act), final vote as recorded on December 18, 2014;
● Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (H.R.3364 or CAATSA), final vote as recorded on August 2, 2017; and
● Export Control Reform Act of 2018 passed through the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R.5040/H.R.5515 or Export Control Reform Act), final vote as recorded for H.R.5515 on August 3, 2018.
While executive orders have been used by both the Trump and Obama administrations to target the Federation during the sample period, executive orders were not examined in the present study due to having largely been incorporated into permanent federal law through the enactment of the referenced pieces of legislation. The only critical legislative sanction that was not enacted under permanent federal law was the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (S.284), which was passed unanimously in the Senate on December 17, 2015, but died in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 18, 2016. President Trump issued EO 13818 on December 20, 2017, which implemented the Act through the executive branch instead (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2020). Thus, S.284 was not explored in the present study as it did not meet the parameters of being passed by both the House and the Senate.
The sample period 2012–2018 was chosen because the five bills vary between the explicit targeting of the Russian energy sector and not targeting the sector at all, thus providing a control sample (not energy-related):
● Magnitsky Act
● Export Control Reform Act
and a treatment sample (energy-related) for analysis:
● SSIDES
● Ukraine Freedom Support Act
● CAATSA
The sample period also spans two presidencies and four meetings of the U.S. Congress with varied political control relative to both houses and the presidency, as expressed in Table 1. This provided the ability to test for the expected amplification of sanctions support should the congressional representative be of the same political party as the sitting president.
Table 1
Political Control of the Presidency, the Senate, and the House of Representatives in the Sample Period 2012–2018
The present study analyzed the complete voting records for both congressional chambers and the personal financial holdings, campaign contributions, and constituency stakes in the energy sector for legislation authors, cosponsors, and the following (co-/vice-)chairs and ranking members of the following (sub)committees in the House of Representatives:[1]
● Agriculture Subcommittee on Conservation, Energy, and Forestry (2012, 2014);
● Agriculture Subcommittee on Commodity Exchanges, Energy, and Credit (2017–2018);
● Committee on Appropriations;
● Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies;
● Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs;
● Committee on Energy and Commerce;
● Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade (2012, 2014);
● Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power (2012, 2014);
● Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on the Environment and the Economy (2012, 2014);
● Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy (2017–2018);
● Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on the Environment (2017–2018);
● Committee on Foreign Affairs;
● Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia (2012);
● Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats (2014, 2017–2018);
● Committee on Natural Resources;
● Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources;
● Oversight Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care and Entitlements (2014);
● Oversight Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy and Environment (2017–2018);[2]
● Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment (2012);
● Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on Energy (2014, 2017–2018);
● Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on the Environment (2014, 2017–2018); and
● Small Business Subcommittee on Agriculture, Energy, and Trade.
These (sub)committees were chosen for their oversight related to the energy industry, U.S. foreign policy concerning the Russian Federation, and U.S. trade relations. Exploration in the Senate was limited to the following (sub)committees, chosen for the same reasons as those in the House of Representatives:[3]
● Agriculture Subcommittee on Rural Development and Energy (2017–2018);
● Committee on Appropriations;
● Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development;
● Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs;
● Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security;
● Committee on Energy and Natural Resources;
● Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy;
● Finance Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources, and Infrastructure;
● Committee on Foreign Relations;
● Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs (2012, 2014);
● Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation (2017–2018);
● Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection (2012, 2014);
● Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multilateral International Development, Multilateral Institutions, and International Economic, Energy, and Environmental Policy (2017–2018); and
● Foreign Relations Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management, International Operations, and Bilateral International Investment (2017–2018).
Exploration was limited to the (co-/vice-)chairs and ranking members of these (sub)committees, given the role that they play in setting the agenda for their respective (sub)committees. These (sub)committees serve as both oversight bodies and the origins of the five bills studied; thus, in addition to the authors and cosponsors, the (co-/vice-)chairs and ranking members would be expected to hold the strongest relationship with the energy industry since the expected return for any financial relationship would be most pronounced for those managing the agenda in the (sub)committees. The exploration of the personal financial holdings and campaign contributions of the (co-/vice-)chairs and ranking members of these (sub)committees was bounded by the sample period 2012–2018. Similarly, the exploration of the levels of constituency stake in the energy industry was also bounded by the sample period. The present study defined “energy” for analysis of all hypotheses as those firms and industry associations engaged in upstream activities — the exploration and production part of the energy value chain, as defined primarily by the following North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes:
● 211: Oil and gas extraction,
● 213111: Drilling oil and gas wells,
● 213112: Support activities for oil and gas operations, and
● 333132: Oil and gas machinery and equipment manufacturing.
Notable absences from this delimitation included exploration and all offshore activities, which fall under larger umbrella NAICS classifications. Organizations and industry groups involved in exploration and offshore activities were still included in the broader “energy” definition for the present study, as were firms engaged in the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry because of the potential to impact regional natural gas markets abroad, in particular in Europe. More information regarding the LNG industry and its disruption potential is discussed in the Energy Policy section of the literature review. The delimitation to just the upstream portion of the energy value chain was identified as necessary in order to explore only the financial interests of firms who would most likely have upstream interests globally and would thereby have increased risk exposure to sanctions efforts vis-à-vis firms operating in the midstream and downstream portions of the energy value chain. Additionally, firms engaged in financing the upstream sector in North America were included in the definition of “energy.” For the purposes of the present study, however, a delimitation was chosen to focus on Wells Fargo & Company (Wells Fargo) due to its largely North American-oriented energy risk exposure compared to its publicly traded counterparts, which include Citigroup Inc. (Citi) and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan Chase), which have more diversified risk exposure to global upstream activities compared to Wells Fargo. At the end of 2019, this exposure totaled $13.56b (Wells Fargo & Company, 2019). In all, these delimitations should have rendered a clear dataset with sufficient information to explore all hypotheses and provide greater clarity concerning the relationship that U.S. energy interests have on the broader political agenda focusing on Russian sanctions.
Limitations
Key limitations for the present study concerned the availability of data regarding the personal financial interests of congressional representatives in the energy sector, given that personal financial holdings are limited exclusively to what is legally mandated. While the mandate does include asset and transaction details, full disclosure of individual stockholdings for the immediate household of the congressional representative is not mandated. This limited the understanding of the extent of any financial relationship a representative may have with the energy industry and is biased against detecting support for the hypotheses. Additionally, legally mandated reporting of lobbying activity does not include the target of the lobbying effort or the specific goals, thus not permitting exploration of the lobbying efforts of the energy sector concerning the five pieces of sanctions legislation or any specific representative. The present study sought to mitigate these limitations by assuming that the only relationship between representatives and the energy sector is that which is legally required to be reported. This was not expected to render the results of the present study incomplete since this data was not previously planned for collection should it have been readily available.
References:
U.S. Congressional Research Service. (2020). U.S. sanctions on Russia (CRS Report No. R45415). Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45415.pdf.
Wells Fargo & Company. (2019). Exhibit 13 (Financials) of the 2019 Annual Report. https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/sec-filings/2019/exhibit-13.pdf.
Footnotes:
[1] (Sub)committee leadership analysis occurred in each year of sanction legislation unless otherwise noted parenthetically.
[2] The Ranking Member for the House Oversight Subcommittee on the Interior, Energy, and Environment in the period 2017–2018 was Representative Stacey Plaskett (D, USVI). As Representative Plaskett is a non-voting member of the House of Representatives, only the (Vice)Chairman of this subcommittee was included in the analysis.
[3] (Sub)committee leadership analysis occurred in each year of sanction legislation unless otherwise noted parenthetically.
