Significance

Despite the prevalence of investment theory literature, there is a virtual gap in the literature concerning the influence of the energy sector on the development of public policy in the United States — with the notable exception of foreign policy toward the Mossadegh government in Iran (Abrahamian, 2013; Bayandor, 2010). Investment theory literature is not limited to a singular sector, given that one of the first pieces focused on the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Freeman, 1965), and the “father” of investment theory applied his landmark study to critical realignment elections in the twentieth century (Ferguson, 1995). However, the existing literature is heavily weighted toward the finance sector (Yu & Yu, 2011; Cohen, et al., 2013; Tahoun, 2014; Akey, 2015; Tahoun & van Lent, 2019). Alternatively, business conflict model literature is not prevalent, but the studies that have been realized are interdisciplinary, exploring the development of coalitions that impact foreign and global policy (Frieden, 1988; Gibbs, 1991; Cox, 1994; Fordham, 1998; Falkner, 2008). However, no literature exists that discusses either investment theory or the business conflict model in the context of the energy sector. Moreover, no literature exists that discusses how either investment theory or the business conflict model impact sanctions development in the United States, let alone concerning the development of U.S. sanctions targeting the Russian Federation. The literature that does exist in relation to Russian sanctions only focuses on their impact (Servettaz, 2014; Kochajdova, 2019) or their legal basis (Doraev 2015). The present study sought to expand on both investment theory and business conflict model literature by incorporating the energy sector and sanctions development. The present study also sought to expand on existing sanctions literature to include the influence of business interests on sanctions development. Additionally, the present study sought to broaden energy policy literature to discuss the impact of the industry on Russo-American foreign policy.

References:

Abrahamian, E. (2013). The coup: 1953, the CIA, and the roots of modern U.S.-Iranian relations. The New Press.

Akey, P. (2015). Valuing changes in political networks: Evidence from campaign contributions to close congressional elections. Review of Financial Studies, 28(11), 3188–3223. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv035.

Bayandor, D. (2010). Iran and the CIA: The fall of Mosaddeq revisited. Palgrave McMillan.

Cohen, L., Diether, K., & Malloy, C. (2013). Legislating stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(3), 574–595. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.012.

Cox, R. W. (1994). Power and profits: U.S. policy in Central America. University Press of Kentucky.

Doraev, M. (2015). The “memory effect” of economic sanctions against Russia: Opposing approaches to the legality of unilateral sanctions clash again. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 37(1), 355–419. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/7/.

Falkner, R. (2008). Business power and conflict in international environmental politics. Palgrave Macmillan.

Ferguson, T. (1995). Golden rule: the investment theory of party competition and the logic of money-driven political systems. University of Chicago Press.

Fordham, B. (1998). Building the Cold War consensus: The political economy of U.S. national security policy, 1949–51. University of Michigan Press.

Freeman, J. L. (1965). The political process: Executive bureau-legislative committee relations. Random House.

Frieden, J. (1988). Sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy, 1914–1940. International Organization, 42(1), 59–90. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706770.

Gibbs, D. N. (1991). The political economy of third world intervention: Mines, money, and U.S. policy in the Congo Crisis. University of Chicago Press.

Kochajdova, M. (2019). Western sanctions: The impact on Russia’s oil and gas sector. Geopolitics of Energy, 41(4), 2–8.

Servettaz, E. (2014). A sanctions primer: What happens to the targeted? World Affairs, 177(2), 82–89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43556206.

Tahoun, A. (2014). The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors. Journal of Financial Economics, 111(1), 86–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.008.

Tahoun, A., & van Lent, L. (2019). The personal wealth interests of politicians and government intervention in the economy. Review of Finance, 23(1), 37–74. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfy015.

Yu, F., & Yu, X. (2011). Corporate lobbying and fraud detection. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, (46)6, 1865–1891. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41409670.