Lit Review: International Relations Theory
No analysis of U.S. foreign policy can begin without a discussion of the two dominant paradigms of international relations (IR) theory: liberalism and realism. These two schools of thought have governed U.S. public policy over the last century, with each holding sway at a particular point in time. At its base, realism believes that anarchy is the dominant natural order of the international system, thus yielding inevitable conflict (Waltz, 1979), while liberalism advocates for interdependence to move beyond conflict, which it believes does not have to be the natural order of the system (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Liberalism has multiple forms, from the vision of a new world order under President Wilson through his Fourteen Points to the militarized U.S.-led, anti-Soviet order under the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations and also to the neoliberalist U.S.-dominated global order of the post-Soviet era. In each of these examples, the principle of interdependence outweighed anarchist, individualist action.
Liberalism does not have to bring net benefits to all peoples, though, and should not be confused with positive action. Keohane and Nye (1977) are keen to note the varying forms of interdependence, such as sensitivity and vulnerability, both of which fall under the umbrella of asymmetrical interdependence, which, unlike mutual interdependence, refers to actors that differ in their levels of exposure to the other. Understanding this aspect of liberalism permits the recognition that liberal IR theory can be found in the perspectives and actions of administrations that do not always self-identify as liberalists. For example, the George W. Bush administration, which would likely never be considered as a “liberal” administration, relied on interdependence through international consensus and coalitions in its nation-building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, similar to how the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations operated.
In contrast to liberalism, realism posits that the decentralized nature of the international system thereby makes it anarchistic. Absent centralized control or management, actors seek to ensure their own survival and operate under zero-sum terms. This yields a prisoner dilemma as Waltz (1979) noted, with each actor limited to maintaining its own position, leaving no actor able to maintain the global system itself. A realist perspective thus yields Realpolitik, where actors operate in their best interests, however that looks, as the goal is self-preservation and strength (Waltz, 1979). Balance of power theory follows in this ideological lane in which actors strengthen and balance against other actors to maintain their own sovereignty in an unconscious fashion.
Waltz noted the history of great power politics in the eighteenth century as well as that of the Cold War as indicators of the anarchist global system yielding balance of power models (1979). He cited the United States’ decision to rearm after the Second World War — contrary to its stated desire — and the Soviet Union’s maintenance of its three-million-strong army and costly military research, despite the toll of the same war, as clear confirmation of balance of power theory given that both chose to strengthen themselves in an almost unconscious fashion regardless of their true desires (Waltz, 1979). It is thus not difficult to identify realist behavior in U.S. public policy historically or contemporarily. The sanctions in question for the present study bear a clear realist mark as they represent the deliberate targeting of a geopolitical market competitor at a time when the United States was seeking to strengthen its own market share in global energy, in particular that of Europe.
Foreign policy does not operate in a vacuum, however. Domestic actors and sentiment bear a significant influence on the development and implementation of foreign policy. Domestic IR theory thus argues that the domestic becomes the international. This can be seen through the influence of interest groups in the iron triangles in Washington D.C., such as those associated with the military-industrial complex. Domestic sentiment and politics transform into foreign policy through several different factors, of which one is the iron triangle, which is explained in the Investment Theory and the Business Conflict Model section of the literature review. Other factors include preference, social norms, and customs (Gourevitch, 2002). Democratically elected leaders are obligated to listen to the domestic stakeholders and typically implement their wishes on the global stage. The norms and customs of individual countries in turn shape preferences, which impact who is elected and what the specific platforms are in democratic systems (Gourevitch, 2002).
The U.S. political system thus serves as a clear application of domestic IR theory. Internal stakeholders — shaped by preferences, norms, and customs — elect both the chief executor of foreign policy, the president, and congressional representatives, who also hold foreign policy authority. These elected officials, in turn, implement policy that is rooted in domestic preferences, norms, and customs, at times written by the electorate and interest groups. Thus, the foreign policy activities of the United States are a direct extension of domestic sentiment and policy. Russian sanctions are therefore able to be considered an extension of domestic sentiment toward the Federation, and thus domestic analysis of their development, identified as a key literature gap, is critical to understanding the influence of business interests who are oftentimes the key internal stakeholders involved in shaping preferences, norms, and customs and ensuring the election of particular congressional representatives and presidents.
References:
Gourevitch, P. (2002). Domestic politics and international relations. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook on International Relations (pp. 309–328). SAGE Publications Ltd.
Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1977). Power and interdependence: World politics in transition. Little Brown.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Random House.
