Hypothesis
Russian sanctions in the period 2012–2018 offered a clear laboratory to explore the relationship that business interests have on the broader political agenda. It is worth noting that U.S. academics and the foreign policy establishment have long held that economic sanctions are not beneficial to public policy and ultimately serve to hurt domestic interests (Haass, 1998b; Lektzian & Biglaiser, 2013). Previous sanctions against energy producers, such as Iran (Clawson, 1998; Wolfe, 2015) and Libya (Rose, 1998), did not yield positive results. Thus, two guiding exploratory questions emerged as to (a) the rationale for sanctioning the Russian Federation and (b) the rationale for targeting the Russian energy sector. The period preceding the earliest Russian sanctions in question saw the United States compete directly with the Federation for global market-share dominance in petroleum and natural gas production. This places Russian sanctions in a different category than previous sanctions targeting energy producers since Russian sanctions constituted a direct attack on a geopolitical market competitor. Thus, a third guiding exploratory question emerged as to the economic benefit to the U.S. energy sector from the development of sanctions, given the immediate exposure of at least US$1 billion (ExxonMobil Corp., 2015).
Using the investment theory of party competition (investment theory) and the business conflict model, the present study measured the correlative relationship between the personal and professional financial interests of congressional representatives in the energy sector and the development of congressional Russian sanctions in the sample period 2012–2018. Additionally, the present study measured the correlative relationship between constituency stake in the energy sector and the development of congressional Russian sanctions in the same period. This was accomplished through the following three hypotheses:
● Hypothesis 1: Congressional representatives with higher levels of personal financial interests in the energy sector will be more likely to support Russian sanctions related to energy compared to sanctions that are not,
● Hypothesis 2: Congressional representatives with higher levels of political campaign contributions from the energy sector will be more likely to support Russian sanctions related to energy compared to sanctions that are not, and
● Hypothesis 3: Congressional representatives with higher levels of constituency stake in the energy sector as measured by active energy operations, measurable levels of employment, or levels of economic stimulus in their districts, will be more likely to support Russian sanctions related to energy compared to sanctions that are not.
It was expected that this relationship would have been more pronounced if the representatives were of the same political party as the sitting president, given that the president serves as the functional leader of the party and the chief executor of foreign policy for the United States. Any influence that the energy sector would have on the legislative process would thus be amplified should a representative be of the same party as the president; theoretically, they would be supportive of the same policy platform and would want to pass legislation for their party leader to execute.
References:
Clawson, P. (1998). Iran. In R. Haass (Ed.), Economic sanctions and American diplomacy (pp. 85–106). Council on Foreign Relations.
ExxonMobil Corp. (2015). Form 10-K 2014. https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/investor-relations/investor-relations-publications-archive/ExxonMobil-2014-Form-10-K.pdf.
Haass, R. (Ed.) (1998b). Economic sanctions and American diplomacy. Council on Foreign Relations.
Lektzian, D., & Biglaiser, G. (2013). Investment, opportunity, and risk: Do U.S. sanctions deter or encourage global investment? International Studies Quarterly, 57(1), 65–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00761.x.
Rose, G. (1998). Libya. In R. Haass (Ed.), Economic sanctions and American diplomacy (pp. 129–156). Council on Foreign Relations.
Wolfe, N. C. W. (2015, April). Nuclear chain reaction: Why economic sanctions are not worth the public costs. Florida Journal of International Law, 27(1), 1–22. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fjil27&div=5&id=&page=.
